BayL­DA: 10th Acti­vi­ty Report 2020

In July, the Bava­ri­an Sta­te Office for Data Pro­tec­tion Super­vi­si­on (BayL­DA) published its Acti­vi­ty report for the year 2020 (annu­al report­ing pur­su­ant to Art. 59 GDPR). In this report, the BayL­DA pro­vi­des infor­ma­ti­on on the num­ber of com­plaints, con­sul­ta­ti­ons and noti­fi­ca­ti­ons as well as its opi­ni­on on indi­vi­du­al topics. Indi­vi­du­al refe­ren­ces (sel­ec­tion) can be found below:

Com­plaints, con­sul­ta­ti­ons and notifications

The num­ber of com­plaints and con­trol requests con­tin­ued to grow in the fourth year under the GDPR, alt­hough not as stron­gly as in the pre­vious year.

The num­ber of con­sul­ta­ti­ons has fal­len in rela­ti­on to the pre­vious year. This can be explai­ned by the con­ti­nuous expan­si­on of the BayDLA’s online infor­ma­ti­on, inclu­ding on cur­rent topics such as the pandemic.

The num­ber of data pri­va­cy breach noti­fi­ca­ti­ons decrea­sed slight­ly com­pared to the pre­vious year, but remains at a high level.

Coro­na­vi­rus pandemic

The coll­ec­tion of cont­act data by pri­va­te indi­vi­du­als requi­res a legal basis under data pro­tec­tion law in accordance with Art. 6 of the GDPR. At first glan­ce, this appears to be unpro­ble­ma­tic, as the pri­va­te indi­vi­du­als con­cer­ned are legal­ly obli­ged to coll­ect data (Art. 6 (1) (c) GDPR). Howe­ver, this legal obli­ga­ti­on can chan­ge con­stant­ly – like other mea­su­res to com­bat the pan­de­mic. If a legal obli­ga­ti­on is remo­ved, the­re is no legal basis. In any case, the BayL­DA does not accept public inte­rests as an alter­na­ti­ve legal basis (Art. 6 (1) (e)) (p. 19):

In the mean­ti­me, the prac­ti­ce of com­pe­ti­ti­on and trai­ning in recrea­tio­nal sports was also per­mit­ted to a cer­tain ext­ent in 2020, alt­hough cont­act data coll­ec­tion was not man­da­to­ry, but only sub­ject to the requi­re­ment that per­sons with typi­cal COVID-19 dise­a­se sym­ptoms were to be denied access to sports faci­li­ties. In such and other cases in which the coll­ec­tion of cont­act data was or is not legal­ly requi­red, it must not take place becau­se the­re is no legal basis for this under data pro­tec­tion law. If the­re is no expli­cit legal obli­ga­ti­on to coll­ect cont­act data, this can­not be based on Artic­le 6 (1) (e) of the GDPR, becau­se in the absence of an expli­cit legal obli­ga­ti­on, it can­not be assu­med that the coll­ec­tion takes place in the con­text of the per­for­mance of a task in the public interest.

On the sub­ject of access con­trols, the BayL­DA reminds us of pro­por­tio­na­li­ty and, in par­ti­cu­lar, sui­ta­bi­li­ty (p. 20):

One com­pa­ny wan­ted to requi­re cus­to­mers to show the Coro­na war­ning app as part of access con­trol. We also asses­sed this as inad­mis­si­ble under data pro­tec­tion law. The app only dis­play­ed “risk encoun­ters” (in the report­ing peri­od), but this infor­ma­ti­on does not pro­vi­de suf­fi­ci­ent evi­dence of infec­tion with SARS-CoV2, so that the pro­ce­s­sing of this infor­ma­ti­on can no more be con­side­red “neces­sa­ry” in the sen­se of the company’s legi­ti­ma­te inte­rests [than taking a tem­pe­ra­tu­re using a ther­mo­me­ter or ther­mal ima­ging cameras].

Fur­ther­mo­re, the BayL­DA refers to the Ori­en­ta­ti­on gui­de “Video con­fe­ren­cing systems of the Con­fe­rence of Fede­ral and Sta­te Data Pro­tec­tion Aut­ho­ri­ties (DSK) and to the “Check­list on data pro­tec­tion regu­la­ti­ons for home offices”. of the BayL­DA (we have reports).

Goog­le Analytics

As alre­a­dy men­tio­ned in the last acti­vi­ty report (we have reports), the BayL­DA repri­man­ds the acti­va­ti­on of Goog­le Ana­ly­tics on web­sites even befo­re acti­ve con­sent is given. The Decis­i­on of the DSK on the use of Goog­le Ana­ly­tics fur­ther cla­ri­fy that the shor­tening of the IP address by adding the func­tion “_anonymizeIp()” to the track­ing code is mere­ly a secu­ri­ty mea­su­re and does not result in the com­ple­te data pro­ce­s­sing being anonymized.

Apple came­ra rides

Due to Apple’s branch office in Munich, the BayL­DA is respon­si­ble for Apple came­ra dri­ves car­ri­ed out in Ger­ma­ny. It asses­ses the­se accor­ding to the Decis­i­on of the DSK on pri­or objec­tions to (Goog­le) Street­View and com­pa­ra­ble ser­vices.

The BayL­DA has appar­ent­ly urged Apple to pro­vi­de not only a cont­act opti­on on the Inter­net, but also by mail (p. 29):

It must be pos­si­ble to file the request for non-dis­clo­sure pur­su­ant to Artic­le 17 (1) of the GDPR and the objec­tion pur­su­ant to Artic­le 21 of the GDPR both online and by mail. The­se rights must be expli­ci­t­ly poin­ted out.

Schrems-II

The BayL­DA empha­si­zes that the con­clu­si­on of the new stan­dard con­trac­tu­al clau­ses does not pro­vi­de a “simp­le solu­ti­on” to the pro­blem iden­ti­fi­ed by the ECJ in the Schrems II ruling (RS C‑311/18 of 16.07.2020). The data export­er must actual­ly com­ply with the veri­fi­ca­ti­on obli­ga­ti­on set out in the clau­ses. It must check whe­ther aut­ho­ri­ties of the third coun­try could pos­si­bly access the data to an ext­ent that goes bey­ond what is accep­ta­ble under EU law. Here, the BayL­DA envi­sa­ges the fol­lo­wing pro­ce­du­re (p. 47):

We expect com­pa­nies and other enti­ties that trans­fer per­so­nal data to third count­ries to con­duct and docu­ment the abo­ve review. We have alre­a­dy recei­ved a num­ber of com­plaints about trans­fers to third count­ries, and we are obli­ged to inve­sti­ga­te each of the­se com­plaints. We then requi­re the data export­er to pro­vi­de evi­dence of the audit, in par­ti­cu­lar of the access pos­si­bi­li­ties of the aut­ho­ri­ties in the third coun­try, and that the data enjoys a level of pro­tec­tion com­pa­ra­ble to the EU level of pro­tec­tion, even in view of the­se access pos­si­bi­li­ties. If the com­pa­ny can­not pro­ve this, we are gene­ral­ly obli­ged to pro­hi­bit the trans­fer – unless the com­pa­ny wai­ves this of its own accord.

Dis­clo­sure of tenant cont­act data

In the area of tenant data pro­tec­tion, the BayL­DA pro­vi­des a good exam­p­le of the fact that it is not always neces­sa­ry to choo­se the mil­der means of achie­ving the pur­po­se, but only if this mil­der means is equal­ly sui­ta­ble for achie­ving the pur­po­se (p. 64):

[The dis­clo­sure of a tenant’s cont­act data by a land­lord to a craft­sman] is, at least as a rule, also per­mis­si­ble wit­hout the tenant’s con­sent on the basis of Artic­le 6 (1) (f) of the GDPR becau­se it is in the landlord’s legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest that the craft­sman cont­acts the tenant in order to arran­ge a repair appoint­ment. It would also be conceiva­ble that the trades­man exclu­si­ve­ly gives the land­lord one or more sui­ta­ble dates from his point of view, and the land­lord tries to coor­di­na­te the­se with the tenant and then gives the trades­man cor­re­spon­ding feed­back. Expe­ri­ence shows, howe­ver, that it is often not easy to coor­di­na­te dates wit­hout being in direct cont­act with each other. The­r­e­fo­re, from our point of view, it is basi­cal­ly legi­ti­ma­te for the land­lord to enable direct cont­act by pas­sing on the tele­pho­ne num­ber to the tradesman.

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