Cloud pro­vi­ders: Risk manage­ment and con­tract negotiation

Intro­duc­to­ry considerations

It is no secret that cloud ser­vices are the topic of the day, nor that this affects all indu­stries – inclu­ding regu­la­ted indu­stries such as banks, insu­r­ers and play­ers in the heal­th­ca­re sec­tor, as well as aut­ho­ri­ties at fede­ral, can­to­nal and muni­ci­pal level. Lar­ge cus­to­mers in par­ti­cu­lar are also incre­a­sing­ly using ser­vices from for­eign pro­vi­ders, such as Ama­zon Web Ser­vices (AWS), Goog­le or Micro­soft (and rather in the SaaS area also from other pro­vi­ders and of cour­se still from Swiss pro­vi­ders). Out­sour­cing is asso­cia­ted with a cer­tain rest­ric­tion of one’s own con­trol, but often also with an increa­se in data security.

Depen­ding on the pro­vi­der, ser­vice and data loca­ti­on, this is a more or less strong Expo­sure to for­eign juris­dic­tions and aut­ho­ri­ties. In the past, the pre­vai­ling opi­ni­on – or more or less the only one – was that out­sour­cing to cloud pro­vi­ders (at that time, rather ASP pro­vi­ders) was inad­mis­si­ble if this could invol­ve the dis­clo­sure of sec­re­cy-pro­tec­ted data abroad. This repre­sen­ted a kind of “over the bor­der, out of con­trol” prin­ci­ple, on the assump­ti­on that thre­ats of punish­ment for pro­fes­sio­nal secrets would legal­ly or at least fac­tual­ly come to not­hing if for­eign aut­ho­ri­ties could access secrets.

The world has been a dif­fe­rent place sin­ce then. Cloud solu­ti­ons have beco­me the stan­dard in many indu­stries. It is now gene­ral­ly accept­ed that the­re is no pro­hi­bi­ti­on on out­sour­cing abroad or to a for­eign cloud provider.

In addi­ti­on, howe­ver, the­re are regu­la­to­ry requi­re­ments with which banks and insu­r­ers, among others, must com­ply, for exam­p­le the agree­ment of FINMA’s audit rights or the Secu­ri­ty inci­dent report­ing.

Below, we show that using cloud with pro­duc­tion workloads is also pos­si­ble for regu­la­ted enterprises.

Data pro­tec­tion and sec­re­cy: con­ver­gence in risk assessment

Data pro­tec­tion and sec­re­cy laws are incre­a­sing­ly con­ver­ging. Both are­as per­mit dis­clo­sure of data along value chains within Switz­er­land, and both pro­vi­de for stric­ter rules and, as a result, risk assess­ment and con­trol when data is trans­fer­red abroad. At the legal level, the opi­ni­on has now pre­vai­led that neither data pro­tec­tion law nor the law on the pro­tec­tion of secrets fun­da­men­tal­ly oppo­se out­sour­cing, even if a pro­vi­der abroad may have access to plain­text data.

This was advo­ca­ted in par­ti­cu­lar by the Swiss Ban­kers Asso­cia­ti­on (SBA) on the basis of two expert opi­ni­ons, which were incor­po­ra­ted into a cor­re­spon­ding Gui­de and David Rosen­thal in his com­pre­hen­si­ve Artic­le in Jus­let­ter from August 10, 2020. The con­side­ra­ti­ons were simi­lar in each case: the­re is no pro­hi­bi­ti­on on out­sour­cing abroad, dis­clo­sure to the ser­vice pro­vi­der is not pro­hi­bi­ted as such eit­her, and accor­ding to the cur­rent case law of the Fede­ral Supre­me Court, only actu­al access by for­eign aut­ho­ri­ties in the sen­se of a crime of suc­cess would be decisive.

Appro­pria­te risk con­trol the­r­e­fo­re remains cru­cial. The Data pro­tec­tion law for exam­p­le, requi­res, in addi­ti­on to the com­ple­ti­on of the Stan­dard Con­trac­tu­al Clau­ses An assess­ment of the risk that an aut­ho­ri­ty in a third coun­try wit­hout an ade­qua­te level of pro­tec­tion based on a legis­la­ti­on or prac­ti­ce that is ina­de­qua­te in terms of the rule of law acce­s­ses trans­mit­ted per­so­nal data.

Under­wri­ting is also the key to for­eign dis­clo­sure at the Sec­re­cy law. If it is cer­tain, or if a com­pa­ny assu­mes on the basis of risk con­side­ra­ti­ons, that a secret is pro­tec­ted and would be vio­la­ted if a for­eign aut­ho­ri­ty were to gain access to the secret, the que­sti­on ari­ses as to whe­ther this access would be cau­sed by an inten­tio­nal or negli­gent con­duct has been made. In any case, this is not the case if the per­son hol­ding the secret – e.g. the bank, but also the lawy­er – is has taken tho­se mea­su­res that are ex ante neces­sa­ry and appro­pria­te to redu­ce the risk of such access below the thres­hold of what is soci­al­ly accep­ta­ble.

This thres­hold, like the pro­tec­tion of secrets as such, is deter­mi­ned by the expec­ta­ti­ons of the owners of the secrets, which are to be sub­stan­tia­ted in a man­ner typi­cal for the indu­stry. Here, the assump­ti­on sug­gests its­elf that abso­lu­te pro­tec­tion is expec­ted only in rare excep­ti­ons. It is true that a clear line can­not be drawn becau­se the deter­mi­na­ti­on of risks is neither ex ante nor ex post an exact sci­ence. A bank, secu­ri­ties firm, or other sec­re­cy pro­vi­der must and may under­ta­ke this risk assess­ment wit­hout zero risk being a goal. Con­cep­tual­ly, this risk assess­ment is no dif­fe­rent from that under data pro­tec­tion law, except that it has a some­what dif­fe­rent sub­ject mat­ter and the­r­e­fo­re turns out to be more in-depth.

The data pro­tec­tion and con­fi­den­tia­li­ty con­side­ra­ti­ons the­r­e­fo­re con­ver­ge in risk assess­ments, muta­tis mut­an­dis. Sin­ce zero risk does not exist, the result can­not be other­wi­se. Advan­ced cloud pro­vi­ders pro­vi­de “on-board resour­ces” here to pro­tect cus­to­mer data, e.g., sta­te-of-the-art encryption.

Agree­ments with cloud providers

In addi­ti­on to the que­sti­on of accep­ta­ble resi­du­al risk, the main issue is how regu­la­ted com­pa­nies can regu­la­to­ry requi­re­ments can imple­ment. The con­tracts with the cloud pro­vi­ders are an essen­ti­al ele­ment in this. In gene­ral, howe­ver, it can be obser­ved that the con­tri­bu­ti­on that cloud con­tracts can make is ove­resti­ma­ted, which is per­haps rela­ted to a Bias of the legal pro­fes­si­on towards con­tracts. Howe­ver, tho­se who seek sal­va­ti­on too much in the wor­ding of the con­tract ove­resti­ma­te both the weak­ne­s­ses and the effect of the con­tracts and tend to unde­re­sti­ma­te other risks, for exam­p­le their own respon­si­bi­li­ty in the imple­men­ta­ti­on of tech­ni­cal secu­ri­ty mea­su­res such as encryp­ti­on, the red­un­dan­cy of data sto­rage or even a clear cloud stra­tegy. This is becau­se risks ari­se not only from a con­trac­tu­al short­fall, but also, for exam­p­le, from an incom­ple­te delinea­ti­on of respon­si­bi­li­ties (in the sen­se of “shared respon­si­bi­li­ty”), an insuf­fi­ci­ent map­ping of cus­to­mer-side respon­si­bi­li­ty to inter­nal pro­ce­s­ses or other inter­nal obli­ga­ti­ons such as, if appli­ca­ble, the sto­rage of cus­to­mer data par­al­lel to the for­eign loca­ti­on also in Switz­er­land due to the cor­re­spon­ding requi­re­ments of FINMA. Par­ti­cu­lar­ly in the case of banks and secu­ri­ties firms, cor­re­spon­ding obli­ga­ti­ons ari­se from spe­cial regu­la­ti­ons such as Annex 3 of the FINMA Cir­cular on Ope­ra­tio­nal Risks.

This is to empha­si­ze the importance of the Con­trac­tu­al arran­ge­ments of the pro­vi­ders natu­ral­ly not be dimi­nis­hed. Last but not least, the requi­re­ments for pro­vi­der con­tracts, at least for mate­ri­al out­sour­cing, are descri­bed in more detail by FINMA’s Out­sour­cing Cir­cular (and the afo­re­men­tio­ned SBA Gui­dance Note also con­ta­ins gui­dance). The Out­sour­cing Cir­cular ser­ves as a cor­re­spon­ding gui­de­line for pro­vi­ders. Here, it can be obser­ved that gre­at pro­gress has been made in recent years, months and weeks. All of the major cloud pro­vi­ders offer their own Con­tracts or con­tract adden­da with which they cover the mini­mum requi­re­ments of the FINMA Cir­cularThe new rules will have a posi­ti­ve impact on the audit pro­cess, par­ti­cu­lar­ly with regard to the audit rights of cus­to­mers, their inter­nal and exter­nal audi­tors, and FINMA. In the case of all pro­vi­ders, for exam­p­le, FINMA now has a con­trac­tu­al right to con­duct audits direct­ly at the provider’s pre­mi­ses wit­hout the cli­ent having to inter­ve­ne. The aspect of Busi­ness Con­ti­nui­ty in con­nec­tion with ter­mi­na­ti­on and dis­con­ti­nua­tion opti­ons of the pro­vi­ders and rights of ser­vice reci­pi­en­ts within the cus­to­mer group was expan­ded. In gene­ral, it can be obser­ved that the cloud pro­vi­ders take feed­back from cus­to­mers and also FINMA serious­ly and imple­ment it in prin­ci­ple. This can be easi­ly tra­ced in the histo­ry of the con­trac­tu­al agree­ments. The FINMA has alre­a­dy accept­ed the con­tracts of the three major pro­vi­ders. Cus­to­mers the­r­e­fo­re do not have to fear any signi­fi­cant head­wind from FINMA with regard to the cor­re­spon­ding con­trac­tu­al arrangements.

Con­tract negotiations

It often remains right or neces­sa­ry, Dis­cuss and ren­ego­tia­te con­tracts, for various con­side­ra­ti­ons, inclu­ding inter­nal requi­re­ments, the company’s own risk appe­ti­te, indu­stry prac­ti­ces, com­mer­cial weights, etc. Howe­ver, not every defect in a con­tract deter­mi­nes the per­mis­si­bi­li­ty of out­sour­cing. Cer­tain ambi­gui­ties can be accept­ed, for exam­p­le, if the wor­ding is not clear but the mea­ning is. Depen­ding on the situa­ti­on, gaps can also be clo­sed by cus­to­mers. One exam­p­le is the Swiss data loca­ti­on. The major pro­vi­ders ope­ra­te data cen­ters in Switz­er­land or have announ­ced Swiss regi­ons, but regu­la­to­ry requi­re­ments in this regard can also be sol­ved by sto­ring data abroad but repli­ca­ting it in Switz­er­land on the cus­to­mer side.

Com­mon points of nego­tia­ti­on also con­cern Cla­ri­fi­ca­ti­ons and of cour­se Com­mer­cial points. The lia­bi­li­ty – to pick an exam­p­le – is not only of a com­mer­cial natu­re in the approach, after the Fede­ral Supre­me Court in the decis­i­on BGE 145 II 229 also refer­red to the lia­bi­li­ty regu­la­ti­on when asses­sing the appro­pria­ten­ess of out­sour­cing by a law firm. Howe­ver, it did not make the state­ment that lia­bi­li­ty as such was decisi­ve. Rather, what was defec­ti­ve in the case under review was a con­tract that was ina­de­qua­te in seve­ral respects and appar­ent­ly as a who­le. In the con­text of pro­fes­sio­nal sec­re­cy, lia­bi­li­ty can only have the mea­ning of an incen­ti­ve to con­duct ones­elf in con­for­mi­ty with the con­tract. It can­not, howe­ver, undo an impro­per dis­clo­sure; in this case, it mere­ly leads to a shift in assets. This is, of cour­se, important, but a mat­ter not of pro­fes­sio­nal sec­re­cy but of sol­ven­cy. Accor­din­gly, lia­bi­li­ty can only have regu­la­to­ry signi­fi­can­ce if, wit­hout it, the­re is a lack of suf­fi­ci­ent incen­ti­ve to ensu­re the con­trac­tual­ly agreed secu­ri­ty, con­fi­den­tia­li­ty and pur­po­se limi­ta­ti­on of the secret. At least for lar­ger pro­vi­ders, howe­ver, this incen­ti­ve is less a que­sti­on of lia­bi­li­ty than of repu­ta­ti­on. If, for exam­p­le, FINMA were to con­clude that a cloud pro­vi­der was unre­lia­ble, the Swiss mar­ket would be dif­fi­cult for this cloud pro­vi­der to penetrate.

This evo­lu­ti­on is not com­ple­te, and future ver­si­ons of the con­tracts will make cer­tain requi­re­ments (“con­trols”) even more robust, but it would be a mista­ke to place the weight of risk assess­ment too uni­la­te­ral­ly on the wor­ding of the con­tracts. As con­tracts beco­me more matu­re, the focus from a cus­to­mer per­spec­ti­ve con­ti­nues to shift to the Inter­nal con­trol of the sup­plier rela­ti­on­ship and the Com­mu­ni­ca­ti­on with the out­side worldalso, for exam­p­le, in gene­ral terms and con­di­ti­ons – both of which can alre­a­dy be obser­ved and will increase.

Aut­ho­ri­ty

Area

Topics

Rela­ted articles

Sub­scri­be