- The Federal Supreme Court determines that the exclusion under Art. 3 para. 1 let. a BGÖ is to be interpreted restrictively: only documents that are precisely part of the case file in the narrower sense are excluded.
- Loose documents or documents created outside of a court order generally remain public; in this specific case there was no intrinsic connection, access was granted.
In its French-language judgment, the Federal Supreme Court 1C_367/2020 (intended for official publication) on the material scope of application of the Federal Act on Civil Procedure: The ground for exclusion of procedural documents under Art. 3 para. 1 subpara. a Federal Act on Civil Procedure must be interpreted restrictively. Accordingly, a loose connection to a proceeding is not sufficient. Rather, the documents must be “précisément la procédure au sens strict” concern.
The subject of the dispute in this judgment of January 12, 2021 was an audit report on two subsidized companies in the shipping and catering sector. A journalist had requested access to the document while criminal and civil proceedings were still pending against the directors. Out of consideration for these ongoing proceedings, the Neuchâtel cantonal court had denied the jurisdiction of the cantonal data protection commissioner.
The basis for this decision was the Intercantonal agreement between the cantons of Jura and Neuchâtel of 8 and 9 May 2012 on data protection and the principle of publicity (CPDT-JUNE, cf. BBl 2013 619). This represents in Art. 69 par. 1 first establishes the principle that every person has the right to inspect official documents (cf. Art. 6 para. 1 FSIO). This excludes, as under Art. 3 para. 1 let. a FSIO, documents relating to ongoing proceedings:
“L’accès aux documents officiels ayant trait aux procédures et arbitrages pendants est régi par les dispositions de procédure.” (Art. 69 par. 2 CPDT-JUNE)
The Federal Supreme Court focused on the question of what is meant by “ayant trait aux” (or “concernant” in Art. 3(1)(a) FCO). In doing so, it essentially relied on the Federal Council’s dispatch on the Federal Act on the Protection of Intellectual Property, which states:
“Access to documents containing the information specified in Article 3 [Paragraph 1] a) shall be governed by the applicable procedural laws. Documents that have a further connection with such proceedings but do not have a Entry into the procedural files in the narrower sense on the other hand, are in principle accessible under the Publicity Act. The protection of the free formation of opinion and will of a public authority applies in such a case if the publication of an official document is is likely to influence the course of pending proceedings or preparatory acts.” (BBl 2003 1963; s. FF 2003 1850)
In order to defuse the underlying conflict between the principle of publicity and the orderly course of proceedings, the Federal Supreme Court undertook a triage:
“d’une part, entre les documents élaborés en dehors d’une procédure judiciaire (et pas non plus explicitement en vue d’une telle procédure) et, d’autre part, les documents qui ont été ordonnés expressément dans le cadre d’une procédure judiciaire (par exemple un échange d’écritures ou une expertise mise en œuvre par les autorités judiciaires). C’est seulement pour ces derniers que le principe de la transparence ne s’applique pasles autres documents demeurent accessibles en vertu du principe de la transparence […]. Les termes ‘ayant trait […] et ‘concernant […] se comprennent ainsi comme visant des documents qui concernent précisément la procédure au sens strict (actes qui émanent des autorités judiciaires ou de poursuite ou qui ont été ordonnés par elles) et non ceux qui peuvent se trouver dans le dossier de procédure au sens large.” (E. 3.4)
Particularly in the case of mere evidence without a close connection to the contested decision or the subject matter of the dispute, no ground for exclusion applies. Otherwise, only loosely connected proceedings could be used as a black box, so to speak, in order to exclude a document from the scope of application of the agreement or the Federal Code of Civil Procedure.
In the present case, the Federal Supreme Court denied an intrinsic connection between the requested document and the ongoing proceedings (“aucun lien intrinsèque”, E. 3.5). It upheld the appeal and referred the case back to the Neuchâtel Council of State for reassessment.