BGer 2C_1039/2018: “indis­pensable” WEKO files.

The can­ton of Aar­gau recei­ves Insight into WEKO inve­sti­ga­ti­ons against two cons­truc­tion com­pa­nies. This was deci­ded by the Fede­ral Supre­me Court on March 18, 2021 (BGer 2C_1039/2018, 2C_1052/2018; the same in the basic con­side­ra­ti­ons: BGer 2C_1040/2018, 2C_1051/2018). In a five-judge panel and with unusual­ly strong words, it over­tur­ned the decis­i­on of the Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court. The lat­ter had made the inspec­tion con­di­tio­nal on the sanc­tion pro­ce­e­dings having been con­clu­ded and a vio­la­ti­on of anti­trust law having been established.

At the out­set, the Weko had fined 18 com­pa­nies for par­ti­ci­pa­ting in com­pe­ti­ti­on agree­ments in road cons­truc­tion and civil engi­nee­ring. Sub­se­quent­ly, the can­ton of Aar­gau reque­sted access to the files of the pro­ce­e­dings in order to cla­ri­fy claims for dama­ges and, if neces­sa­ry, to exclude com­pa­nies from sub­mis­si­ons. The Weko par­ti­al­ly appro­ved the request. Two com­pa­nies suc­cessful­ly appea­led to the Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court.

The core of the dis­pu­te was Art. 19 para. 1 let. a FADP. Accor­ding to this, fede­ral bodies may dis­c­lo­se per­so­nal data if the­se “for the recei­ver indis­pensable in indi­vi­du­al cases for the ful­fill­ment of its sta­tu­to­ry task are”. Based on this, the Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court had found the data dis­pensable for two considerations:

In sum­ma­ry, the Legal force of the sanc­tion order (or a judgment repla­cing it) as a neces­sa­ry con­di­ti­on to be able to exami­ne the cri­ter­ion of indis­pensa­bi­li­ty at all. Next, it is neces­sa­ry that at least one Inf­rin­ge­ment of anti­trust law estab­lished other­wi­se the asser­ti­on of a cla­im for dama­ges appears to be so unli­kely that a pur­po­seful use of the data can alre­a­dy be exclu­ded with suf­fi­ci­ent cer­tain­ty in the admi­ni­stra­ti­ve assi­stance pro­ce­e­dings.

(BVGer A‑604/2018, E. 8.5; simi­lar­ly BVGer A‑592/2018, E. 9.5)

The Fede­ral Supre­me Court meti­cu­lous­ly dis­sec­ted Art. 19 (1) (a) DPA into its com­pon­ents and explai­ned what is meant in this respect by “data” (E. 4.2), “reci­pi­en­ts” (E. 5.2), the “ful­fill­ment of legal tasks” (E. 5.3) and their “indis­pensa­bi­li­ty” (E. 5.4). On the last point, it beca­me very clear: the lower court had “an inad­mis­si­ble posi­ti­on” taken, “over­look essen­ti­al aspects”, other aspects “mithout a word men­tio­ned” and its­elf “impro­per­ly sub­sti­tu­ted both for the Can­ton of Aar­gau and for the Civil Court” (E. 5.4.8.2).

Mate­ri­al­ly, the Fede­ral Supre­me Court ruled that requests for inspec­tion under Art. 19(1)(a) DPA neither the ent­ry into force of the law nor the fin­ding of a vio­la­ti­on of anti­trust law (E. 5.4.8.1). In addi­ti­on to syste­ma­tic and con­sti­tu­tio­nal argu­ments, it also put for­ward a prac­ti­cal one:

The lower court, with its case law accor­ding to which access to data can only be gran­ted once the sanc­tion pro­ce­e­dings have been legal­ly con­clu­ded, also puts the can­ton of Aar­gau from the risk that its poten­ti­al claims will beco­me time-bar­red.” (E. 5.4.8.3)

In view of the­se limi­ta­ti­on peri­ods and the length of the pro­ce­e­dings to date, the Fede­ral Supre­me Court deci­ded on the merits of the case its­elf (E. 6.1), upheld the appeal and essen­ti­al­ly con­firm­ed the decis­i­on of the Com­pe­ti­ti­on Com­mis­si­on (E. 9.1). In con­trast to the lower court, which had con­duc­ted the pro­ce­e­dings anony­mously upon request, it also inclu­ded the name of the respon­dent in the hea­ding as usu­al and dis­pen­sed with an anony­mi­zed judgment order (E. 8).

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