The Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court (BVGer) has par­ti­al­ly upheld an appeal against a decis­i­on by the Sta­te Secre­ta­ri­at for Inter­na­tio­nal Finan­cial Mat­ters (SIF) (A‑2652/2025, dated August 11, 2026). The issue in dis­pu­te was access to inter­nal cor­re­spon­dence regar­ding Uzbekistan’s re-ent­ry into the voting rights group led by Switz­er­land at the Inter­na­tio­nal Mone­ta­ry Fund (IMF).

In a recom­men­da­ti­on dated Febru­ary 21, 2025, the EDÖB had recom­men­ded gran­ting access to con­tent rela­ting to the SNB and to per­so­nal data, pro­vi­ded that such infor­ma­ti­on did not con­cern for­eign govern­ment offi­ci­als. The SIF did not com­ply with this recom­men­da­ti­on and gran­ted access to five emails only in redac­ted form. Among other things, the redac­tions cover­ed the names of employees of the Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­on and the Swiss Natio­nal Bank (SNB), as well as cer­tain pas­sa­ges of text. The Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court […] 

Art. 2, para. 2 of the Fede­ral Act on Access to Govern­ment Infor­ma­ti­on: A mere men­ti­on of the SNB is not covered

The SIF initi­al­ly argued that the SNB is exempt from the scope of the Access to Govern­ment Infor­ma­ti­on Act (Art. 2(2) of the Act). This exemp­ti­on, it con­ten­ded, must also app­ly to infor­ma­ti­on rela­ting to the SNB con­tai­ned in third-par­ty docu­ments, inclu­ding the per­so­nal data of its employees. In its recom­men­da­ti­on, the FDPIC had argued as follows.

The FDPIC con­side­red that, accor­ding to the clear wor­ding of Art. 2, para. 2 of the Fede­ral Act on Access to Govern­ment Infor­ma­ti­on (BGÖ), the Act does not app­ly to the SNB and the Swiss Finan­cial Mar­ket Super­vi­so­ry Aut­ho­ri­ty (FINMA). This reser­va­ti­on applies to the enti­re sta­tu­te, inclu­ding the defi­ning cha­rac­te­ri­stics of an offi­ci­al docu­ment (Art. 5 of the Free­dom of Infor­ma­ti­on Act). Legal scho­lar­ship con­clu­des from this that docu­ments trans­mit­ted by the SNB or FINMA to an aut­ho­ri­ty sub­ject to the Free­dom of Infor­ma­ti­on Act do not beco­me offi­ci­al docu­ments within the mea­ning of that Act. By law, the recei­ving aut­ho­ri­ty must tre­at such docu­ments as con­fi­den­ti­al. The­re is no right of access to them. By con­trast, docu­ments crea­ted by an aut­ho­ri­ty sub­ject to the Free­dom of Infor­ma­ti­on Act and sub­se­quent­ly sub­mit­ted to the SNB would, or tho­se that ser­ved on an admi­ni­stra­ti­ve unit by third par­ties and, at the same time, on the SNB would. In this regard, neither the law nor the mate­ri­als accom­pany­ing the Free­dom of Infor­ma­ti­on Act indi­ca­te that the Free­dom of Infor­ma­ti­on Act does not app­ly to such docu­ments. The same applies to offi­ci­al docu­ments in which the SNB mere­ly men­tio­ned will beco­me, or which of the SNB deli­ver­ed retroac­tively would.

The Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court con­curs. The excep­ti­ons gran­ted to the SNB and FINMA are based exclu­si­ve­ly on poli­ti­cal and histo­ri­cal grounds, and legal scho­lar­ship takes a cri­ti­cal view of Art. 2, para. 2 of the Fede­ral Act on Access to Govern­ment Information:

Accor­ding to the FDPIC, Art. 2(2) of the Fede­ral Act on Access to Govern­ment Docu­ments (BGÖ) must the­r­e­fo­re be inter­pre­ted nar­row­ly, at least with regard to the per­so­nal data reque­sted by the com­plainants, sin­ce the­se are not docu­ments of the SNB and, in view of its con­sti­tu­tio­nal­ly gua­ran­teed inde­pen­dence, do not per­tain to any fur­ther infor­ma­ti­on from the SNB in con­nec­tion with its acti­vi­ties. This infor­ma­ti­on the­r­e­fo­re falls within the per­so­nal scope of the Free­dom of Infor­ma­ti­on Act. It remains open whe­ther (in addi­ti­on to the per­so­nal data) other infor­ma­ti­on con­cer­ning the SNB falls out­side the per­so­nal scope of appli­ca­ti­on of Art. 2(2) of the Free­dom of Infor­ma­ti­on Act, sin­ce an excep­ti­on applies in this regard any­way, as will be shown below (see E. 7 below).

In this regard, the Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court reli­es in par­ti­cu­lar on the FAQ from the Fede­ral Office of Justi­ce and the Fede­ral Data Pro­tec­tion Com­mis­sio­ner on the Imple­men­ta­ti­on of the Prin­ci­ple of Public Access in the Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­on (Sec­tion 2.21):

Ans­wer: When draf­ting the Free­dom of Infor­ma­ti­on Act, the legis­la­tu­re opted for a system of excep­ti­ons based on a balan­cing of the inte­rests at sta­ke in each spe­ci­fic case (Art. 7 FOIA), rather than a system of excep­ti­ons to the scope of the Act. The exclu­si­ons of the Swiss Natio­nal Bank and the Swiss Finan­cial Mar­ket Super­vi­so­ry Aut­ho­ri­ty from the scope of the Act are based sole­ly on poli­ti­cal and histo­ri­cal grounds (Art. 2, para. 2 of the Swiss Free­dom of Infor­ma­ti­on Act). They the­r­e­fo­re have no sub­stan­ti­ve basis.

The pro­vi­si­on must the­r­e­fo­re be «inter­pre­ted nar­row­ly, at least with regard to the per­so­nal data reque­sted by the com­plainants,» becau­se the docu­ments in que­sti­on do not belong to the SNB and no other infor­ma­ti­on from the SNB rela­ted to its acti­vi­ties is invol­ved. The names of SNB employees do not fall under Art. 2(2) of the Fede­ral Act on Access to Govern­ment Infor­ma­ti­on (BGÖ). The court express­ly lea­ves open whe­ther other infor­ma­ti­on rela­ting to the SNB falls out­side the scope of the Act, sin­ce an excep­ti­on applies in this regard anyway.

For­eign Poli­cy Inte­rests: Redac­tions Confirmed

The Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court upholds the redac­tions made pur­su­ant to Art. 7(1)(d) of the Fede­ral Access to Govern­ment Infor­ma­ti­on Act. The case appar­ent­ly invol­ved docu­ments direct­ly rela­ted to Uzbe­ki­stan and to for­eign poli­cy Switzerland’s acti­vi­ties within the IMF and the „IMF Voting Rights Group,“ which an insight into Inter­nal cor­re­spon­dence from Swiss aut­ho­ri­ties regar­ding the resump­ti­on of would place Uzbe­ki­stan in the Swiss voting group on the IMF side. If this were dis­c­lo­sed, it would likely result in The­re is a real risk of a nega­ti­ve impact on coope­ra­ti­on bet­ween Switz­er­land and Uzbe­ki­stan. The dis­clo­sure of per­so­nal data regar­ding for­eign govern­ment offi­ci­als would also be view­ed nega­tively in terms of foste­ring trust in our joint cooperation.

The appli­ca­ti­on of this excep­ti­on requi­res that the­re be a serious risk of harm:

Switzerland’s for­eign poli­cy inte­rests may be com­pro­mi­sed if ano­ther sta­te could exploit infor­ma­ti­on to be dis­c­lo­sed to Switzerland’s detri­ment. In par­ti­cu­lar, this is inten­ded to ensu­re that Switzerland’s cur­rent and future nego­tia­ting posi­ti­ons are not wea­k­en­ed (see Art. 7(1)(d) in con­junc­tion with Art. 8(4) of the Fede­ral Act on Access to Govern­ment Infor­ma­ti­on). In this regard, the pro­vi­si­on covers not only the Switzerland’s posi­ti­ons and argu­mentsbut other infor­ma­ti­on as well, which could be signi­fi­cant for the pro­gress of the nego­tia­ti­ons […]. The same applies if publi­ca­ti­on could lead to a dete­rio­ra­ti­on in rela­ti­ons with other sta­tes or inter­na­tio­nal orga­nizati­ons. For cer­tain sen­si­ti­ve infor­ma­ti­on, diplo­ma­tic prac­ti­ce requi­res the express con­sent of the other sta­te con­cer­ned befo­re it may be dis­c­lo­sed. Howe­ver, the feared adver­se effect resul­ting from the dis­clo­sure of the infor­ma­ti­on must signi­fi­cant be, and the­re must be a a serious risk of their occur­rence exist (see […]).

In the con­text of Switzerland’s nego­tia­ti­ons, this does not refer to an expec­ted out­co­me of the nego­tia­ti­ons, but rather to the fact that the infor­ma­ti­on in and of its­elf sui­ta­ble is the one that To wea­k­en Switzerland’s posi­ti­on in the upco­ming nego­tia­ti­ons and ther­eby harm Switzerland’s for­eign poli­cy inte­rests or inter­na­tio­nal rela­ti­ons. This applies here:

The lower court is cor­rect in sta­ting that the con­tent in que­sti­on Inter­nal cor­re­spon­dence within Switz­er­land that con­cern Uzbekistan’s rela­ti­ons with other count­ries or inter­nal mat­ters within Uzbe­ki­stan its­elf, as well as assess­ments — reser­ved for inter­nal Swiss­as­sess­ments regar­ding deve­lo­p­ments in Uzbe­ki­stan, the pos­si­ble moti­ves for rejoi­ning the Swiss voting group — inclu­ding within the IMF — or other inter­nal mat­ters of for­eign sta­tes men­tio­ned in the docu­ments. The infor­ma­ti­on is the­r­e­fo­re, in and of its­elf, likely to influence Switzerland’s posi­ti­on in the upco­ming nego­tia­ti­ons regar­ding wea­k­en and ther­eby harm Switzerland’s for­eign poli­cy inte­rests or inter­na­tio­nal relations. […] 

The same applies to the names of for­eign govern­ment offi­ci­als con­tai­ned the­r­ein (per­so­nal data as defi­ned in Art. 5(a) [DSG]) and the names of orga­nizati­ons. The
The Spe­ci­fi­ci­ty of the Risk of Adver­se Effects This coope­ra­ti­on is unders­cored by the fact that the com­plainants’ legal repre­sen­ta­ti­ve has, in the past, publicly repor­ted on his acti­vi­ties rela­ted to Uzbe­ki­stan in the inter­na­tio­nal press. It the­r­e­fo­re appears that the lower court can­not rule out the pos­si­bi­li­ty that the dis­c­lo­sed infor­ma­ti­on would also reach the sta­tes in que­sti­on and that Uzbe­ki­stan (as well as other mem­bers of the voting bloc) might, if dis­sa­tis­fied with Switzerland’s lea­der­ship of the voting bloc, deci­de to with­draw from the Swiss voting bloc, under­stan­da­ble.

Fur­ther­mo­re, the BGÖ does not app­ly to the records from the con­ci­lia­ti­on pro­ce­e­dings them­sel­ves. The pro­vi­si­ons of the VwVG regar­ding the right to a fair hea­ring are not direct­ly appli­ca­ble in con­ci­lia­ti­on pro­ce­e­dings, and the EDÖB does not issue a ruling but mere­ly makes a recom­men­da­ti­on. The con­sti­tu­tio­nal right to a fair hea­ring the­r­e­fo­re does not app­ly in con­ci­lia­ti­on pro­ce­e­dings (estab­lished case law).

Per­so­nal Data of Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Employees

As a gene­ral rule, per­so­nal data in offi­ci­al docu­ments must be anony­mi­zed upon dis­clo­sure (Art. 9, para. 1, of the Fede­ral Act on Access to Offi­ci­al Docu­ments), with two exceptions:

  • Name and Job Tit­le of Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve staff in offi­ci­al docu­ments; the­se are gene­ral­ly not sub­ject to the requi­re­ment of anony­mizati­on. Anyo­ne acting in the per­for­mance of a public duty can­not invo­ke the right to pri­va­cy in the same way as a pri­va­te third par­ty. Dis­clo­sure may be wai­ved in such cases only if it would cau­se, or is high­ly likely to cau­se, con­cre­te harm to the indi­vi­du­als con­cer­ned. The stan­dard, howe­ver, depends on the hier­ar­chi­cal level of the indi­vi­du­als in question.
  • If — as in this case — aexpress­ly requi­res access to per­so­nal data was. In this case, a legal basis for dis­clo­sure is requi­red under Art. 9(2) of the Fede­ral Act on Access to Govern­ment Infor­ma­ti­on (BGÖ) in con­junc­tion with Art. 36 of the Data Pro­tec­tion Act (DSG). The­re is no basis under Artic­le 36(1) and (2) of the DSG in the pre­sent case, so Artic­le 36(3) of the DSG must be exami­ned (con­nec­tion to the per­for­mance of public duties), alt­hough this is alre­a­dy evi­dent from the defi­ni­ti­on of an offi­ci­al docu­ment (Art. 5(1)(c) of the BGÖ).

When dis­clo­sing per­so­nal data, a balan­cing of inte­rests must the­r­e­fo­re be con­duc­ted; in prac­ti­ce, the Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court does not distin­gu­ish bet­ween Art. 36(6) of the Data Pro­tec­tion Act and Art. 7(2) of the Fede­ral Act on Access to Govern­ment Documents:

Sin­ce both Art. 7(2) of the Fede­ral Act on Access to Govern­ment Infor­ma­ti­on (BGÖ) and Art. 36 of the Data Pro­tec­tion Act (DSG) pro­vi­de for a balan­cing of inte­rests, it is justi­fi­ed to weigh the com­pe­ting public and pri­va­te inte­rests against one ano­ther wit­hout strict­ly distin­gu­is­hing bet­ween the two provisions ([…]).

Go to Inte­rest in the Public Natu­re of Govern­ment:

While the public’s inte­rest in the administration’s affairs car­ri­es weight in and of its­elf, this weight must be deter­mi­ned on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the intent and pur­po­se of the Free­dom of Infor­ma­ti­on Act, and its signi­fi­can­ce may vary.
[…].

Go to Inte­rests of the indi­vi­du­als con­cer­ned:

When balan­cing the inte­rests of the indi­vi­du­als con­cer­ned, par­ti­cu­lar con­side­ra­ti­on must be given to the natu­re of the data, the role or sta­tus of the indi­vi­du­al in que­sti­on, and the seve­ri­ty of the con­se­quen­ces of dis­clo­sure for tho­se affec­ted […]. The poten­ti­al impair­ment or jeo­par­dy to tho­se inte­rests must to be sub­stan­ti­al; it need not neces­s­a­ri­ly occur, but neither may it appear mere­ly conceiva­ble or (remo­te­ly) pos­si­ble ([…]). […] The risk of serious harm to one’s per­son must be accom­pa­nied by a to some ext­ent is immi­nent. Con­se­quent­ly, the inf­rin­ge­ment that is immi­nent as a result of gran­ting access must sub­stan­ti­al Minor, mere­ly unp­lea­sant con­se­quen­ces are not suf­fi­ci­ent to estab­lish an over­ri­ding pri­va­te inte­rest, nor is it suf­fi­ci­ent if an inf­rin­ge­ment of per­so­nal rights is mere­ly conceiva­ble or remo­te­ly possible.

The dis­clo­sure of per­so­nal data is spe­ci­fi­cal­ly regu­la­ted under data pro­tec­tion law becau­se it remo­ves per­so­nal data from the con­trol of the dis­clo­sing enti­ty and expo­ses it to a hig­her risk. The legis­la­tu­re has addres­sed this risk abstract is con­side­red ele­va­ted, which is why a sepa­ra­te pro­vi­si­on was estab­lished (Art. 30(1)(c) and Art. 36 of the DSG). Howe­ver, this abstract risk can­not be taken into account again when balan­cing inte­rests in the con­text of an access request, becau­se it has alre­a­dy been incor­po­ra­ted into the sta­tu­to­ry pro­vi­si­on (the per se requi­re­ment for a balan­cing of inte­rests). To weigh it again would con­sti­tu­te a “dou­ble dip.” A spe­ci­fic It is the­r­e­fo­re appro­pria­te to char­ge interest.

Pro­ce­du­re for Dis­clo­sing Per­so­nal Data: Accor­ding to case law, a mul­ti-step pro­ce­du­re applies:

  • Step 1: A preli­mi­na­ry balan­cing of inte­rests to deter­mi­ne whe­ther publi­ca­ti­on of the docu­ment is even a pos­si­bi­li­ty or whe­ther it is ruled out from the out­set due to over­ri­ding public or pri­va­te interests.
  • Step 2: If the pos­si­bi­li­ty of gran­ting access is being con­side­red, the affec­ted third par­ties must gene­ral­ly be heard so that they can pre­sent their inte­rests that would pre­vent publi­ca­ti­on. The­re are two excep­ti­ons to this rule: If the preli­mi­na­ry balan­cing of inte­rests cle­ar­ly favors publi­ca­ti­on to such an ext­ent that it can­not serious­ly be expec­ted that the­re are still unre­co­gnized pri­va­te inte­rests; or when the hea­ring appears dis­pro­por­tio­na­te, par­ti­cu­lar­ly becau­se it would ent­ail an exce­s­si­ve bur­den or becau­se it „would come into an irre­con­cilable con­flict with the fun­da­men­tal pur­po­se of the Free­dom of Infor­ma­ti­on Act, which is to ensu­re trans­pa­ren­cy in admi­ni­stra­ti­ve acti­vi­ties“ (Fede­ral Supre­me Court 1C_50/2015; wha­te­ver that means).
  • Step 3: Based on this, the final balan­cing of inte­rests must be car­ri­ed out and the actu­al decis­i­on must be made.

In this case, the issue con­cer­ned per­so­nal data of for­eign govern­ment repre­sen­ta­ti­ves, but the names of various employees of the Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­on and the SNB were also invol­ved; the com­plainants wan­ted to know who acted in what offi­ci­al capa­ci­ty and how. Thus, this does not con­cern pri­va­te third par­ties, and the dis­clo­sure of basic per­so­nal data such as name, address, date of birth, etc., is gene­ral­ly con­side­red a „minor intru­si­on.“ The pre­sump­ti­on of free access to the reque­sted per­so­nal data was the­r­e­fo­re not rebut­ted in this case (sub­ject to the names of for­eign govern­ment representatives).

In this respect, the appeal is well-foun­ded. The Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court eit­her deci­des the mat­ter its­elf or, in excep­tio­nal cases, remands it to the lower court with bin­ding ins­truc­tions (Art. 61(1) of the Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Pro­ce­du­re Act). When it comes to issues that spe­cia­li­zed exper­ti­se requi­re, or if to estab­lish addi­tio­nal facts …it is gene­ral­ly not the role of the Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court to rule as the court of first instance in a spe­cia­li­zed field whe­re the con­sidera­ble dis­creti­on of the lower court, which has grea­ter exper­ti­se, must be respec­ted. In the pre­sent case,

  • to con­duct ano­ther com­pre­hen­si­ve preli­mi­na­ry balan­cing of inte­rests regar­ding the dis­clo­sure of per­so­nal data (pro­vi­ded such data does not con­cern for­eign govern­ment offi­ci­als), and
  • If neces­sa­ry, the indi­vi­du­als con­cer­ned should be con­sul­ted in advance.

The lower court is bet­ter sui­ted for this task due to its pro­xi­mi­ty to the mat­ter at hand; the­r­e­fo­re, the case should be reman­ded to that court for a deter­mi­na­ti­on of the facts, a com­pre­hen­si­ve preli­mi­na­ry balan­cing of inte­rests, any neces­sa­ry hea­rings, and a sub­se­quent defi­ni­ti­ve balan­cing of interests.