Take-Aways (AI)
  • The Artic­le 29 Working Par­ty inter­prets Art. 22 GDPR strict­ly: AEFE with legal or com­pa­ra­ble effects gene­ral­ly pro­hi­bi­ted, excep­ti­ons narrow.
  • Per­mit­ted excep­ti­ons accor­ding to Art. 22 para. 2 only in case of con­trac­tu­al neces­si­ty, legal aut­ho­rizati­on or express consent.
  • Tho­se respon­si­ble must inform tho­se affec­ted and grant them the right to esca­la­te to a human decision.
  • Swiss E‑DSG is more libe­ral: AEFE not pro­hi­bi­ted; only obli­ga­ti­on to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on and right of escala­ti­on required.

The Artic­le 29 Working Group has issued an invi­ta­ti­on dated Octo­ber 3, 2017 Gui­dance on auto­ma­ted indi­vi­du­al (case) decis­i­ons (AEFE) published in draft form. Inte­re­sted par­ties can com­ment on the draft until Novem­ber 27, 2017.

AEFE requi­re­ments

In addi­ti­on to expl­ana­ti­ons of the terms used, e.g. pro­fil­ing, the gui­de con­ta­ins expl­ana­ti­ons of Art. 22 GDPR. The Working Par­ty inter­prets Art. 22(1) GDPR as pro­hi­bi­ting AEFE if they have legal or other com­pa­ra­ble effects on the data sub­ject. A justi­fi­ca­ti­on of such AEFE is only pos­si­ble in the con­text of Art. 22(2) GDPR, i.e., in the strict inter­pre­ta­ti­on of the Working Party,

  • in the event of strict neces­si­ty for the con­clu­si­on or ful­fill­ment of a Con­tract with the data sub­ject (e.g.: cre­dit assessment);
  • at legal Aut­ho­rizati­on or obli­ga­ti­on (wher­eby only the law of the EU or of a mem­ber sta­te is likely to be in question);
  • with express Con­sent.

The other grounds for justi­fi­ca­ti­on are exclu­ded in this rea­ding, in par­ti­cu­lar the legi­ti­ma­te inte­rests of the controller.

Even if the AEFE is admis­si­ble, the respon­si­ble par­ty is obli­ged to inform the data sub­ject about the AEFE and to grant him or her a right of escala­ti­on. In other words, the data sub­ject has the right to make the AEFE a human decis­i­on again.

Becau­se of the­se strict requi­re­ments, the que­sti­on of when an AEFE has legal or com­pa­ra­ble effects comes into focus. Here, too, the working group takes a strict stance. As Examp­les of legal effects calls them

  • Rest­ric­tions on fun­da­men­tal rights, such as free­dom of assembly;
  • a chan­ge in a legal posi­ti­on or in con­trac­tu­al rights;
  • deci­ding on sta­tu­to­ry entit­le­ments, e.g. housing allo­wan­ces (men­tio­ning also the gran­ting of such entitlements);
  • the refu­sal of entry;
  • the decis­i­on on inve­sti­ga­ti­ve or super­vi­so­ry mea­su­res by authorities;
  • the inter­rup­ti­on of tele­com­mu­ni­ca­ti­ons ser­vices due to a delay in payment.

Com­pa­ra­ble other effects (posi­ti­ve or nega­ti­ve) if they have the poten­ti­al to influence the Cir­cum­stances, signi­fi­cant­ly affect a person’s beha­vi­or or choices. Howe­ver, it is dif­fi­cult to app­ly this thres­hold. For exam­p­le, not every deni­al of a bene­fit has “sub­stan­ti­al” effects. For exam­p­le, refu­sing to rent a bicy­cle during the vaca­ti­ons does not have a signi­fi­cant impact; refu­sing a mor­tga­ge would be different.

Ano­ther inte­re­st­ing and poten­ti­al­ly far-rea­ching exam­p­le is that, under cer­tain cir­cum­stances, the tar­ge­ted adver­ti­sing (“tar­ge­ted adver­ti­sing”) have signi­fi­cant effects. The cir­cum­stances of the indi­vi­du­al case are decisi­ve for this, for exam­p­le the following:

  • the scope of profiling;
  • the expec­ta­ti­ons and wis­hes of the per­son concerned;
  • the way of advertising;
  • any par­ti­cu­lar vul­nerabi­li­ty of the per­sons concerned.

As an exam­p­le of adver­ti­sing with a signi­fi­cant impact, the working group cites adver­ti­sing for online sweepsta­kes that is repea­ted­ly shown to a per­son in debt.

The appli­ca­ti­on of dif­fe­ren­tia­ted pri­ces could also poten­ti­al­ly have a signi­fi­cant impact, name­ly if someone is unable to use cer­tain ser­vices due to pro­hi­bi­tively high prices.

Pro­fil­ing requirements

Pro­fil­ing is not inclu­ded as an inde­pen­dent ele­ment. Art. 22 GDPR only men­ti­ons it as a pos­si­ble – but not man­da­to­ry – ele­ment of AEFE. Howe­ver, Reci­tal 71 sta­tes that pro­fil­ing out­side of AEFE must also com­ply with requi­re­ments based on gene­ral principles:

[…] the data con­trol­ler should sui­ta­ble mathe­ma­ti­cal or sta­tis­ti­cal methods use for pro­fil­ing, take tech­ni­cal and orga­nizatio­nal mea­su­res to ensu­re in an appro­pria­te man­ner, in par­ti­cu­lar, that fac­tors lea­ding to inac­cu­ra­te per­so­nal data are cor­rec­ted and the risk of errors is mini­mi­zed, and […] pre­vent any dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on against natu­ral per­sons on grounds of racial or eth­nic ori­gin, poli­ti­cal opi­ni­on, reli­gi­on or belief, trade uni­on mem­ber­ship, gene­tic make­up or health sta­tus, and sexu­al ori­en­ta­ti­on. dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry effects […] comes […].

Regu­la­ti­on in Switz­er­land (E‑DSG)

The regu­la­ti­on pro­po­sed in Switz­er­land is sub­stan­ti­al­ly libe­ral. AEFE with legal or com­pa­ra­ble effects are not pro­hi­bi­ted; the data sub­ject must only be infor­med – befo­re or after the AEFE – and has the right to esca­la­te the AEFE to a human being. Con­se­quent­ly, the con­nec­tion with a con­tract or the expli­cit con­sent are also not note­wor­t­hy as justi­fi­ca­ti­on; they only omit – unli­ke under the GDPR – the spe­cial requi­re­ments (infor­ma­ti­on and escalation).