On March 26, 2025, the Gen­e­va Cour de Justi­ce issued a ruling on the Cri­mi­nal lia­bi­li­ty for a breach of the mini­mum data secu­ri­ty requi­re­ments (judgment ACPR/239/2025), via the Fran­çois Char­let has alre­a­dy repor­ted at Swiss­pri­va­cy.

The back­ground to this was a trai­ning cour­se at a busi­ness school in which cli­nic employee E alle­gedly shared medi­cal infor­ma­ti­on about ano­ther class­ma­te with her class­ma­te A. A was under psych­ia­tric care at the same cli­nic. A was recei­ving psych­ia­tric care at the same cli­nic and sub­se­quent­ly wan­ted to know whe­ther her data had also been acce­s­sed. In fact, a check reve­a­led a Access by E to their data too. The­re was sub­se­quent­ly a fur­ther dis­cus­sion and a poli­ce inve­sti­ga­ti­on into the rea­sons for and ext­ent of the access. Appar­ent­ly, E was employed in the clinic’s accoun­ting depart­ment and was the­r­e­fo­re able to access the pati­ent files, inclu­ding medi­cal data, becau­se the cli­nic soft­ware did not allow only rest­ric­ted access.

The pro­ce­e­dings were not even initia­ted by the public prosecutor’s office. The Cour de Justi­ce rejects A’s appeal against the refu­sal to take action on the basis of brief reasons:

A Vio­la­ti­on of the right to infor­ma­ti­on pur­su­ant to Art. 60 para. 1 FADP could not be estab­lished be made. Alt­hough A had not been told exact­ly which of her data had been acce­s­sed, this was harmless:

[It is] irrele­vant that the infor­ma­ti­on pro­vi­ded does not indi­ca­te whe­ther […] medi­cal ele­ments were actual­ly acce­s­sed. Within the mea­ning of Art. 60 para. 1 FADP only the com­ple­te infor­ma­ti­on on the scope of the admi­ni­stra­ti­ve staff’s right of access is decisi­ve. In addi­ti­on, the vio­la­ti­on of Art. 60 FADP is exclu­si­ve­ly intentional.

Also a Vio­la­ti­on of the mini­mum data secu­ri­ty requi­re­ments – becau­se of the com­pre­hen­si­ve rather than limi­t­ed access to the pati­ent file was not created:

  • Due to the ambi­gui­ty of Art. 61 para. 1 lit. c FADP only obvious inju­ries The scope of the regu­la­ti­on should include, for exam­p­le, the com­ple­te absence of safe­ty mea­su­res, but not mere­ly ina­de­qua­te mea­su­res or incom­ple­te regu­la­ti­on, as risk con­side­ra­ti­ons and que­sti­ons of appro­pria­ten­ess are decisi­ve here.
  • In this case, the­re was a fun­da­men­tal rea­son for the dis­pu­ted access, which is why the­re is no clear-cut case. In addi­ti­on, as an auxi­lia­ry per­son, E was also sub­ject to pati­ent confidentiality

The result of the ruling is hard­ly surprising:

  • The­re is unli­kely to be any appe­ti­te to pro­se­cu­te data pro­tec­tion vio­la­ti­ons, even in a case such as this, which invol­ved at least high­ly que­stionable access to health data. In par­ti­cu­lar, justi­fi­ed access legi­ti­mi­zesright not all effec­ti­ve access. In this respect, one can sym­pa­thi­ze with the com­plainant that she did not want to let the case rest on its lau­rels by refu­sing to enter it.
  • It is true, howe­ver, that the Cour de Justi­ce has joi­n­ed the cri­ti­cal lite­ra­tu­re and only abso­lut­e­ly obvious cases of secu­ri­ty brea­ches as poten­ti­al­ly cri­mi­nal­ly rele­vant cate­go­ri­zed. In the broad gray area of “appro­pria­te” data secu­ri­ty, cri­mi­nal lia­bi­li­ty would in fact hard­ly be com­pa­ti­ble with the prin­ci­ple of cer­tain­ty (see here).

A vio­la­ti­on of Art. 321 StGB or Art. 62 DSG. Neither could be ruled out a prio­ri, at least if one assu­mes that a dis­clo­sure within the orga­nizati­on of a legal enti­ty can con­sti­tu­te a cri­mi­nal offence (see also Reto Fer­ra­ri-Vis­ca, in his dis­ser­ta­ti­on, para. 958: no bank-inter­nal ban­king sec­re­cy; at least que­stionable in view of the per­so­nal owner­ship of the secret and the AXA pen­si­on fund decis­i­on of the FAC).