Bez­Ger ZH (1.6.2018, CG160047): Pas­si­ve legi­ti­ma­cy of search engi­ne for deep links affirmed

The district court has dis­missed the lawsu­it of a depu­ty cli­nic direc­tor against a search engi­ne ope­ra­tor – pre­su­ma­b­ly Goog­le – with which Goog­le was to be forced to dele­te links to nega­ti­ve con­tri­bu­ti­ons. The first point in dis­pu­te was the pas­si­ve legi­ti­ma­cy of the search engi­ne ope­ra­tor, i.e., whe­ther the Dis­play of a direct link to inf­rin­ging con­tent in a search engi­ne alre­a­dy con­sti­tu­tes “coope­ra­ti­on” within the mea­ning of Art. 28 para. 1 ZGB repres­ents (Link: Swiss­lex). Accor­ding to infor­ma­ti­on from the district court, the ver­dict is final.

The BGer has ans­we­red this que­sti­on in the Judgment 5A_658/2014 i.S. Hirsch­mann but not ans­we­red, becau­se it only dealt with gene­ral links, not direct links (deep links) to inf­rin­ging con­tent (E. 4.2):

The Com­mer­cial Court must be agreed that it is not suf­fi­ci­ent for par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on in the sen­se descri­bed if the web­site of a medi­um ope­ra­ted by respon­dent 1 or the web­site of respon­dent 1 its­elf con­ta­ins a gene­ral link to the web­site of a news­pa­per or a radio sta­ti­on which is con­trol­led (in terms of cor­po­ra­te law and eco­no­my) by respon­dent 1. Such a “link” is too unspe­ci­fic to be able to cau­se, enable or favor the inf­rin­ge­ment by a spe­ci­fic media report. Whe­ther the legal situa­ti­on would have to be asses­sed dif­fer­ent­ly if respon­dent 1 had pla­ced spe­ci­fic links to the sued media reports of Radio 24 and/or the Thur­gau­er Zei­tung on its own web­site or on the web­site of a press pro­duct published by it can be left open.

The Bez­Ger affirms the pas­si­ve legi­ti­ma­cy of the ope­ra­tor for a direct link to con­tent that vio­la­tes per­so­nal rights, essen­ti­al­ly becau­se of the importance of search engi­nes in pro­vi­ding infor­ma­ti­on and becau­se pas­si­ve legi­ti­ma­cy is con­side­red rea­sonable in view of the com­mer­cial inte­rests of the operator:

6.2.8 The fede­ral court juris­pru­dence regar­ding the term ‘par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on’ can be descri­bed as broad; in par­ti­cu­lar, it suf­fices to ‘Favo­ri­tism’ of an inf­rin­ge­ment of per­so­na­li­ty. Thus, in par­ti­cu­lar, the per­son who con­tri­bu­tes to the trans­mis­si­on of dis­pu­ted state­ments wit­hout hims­elf being the direct aut­hor or kno­wing their con­tent or aut­hor can be held responsible […].

6.2.9 Search engi­ne ope­ra­tors play a key role in making infor­ma­ti­on on the Inter­net acce­s­si­ble to a wide ran­ge of users. Wit­hout search engi­nes, much of the infor­ma­ti­on would be dif­fi­cult to find for a lar­ge part of the public. They have a signi­fi­cant influence on the findabili­ty of artic­les (inclu­ding tho­se that vio­la­te per­so­nal rights). In view of the Mea­ning, which search engi­nes in the dis­se­mi­na­ti­on of infor­ma­ti­on can­not be con­clu­ded that they would not pro­mo­te their dis­se­mi­na­ti­on by spe­ci­fic links to con­tri­bu­ti­ons of web­sites that inf­rin­ge per­so­nal rights. The pas­si­ve legi­ti­ma­ti­on is con­se­quent­ly to be affirmed […].

6.2.10 In addi­ti­on, the defen­dant, by ope­ra­ting a search engi­ne com­mer­cial inte­rests through adver­ti­se­ments which is not dis­pu­ted by the defen­dant. The­re is the­r­e­fo­re no appa­rent rea­son why search engi­nes should be fun­da­men­tal­ly reli­e­ved of their respon­si­bi­li­ty under civil law, espe­ci­al­ly sin­ce the defen­dant its­elf also pro­vi­des the opti­on of sub­mit­ting dele­ti­on requests or having infor­ma­ti­on remo­ved from the search engi­ne, ther­eby pro­vi­ding a cer­tain con­tent check even does it hims­elf. It should also be noted that legal action can be taken against con­tent that vio­la­tes per­so­nal pri­va­cy on for­eign pro­vi­ders can be asso­cia­ted with con­sidera­ble dif­fi­cul­ties. In the­se cases, the only effec­ti­ve means of legal pro­tec­tion to pre­vent a vio­la­ti­on of pri­va­cy would often be to have the search engi­nes put into law.

On the merits, howe­ver, the District Court dis­mis­ses the action becau­se the ope­ra­tor does not adopt the media reports in dis­pu­te as its own and becau­se the inte­rest in infor­ma­ti­on pre­vails.:

6.3.8 In the pre­sent case, it is a mat­ter of inter­pre­ting the results of inve­sti­ga­ti­ons. The fact that the cri­ti­ci­zed pas­sa­ges in the three reports pro­ve to be vio­la­ting per­so­nal rights is the­r­e­fo­re not obvious. In view of this and in app­re­cia­ti­on of the inte­rests descri­bed, the weig­hing in the pre­sent case is to the dis­ad­van­ta­ge of the plain­ti­ff. This means that even if the three artic­les in dis­pu­te were to be qua­li­fi­ed as vio­la­ting per­so­nal rights – which can be left open – the vio­la­ti­on would not be unlawful within the mea­ning of Art. 28 para. 2 of the Ger­man Civil Code. ZGBas can be seen from the fol­lo­wing considerations.

6.3.9 It is true that the dis­se­mi­na­ti­on of untrue facts that vio­la­te per­so­nal rights is, in prin­ci­ple, always unlawful (BGE 138 III 641 Rec. 4.1.2; BGE 129 III 49 Rec. 2.2). Thus, in con­nec­tion with unlawful state­ments by third par­ties through media pro­fes­sio­nals, the Fede­ral Court has alre­a­dy held that the dis­se­mi­na­ti­on of unlawful state­ments by a medi­um can be lawful under cer­tain cir­cum­stances. This is to be assu­med in par­ti­cu­lar if the third-par­ty state­ment is pre­sen­ted com­ple­te­ly and truthful­ly (objec­tively cor­rect repro­duc­tion), is mark­ed as such and does not appear as the ori­gi­nal opi­ni­on of the dis­se­mi­na­tor to a cer­tain ext­ent show­ing the own view (reco­gnizable dis­so­cia­ti­on) and the know­ledge of it is of value for the rea­der (infor­ma­ti­on inte­rest). Pra­zel­ler also wants this case law to be applied to ope­ra­tors of news web­sites if social media con­tent is included […].

6.3.10 […]. An objec­tively cor­rect repro­duc­tion of the reports is gua­ran­teed, becau­se when clicking on the link, a for­war­ding to the web­site of the ‘C.’ takes place, from which the con­tents are retrie­ved. Ther­eby also a reco­gnizable dis­so­cia­ti­on of the search engi­ne ope­ra­tor to the con­tents on the web page of the ‘C.’ takes place. Then an inte­rest in infor­ma­ti­on can be affirm­ed for the rea­sons alre­a­dy sta­ted. Even if the report­ing con­tai­ned untrue ele­ments, this would be accep­ta­ble as an excep­ti­on within the mea­ning of the cited case law – given the descri­bed invol­vement of the defen­dant with its search engi­ne – in view of the weig­hing of inte­rests car­ri­ed out in the pre­sent case, espe­ci­al­ly if effec­ti­ve legal pro­tec­tion opti­ons are available against the media com­pa­ny in que­sti­on or against the authorship.

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