BGE 140 V 464: Inhe­ri­ta­bi­li­ty of the right to infor­ma­ti­on; limi­ta­ti­on to pur­po­ses reco­gnized by data pro­tec­tion law

In the pre­sent decis­i­on, the Fede­ral Supre­me Court comm­ents as fol­lows on the right to infor­ma­ti­on under DPA 8: 

Fur­ther­mo­re, the com­plainant claims that she has the right to inspect the files based on Art. 8 FADP in con­junc­tion with Art. 560 Para. Art. 560 para. 2 CC. This can­not be fol­lo­wed. Con­tra­ry to the view of the com­plainant, the right to infor­ma­ti­on under data pro­tec­tion law pur­su­ant to Art. 8 DPA does not pass to the heirs (HÄUPTLI, loc. cit., n. 16a to Art. 560 ZGB; ROSENTHAL/JÖHRI, in: Hand­kom­men­tar zum Daten­schutz­ge­setz, 2008, n. 5 to Art. 8 DSG). In any case, the right under data pro­tec­tion law applies (only) to the ext­ent that it cor­re­sponds to the rele­vant objec­ti­ves. The right to infor­ma­ti­on under Art. 8 DPA is inten­ded to enable the data sub­ject to exer­cise his or her other data pro­tec­tion rights (BGE 139 V 492 E. 3.2 p. 494 with refe­ren­ces). This must also app­ly to Art. 1 of the Ordi­nan­ce of 14 June 1993 to the Fede­ral Act on Data Pro­tec­tion (VDSG; SR 235.11), which regu­la­tes the moda­li­ties of the right to infor­ma­ti­on. The complainant’s request is based exclu­si­ve­ly on the pur­su­it of a cla­im under inhe­ri­tance law. In view of this objec­ti­ve, which does not cor­re­spond to that of the FADP, the com­plainant can­not invo­ke the right to infor­ma­ti­on under data pro­tec­tion law. In this initi­al situa­ti­on, it can be left open whe­ther para. 7 of this ordi­nan­ce pro­vi­si­on, which deals, among other things, with the pro­vi­si­on of infor­ma­ti­on to clo­se rela­ti­ves of decea­sed per­sons, is lawful (cri­ti­cal of this: HÄUPTLI, loc. cit., n. 16a on Art. 560 ZGB; MAURER-LAMBROU/KUNZ, in: Bas­ler Kom­men­tar, Daten­schutz­ge­setz, 3rd ed. 2014, n. 6 on Art. 2 DSG; PHILIPPE MEIER, Pro­tec­tion des don­nées, 2011, p. 177).

The Fede­ral Supre­me Court thus not only sta­tes that the right to infor­ma­ti­on is not inhe­ri­ta­ble. Rather, it rei­te­ra­tes the prin­ci­ples also found in BGE 139 V 492 that the right to infor­ma­ti­on under data pro­tec­tion law only applies to the ext­ent that it cor­re­sponds to the rele­vant objectives. 

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