Take-Aways (AI)
  • The Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court con­firms that COMCO may pass on data from com­ple­ted car­tel pro­ce­e­dings to a public aut­ho­ri­ty by way of admi­ni­stra­ti­ve assi­stance, pro­vi­ded that legal requi­re­ments are met.
  • DSG 19 I lit. a per­mits limi­t­ed infor­ma­ti­on in the case of a spe­ci­fic, one-off request for the ful­fill­ment of legal tasks; neces­si­ty and sub­si­dia­ri­ty must be strict­ly examined.
  • Dis­clo­sures are per­mit­ted if no busi­ness secrets are invol­ved, sui­ta­ble con­di­ti­ons exist and third-par­ty inte­rests wort­hy of pro­tec­tion are pro­tec­ted by redactions.

On August 23, 2016, the Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court ruled that the WEKO. may dis­c­lo­se data of a con­clu­ded anti­trust case to a public aut­ho­ri­ty by way of admi­ni­stra­ti­ve assi­stance (Decis­i­on as PDF).

This que­sti­on aro­se in con­nec­tion with a sanc­tion order con­cer­ning com­pe­ti­ti­on agree­ments in road cons­truc­tion and civil engi­nee­ring in the can­ton of Zurich. The­se agree­ments bet­ween 16 com­pa­nies from the cons­truc­tion indu­stry con­cer­ned sub­mis­si­ons in the can­ton of Zurich, in which the cons­truc­tion com­pa­nies agreed on their bid pri­ces and deter­mi­ned who should be award­ed the con­tract. In the sanc­tion order, howe­ver, the desi­gna­ti­ons of the pro­jects con­cer­ned were remo­ved, so that third par­ties such as poten­ti­al­ly aggrie­ved cli­ents could not find out whe­ther they had been har­med by the col­lu­si­on. The muni­ci­pa­li­ty of Mei­len the­r­e­fo­re reque­sted access to the rele­vant files and, in par­ti­cu­lar, infor­ma­ti­on on whe­ther it had award­ed cons­truc­tion pro­jects that were affec­ted by unlawful com­pe­ti­ti­on agree­ments. The WEKO gran­ted the muni­ci­pa­li­ty of Mei­len access to the sanc­tion order and to evi­dence inso­far as the­se con­cer­ned ten­ders of the muni­ci­pa­li­ty of Mei­len (and inso­far as this did not reve­al infor­ma­ti­on dis­c­lo­sed by the self-adver­ti­ser). Howe­ver, one of the com­pa­nies con­cer­ned appea­led to the FAC.

BGVer first rejects an access cla­im based on BGÖ:

  • It is true that the anti­trust pro­ce­e­dings fall as Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve pro­ce­du­re not sub­ject to the exclu­si­on ground of BGÖ 3 I lit. a No. 2 (no appli­ca­ti­on to cri­mi­nal pro­ce­e­dings), alt­hough sanc­tions under KG 49a have a cri­mi­nal or cri­mi­nal-like character.
  • Howe­ver, DSG 19 I lit. a pro­vi­des for a spe­cial right to infor­ma­ti­on in the case of requests from bodies respon­si­ble for sta­tu­to­ry duties, pro­vi­ded that the request con­cerns per­so­nal data. This spe­cial access pro­vi­si­on takes pre­ce­dence over BGÖ (BGÖ 4 lit. b; same as BGÖ 9 II in the result).

Appli­ca­ti­on of the excep­ti­on pro­vi­si­on of DSG 19 I lit. a

DSG 19 I lit. a reads as follows:

Fede­ral bodies may dis­c­lo­se per­so­nal data only if the­re is a legal basis for doing so within the mea­ning of Artic­le 17 or if:
a. the data are indis­pensable for the reci­pi­ent in the indi­vi­du­al case for the ful­fill­ment of its legal task; […].

This “gene­ral pro­vi­si­on on admi­ni­stra­ti­ve and legal assi­stance and imple­men­ting pro­vi­si­on on gene­ral offi­ci­al sec­re­cy” (Fede­ral Coun­cil Dis­patch on the FADP 1988, 469; cited by the Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court) gives con­cre­te form to the con­sti­tu­tio­nal prin­ci­ple of mutu­al (here: infor­mal) admi­ni­stra­ti­ve assi­stance (BV 44). Howe­ver, as an excep­ti­on to the requi­re­ment of the legal basis iSv DSG 17 I, it is to be applied only in indi­vi­du­al cases and inter­pre­ted nar­row­ly in each case. Dis­clo­sure pur­su­ant to DSG 19 I lit. a is only per­mis­si­ble as follows:

  1. Dis­clo­sure upon request in indi­vi­du­al cases, i.e. for a one-time pur­po­se to per­form a sta­tu­to­ry task, not on a regu­lar or even per­ma­nent basis;
  2. Dis­clo­sure only on con­cre­te request with pre­sen­ta­ti­on of the rele­vant facts, with con­cre­te desi­gna­ti­on of the reque­sted infor­ma­ti­on and docu­ments and indi­ca­ti­on of the rea­son for the request; no request wit­hout a pre­cise rea­son or con­cre­te que­sti­on, i.e. no “fishing expeditions”.

Dama­ge covera­ge as a sta­tu­to­ry duty

In the pre­sent case, it was dis­pu­ted whe­ther the request of the muni­ci­pa­li­ty of Mei­len con­cer­ned a sta­tu­to­ry task or “a gene­ral sta­te poli­cy objec­ti­ve”, and whe­ther the pro­cu­re­ment of evi­dence for the pro­se­cu­ti­on of civil claims is not in any case sub­ject to pri­va­te law. In this con­text, the BVGer sta­tes that the Duty to hand­le tax­payers’ money careful­ly among other things, deman­ded to enforce civil law claims against the par­ti­ci­pan­ts of a sub­mis­si­on car­tel. This is even a legal task of “cru­cial importance”. The legal natu­re of any pro­ce­du­ral means, such as an action for dama­ges, is irrelevant.

Neces­si­ty of data dis­clo­sure (sub­si­dia­ri­ty)

Dis­clo­sure in accordance with DSG 19 I lit. a is only per­mis­si­ble inso­far as the data is requi­red for the ful­fill­ment of the sta­tu­to­ry task. This results in two pre­re­qui­si­tes:

  1. The data its­elf must be neces­sa­ry for the per­for­mance of the task.
  2. The data can­not be obtai­ned in any other way; i.e. the request for infor­ma­ti­on must not be the easier way, but the only way.

The FAC con­siders both con­di­ti­ons to be met (and makes it clear that the unre­a­son­ab­leness of ano­ther path is equi­va­lent to impossibility):

Joi­ning the inve­sti­ga­ti­on procedure?

An acce­s­si­on of the muni­ci­pa­li­ty to the inve­sti­ga­ti­on pro­ce­du­re accor­ding to KG 43 I lit. a would have been “pro­ba­b­ly exclu­ded” (and if such an acce­s­si­on had been pos­si­ble, the fur­ther que­sti­on would have ari­sen whe­ther the muni­ci­pa­li­ty was entit­led to par­ty status).

Cri­mi­nal char­ges for sub­mis­si­on fraud?

The muni­ci­pa­li­ty could have filed cri­mi­nal char­ges for sub­mis­si­on fraud (StGB 144) against unknown per­sons. In this case, the files of the car­tel pro­ce­e­dings would have had to be con­sul­ted by way of legal assi­stance (StPO 44). If the muni­ci­pa­li­ty had then con­sti­tu­ted its­elf as a pri­va­te plain­ti­ff, it could have reque­sted access to the files. 

In the view of the FAC, howe­ver, it would be wrong to requi­re the muni­ci­pa­li­ty of Mei­len to take such action becau­se the pro­s­pects of suc­cess of cri­mi­nal pro­ce­e­dings were “extre­me­ly low” and the muni­ci­pa­li­ty was not even see­king cri­mi­nal sanc­tions against the com­pa­nies con­cer­ned. Against this back­ground, the path via cri­mi­nal pro­ce­e­dings would be a “mas­si­ve waste of sta­te resour­ces” and a “mis­ap­pro­pria­ted use of the cri­mi­nal pro­se­cu­ti­on law”.

Inspec­tion of files direct­ly based on con­sti­tu­tio­nal pro­ce­du­ral guarantees?

Final­ly, the FAC won­ders whe­ther a right to inspect files could be deri­ved direct­ly from con­sti­tu­tio­nal pro­ce­du­ral gua­ran­tees. Howe­ver, case law had affirm­ed such a right to inspect files for the pur­po­se of initia­ting sub­se­quent pro­ce­e­dings exclu­si­ve­ly for natu­ral or legal per­sons under pri­va­te law who were obvious­ly depen­dent on the inspec­tion of files (cf. for instance 1A.253/2005 E. 3.6.4). Howe­ver, this was not the case in the pre­sent case, becau­se DSG 19 I lit. a sub­stan­tia­tes the con­sti­tu­tio­nal­ly gua­ran­teed right to inspect files for a com­mu­ni­ty and thus takes precedence.

Thus, the right to inspect files pur­su­ant to DSG 19 I lit. a was to be affirm­ed in principle.

Limits to the right of inspection?

KG 25

Accor­ding to DSG 19 IV lit. b, data dis­clo­sure must be refu­sed, rest­ric­ted or sub­ject to con­di­ti­ons if requi­red by legal sec­re­cy obli­ga­ti­ons or spe­cial data pro­tec­tion regu­la­ti­ons. In par­ti­cu­lar, DSG 19 I lit. a does not release from offi­ci­al sec­re­cy or other spe­cial sec­re­cy obli­ga­ti­ons. Here, the­r­e­fo­re, KG 25 (offi­ci­al and busi­ness sec­re­cy) had to be exami­ned first. After a detail­ed inve­sti­ga­ti­on, the BVger comes to the fol­lo­wing conclusions: 

11.4 In sum­ma­ry, Art. 25 para. 2 KG does not exclude any use of the data obtai­ned in anti­trust inve­sti­ga­ti­on pro­ce­e­dings, inclu­ding in par­ti­cu­lar their dis­clo­sure to third par­ties. Such a dis­clo­sure is per­mis­si­ble if the data is pro­vi­ded to a (poten­ti­al) car­tel vic­tim, no trade or manu­fac­tu­ring secrets are affec­ted by the dis­clo­sure and the data is used exclu­si­ve­ly for anti­trust pur­po­ses. This inter­pre­ta­ti­on does not con­flict with Art. 25 Para. 3 KG, sin­ce this pro­vi­si­on does not estab­lish an exclu­si­ve right of explo­ita­ti­on in favor of the pri­ce supervisor.

Accor­ding to the abo­ve, a dis­clo­sure of the data in the spe­ci­fic case is per­mis­si­ble despi­te the fun­da­men­tal pro­hi­bi­ti­on of explo­ita­ti­on under Art. 25 para. 2 KG, pro­vi­ded that the data are exploi­ted exclu­si­ve­ly for the inten­ded pur­po­se, which must be ensu­red by impo­sing a con­di­ti­on (cf. E. 13.2.2 and 15). Con­se­quent­ly, Art. 25 para. 2 KG does not con­sti­tu­te a legal pro­vi­si­on within the mea­ning of Art. 19 para. 4 let. b FADP which pro­hi­bi­ted the lower instance from dis­clo­sing data. Fur­ther­mo­re, no other pro­vi­si­ons are appa­rent which impo­se spe­cial sec­re­cy obli­ga­ti­ons on the lower instance. Sin­ce the requi­re­ments for data dis­clo­sure pur­su­ant to Art. 19 para. 1 let. a FADP are basi­cal­ly ful­fil­led in the pre­sent case (cf. E. 10), the­re is in par­ti­cu­lar also no breach of offi­ci­al secrecy.

Weig­hing of interests

Accor­ding to DSG 19 IV lit. a, dis­clo­sure must be refu­sed, rest­ric­ted or sub­ject to con­di­ti­ons if essen­ti­al public inte­rests or inte­rests of a data sub­ject that are obvious­ly wort­hy of pro­tec­tion so requi­re. The BVGer comes to the fol­lo­wing conclusion:

12.5 In sum­ma­ry, in the pre­sent case, inte­rests wort­hy of pro­tec­tion exist only with regard to any exi­sting data of third-par­ty com­pa­nies, which requi­re a rest­ric­tion of data dis­clo­sure pur­su­ant to Art. 19 para. 4 let. a FADP. If data of the­se com­pa­nies is con­tai­ned in the pas­sa­ges of the sanc­tion order to be dis­c­lo­sed, the­se must be blacked out. Final­ly, all excerp­ts of the order which con­tain data of the self-indi­ca­tor are not to be dis­c­lo­sed, as their dis­clo­sure is no lon­ger disputed.

Gene­ral pro­ce­s­sing principles

Final­ly, the FAC exami­nes and affirms that the other data pro­tec­tion prin­ci­ples accor­ding to DPA 4 have also been com­plied with.