BGH i.S. Brey­er (VI ZR 135/13, 16.5.17): Per­so­nal refe­rence of dyna­mic IP addresses

The ECJ has ruled with Judgment in the case of Brey­er of Octo­ber 19, 2016 on dyna­mic IP addres­ses sta­ted the following:

In the light of the fore­go­ing, the ans­wer to the first que­sti­on must be that Artic­le 2(a) of Direc­ti­ve 95/46 must be inter­pre­ted as mea­ning that a dyna­mic IP address stored by a pro­vi­der of online media ser­vices when a per­son acce­s­ses a web­site which that pro­vi­der makes gene­ral­ly acce­s­si­ble con­sti­tu­tes, for the pro­vi­der, a per­so­nal data item within the mea­ning of that pro­vi­si­on, if he/she has legal means that allow him/her to deter­mi­ne the per­son in que­sti­on on the basis of the addi­tio­nal infor­ma­ti­on that the Inter­net access pro­vi­der of this per­son has.

We have repor­ted on this. This ruling was based on a refer­ral by the Ger­man Fede­ral Court of Justi­ce (BGH). The BGH sub­se­quent­ly con­tin­ued the pro­ce­e­dings and ruled on the basis of the ECJ’s decis­i­on (Ref. VI ZR 135/13 of May 16, 2017). The BGH ruled as fol­lows on dyna­mic IP addres­ses (the pro­ce­e­dings also con­cer­ned a que­sti­on of the Ger­man Tele­me­dia Act (TMG):

a) The dyna­mic IP address stored by a pro­vi­der of online media ser­vices when a per­son acce­s­ses an Inter­net page that this pro­vi­der makes gene­ral­ly acce­s­si­ble con­sti­tu­tes a per­so­nal data for the pro­vi­der within the mea­ning of Sec­tion 12 (1) and (2) TMG in con­junc­tion with Sec­tion 3 (1) BDSG (con­ti­nua­tion of ECJ NJW 2016, 3579).

The rela­ted reci­tals are as follows:

23 The pos­si­bi­li­ty of lin­king a dyna­mic IP address to the addi­tio­nal infor­ma­ti­on held by the inter­net access pro­vi­der con­sti­tu­tes a means which may rea­son­ab­ly be used to iden­ti­fy the per­son con­cer­ned. Alt­hough the refer­ring court poin­ted out in its order for refe­rence that Ger­man law does not per­mit the Inter­net access pro­vi­der to com­mu­ni­ca­te direct­ly to the pro­vi­der of online media ser­vices the addi­tio­nal infor­ma­ti­on neces­sa­ry to iden­ti­fy the per­son con­cer­ned, but it appears that, sub­ject to the checks to be car­ri­ed out by the refer­ring court in this regard, the­re are legal pos­si­bi­li­ties for the pro­vi­der of online media ser­vices to cont­act the com­pe­tent aut­ho­ri­ty, in par­ti­cu­lar in the event of cyber­at­tacks, so that the lat­ter takes the neces­sa­ry steps to obtain the infor­ma­ti­on in que­sti­on from the Inter­net access pro­vi­der and to initia­te pro­se­cu­ti­on. The pro­vi­der of online media ser­vices thus appar­ent­ly had means that could rea­son­ab­ly be used to have the per­son in que­sti­on iden­ti­fi­ed on the basis of the stored IP addres­ses with the help of third par­ties, name­ly the com­pe­tent aut­ho­ri­ty and the Inter­net access provider.

24 cc) On this basis, the defi­ni­ti­on of “per­so­nal data” in Sec­tion 12 (1) and (2) of the Ger­man Tele­me­dia Act (TMG) in con­junc­tion with Sec­tion 3 (1) of the Ger­man Fede­ral Data Pro­tec­tion Act (BDSG) is inter­pre­ted in con­for­mi­ty with the Direc­ti­ve to the effect that a Dyna­mic IP addresswhich is stored by a pro­vi­der of online media ser­vices when a per­son acce­s­ses an Inter­net page that this pro­vi­der makes gene­ral­ly acce­s­si­ble, for the pro­vi­der con­sti­tu­tes a per­so­nal data within the mea­ning of the afo­re­men­tio­ned provision.

25 This is becau­se the defen­dant has legal means that can rea­son­ab­ly be used to have the per­son con­cer­ned iden­ti­fi­ed on the basis of the stored IP addres­ses with the help of third par­ties, name­ly the com­pe­tent aut­ho­ri­ty and the Inter­net access pro­vi­der (see Court of Justi­ce, loc. cit., para. 47).

26 The defen­dant may – in the case of inju­ry that has alre­a­dy occur­red. file a cri­mi­nal com­plaint with the law enforce­ment aut­ho­ri­ties; in the event of immi­nent harm, it may invol­ve the aut­ho­ri­ties respon­si­ble for pre­ven­ting dan­ger. Pur­su­ant to Sec­tion 100j (2) and (1) of the Code of Cri­mi­nal Pro­ce­du­re (StPO), Sec­tion 113 of the Tele­com­mu­ni­ca­ti­ons Act (cf. BVerfGE 130, 151), the aut­ho­ri­ties respon­si­ble for the pro­se­cu­ti­on of cri­mi­nal offen­ces or admi­ni­stra­ti­ve offen­ces may for this pur­po­se demand infor­ma­ti­on from Inter­net access pro­vi­ders if cer­tain con­di­ti­ons are metThe same shall app­ly to the aut­ho­ri­ties respon­si­ble for aver­ting thre­ats to public safe­ty or order, the fede­ral and sta­te aut­ho­ri­ties for the pro­tec­tion of the con­sti­tu­ti­on, the Mili­ta­ry Coun­ter-Intel­li­gence Ser­vice and the Fede­ral Intel­li­gence Ser­vice for aver­ting thre­ats to public safe­ty or order or for the per­for­mance of the sta­tu­to­ry duties of the afo­re­men­tio­ned aut­ho­ri­ties. The data to be inclu­ded in a dis­clo­sure may also be deter­mi­ned on the basis of an Inter­net pro­to­col address assi­gned at a spe­ci­fic time. This allo­ws the infor­ma­ti­on obtai­ned to be com­bi­ned and the user to be iden­ti­fi­ed (cf. Court of Justi­ce loc. cit., mar­gi­nal no. 49 et seq.).

Accor­din­gly, the Fede­ral Court of Justi­ce gene­ral­ly con­siders dyna­mic IP addres­ses to be per­so­nal, irre­spec­ti­ve of spe­cial cir­cum­stances. In par­ti­cu­lar, it does not requi­re that the­re be indi­ca­ti­ons of a situa­ti­on in which the afo­re­men­tio­ned pro­ce­du­ral pos­si­bi­li­ties beco­me spe­ci­fi­cal­ly rele­vant. The­re are doubts as to whe­ther this is in line with the requi­re­ments of the ECJ (cf. the Com­ment by RA Tho­mas Stad­ler).

In Switz­er­land, the fol­lo­wing still applies Logi­step case law. Accor­ding to it, too, the means of iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on available to the respec­ti­ve hol­der and/or reci­pi­ent are decisi­ve in each case; howe­ver, it places much more weight on the cir­cum­stances of the indi­vi­du­al case:

that the neces­si­ty of the action of a third par­ty is irrele­vant as long as the over­all effort of the cli­ent for the deter­mi­na­ti­on of the per­son con­cer­ned is not so gre­at that, accor­ding to gene­ral life expe­ri­ence, it could no lon­ger be expec­ted that the cli­ent would take it upon hims­elf (cf. E. 3.1 abo­ve). This must be asses­sed against the back­ground of the spe­ci­fic cir­cum­stances of the indi­vi­du­al case. It is the­r­e­fo­re not pos­si­ble to make an abstract deter­mi­na­ti­on as to whe­ther or not (espe­ci­al­ly in the case of dyna­mic) IP addres­ses con­sti­tu­te per­so­nal data.

Dyna­mic IP addres­ses are thus still not gene­ral­ly per­so­nal for the Inter­net pro­vi­der in Switz­er­land, but only in excep­tio­nal cases (unless addi­tio­nal infor­ma­ti­on is coll­ec­ted that allo­ws iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on, and sub­ject to the pro­vi­so that an IP address iden­ti­fi­es the access pro­vi­der, who is a data sub­ject under the law still in force). Whe­ther the legal situa­ti­on in Euro­pe is dif­fe­rent may be doub­ted (even after the GDPR).

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