BGer (4A_105/2024): Justi­fi­ca­ti­on of the con­tract (pro­cu­re­ment of infor­ma­ti­on in the tenancy)

The Fede­ral Supre­me Court made a mar­gi­nal state­ment on a data pro­tec­tion issue in a ten­an­cy law dis­pu­te (4A_105/2024 of August 19, 2024). The case con­cer­ned a com­plaint that had been suc­cessful befo­re the OGer ZH that a chan­ge to a ren­tal agree­ment for a muni­ci­pal apart­ment – the plain­ti­ff would have ear­ned too much with this chan­ge to be able to remain a tenant of the apart­ment – should be annul­led as inva­lid or abu­si­ve. The BGer upheld the appeal, thus pro­tec­ting the amendment.

Part of the amend­ment was a clau­se on the obli­ga­ti­on to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on and an aut­ho­rizati­on to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on so that the land­lord can obtain the neces­sa­ry infor­ma­ti­on, which the BGer con­siders to be legi­ti­ma­te, also from a data pro­tec­tion point of view:

The coll­ec­tion and pro­ce­s­sing of data is also lawful under the pro­vi­si­ons of fede­ral data pro­tec­tion law. The­re is a justi­fi­ca­ti­on accor­ding to Art. 31 para. 2 lit. a FADP exists. The data pro­ce­s­sing is neces­sa­ry in direct con­nec­tion with the exe­cu­ti­on of the con­tract and is the­r­e­fo­re in the over­ri­ding inte­rest of the com­plainant […]. […] It is irrele­vant whe­ther the­re is a gene­ral duty to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on bet­ween con­trac­ting par­ties under pri­va­te law. […] Final­ly, the ful­fill­ment of the con­tract is a solid justi­fi­ca­ti­on even when it comes to the pro­ce­s­sing of data despi­te objection […].
The­re are seve­ral inte­re­st­ing points here:
  • The BGer deals with the Justi­fi­ca­ti­on of the con­trac­tu­al con­text (Art. 32 para. 2 lit. a FADP) not as an indi­ca­ti­on, but like a legal basis. Con­cep­tual­ly, the ele­ments of Art. 32 para. 2 FADP are neither fic­tions nor pre­sump­ti­ons, but mere­ly – but none­thel­ess – gui­de­lines for weig­hing up inte­rests. When the Fede­ral Supre­me Court says that the ful­fill­ment of the con­tract is a “solid justi­fi­ca­ti­on” even in the event of an objec­tion, it can hard­ly be con­tra­dic­ted. Nevert­hel­ess, a balan­cing of inte­rests would have to be car­ri­ed out – the objec­tion as such may be irrele­vant, but the inte­rests wort­hy of pro­tec­tion that may be expres­sed the­r­ein are cer­tain­ly relevant.
  • The Fede­ral Supre­me Court makes short work of the issue of data pro­tec­tion – that’s true, but after rea­ding for­eign case law, it’s a good thing.
  • The refe­rence to the gene­ral duty to inform does not refer to the duty to inform under data pro­tec­tion law, but to a – nega­ted – duty under civil law to inform the con­trac­tu­al part­ner. It can­not the­r­e­fo­re be infer­red from the ruling that a breach of the duty to inform under Art. 19 et seq. FADP does not affect the lawful­ness of the pro­ce­s­sing (which of cour­se it does not).

The OGer ZH had still upheld the action, also from a data pro­tec­tion point of view; howe­ver, this was not becau­se it had taken a dif­fe­rent view to the BGer, but becau­se it con­side­red the amend­ment to the con­tract to be void under civil law, which is why the cor­re­spon­ding data pro­cu­re­ment had to be dis­pro­por­tio­na­te – becau­se it had no consequences.

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