Take-Aways (AI)
  • Report iden­ti­fi­es data pro­tec­tion risks for LLMs along the enti­re life­cy­cle: trai­ning, appli­ca­ti­on, feed­back and agent systems.
  • Main pro­blems: uncon­trol­led trai­ning data, memo­rizati­on of per­so­nal con­tent, leaka­ge and lack of trans­pa­ren­cy in decis­i­on-making processes.
  • Recom­men­ded mea­su­res: Data mini­mizati­on, pri­va­cy by design, veri­fi­ed anony­mizati­on and tech­ni­cal pro­tec­tion mecha­nisms (e.g. dif­fe­ren­ti­al pri­va­cy, filters).
  • Gover­nan­ce recom­men­da­ti­ons: Access roles, out­put con­trols, sepa­ra­te feed­back pro­ce­s­sing, regu­lar risk reviews and trans­pa­rent documentation.

In March 2025, as part of the “Sup­port Pool of Experts” pro­gram published a 100-page report on data pro­tec­tion risks when using lar­ge lan­guage models (LLMs) and on secu­ri­ty mea­su­res (“AI Pri­va­cy Risks & Miti­ga­ti­ons – Lar­ge Lan­guage Models (LLMs)”). The pro­gram ser­ves to sup­port the super­vi­so­ry aut­ho­ri­ties in com­plex cases, with the aim of con­tri­bu­ting to the appli­ca­ti­on of the GDPR wit­hout being binding.

The report ana­ly­zes after a detail­ed Intro­duc­tion also to tech­ni­cal aspects and Agen­tic AI the data pro­tec­tion chal­lenges asso­cia­ted with the deve­lo­p­ment, ope­ra­ti­on and inte­gra­ti­on of LLMs in AI systems.

Risks

The risk ana­ly­sis is based on the life cycle of an LLM system:

1. risks in the trai­ning phase:

  • Uncon­trol­led data sources: LLMs are often trai­ned with lar­ge data sets, which can ori­gi­na­te from web scra­ping, among other things. They may unin­ten­tio­nal­ly con­tain per­so­nal or sen­si­ti­ve information.
  • Memo­rizati­on of con­tent: The model can “memo­ri­ze” per­so­nal con­tent and repro­du­ce it later.
  • Lack of anony­mizati­on: Even if data is pre-pro­ce­s­sed, anony­mizati­on is not always sufficient.
  • Legal uncer­tain­ty: The legal sta­tus of trai­ning data (e.g. con­sent, pur­po­se limi­ta­ti­on) may be unclear.

2. risks in the appli­ca­ti­on of the model:

  • Leaka­ge: Out­puts can refer direct­ly or indi­rect­ly to real peo­p­le or trai­ning content.
  • Recons­truc­ta­bi­li­ty: Cer­tain inputs can cau­se the model to par­ti­al­ly repro­du­ce trai­ning pat­terns or source texts.
  • RAGs: If data sources (e.g. a RAG) are used for prompts and the respon­se, sen­si­ti­ve con­tent may be disclosed.

3. risks due to feedback:

  • Unclear data flows: Feed­back from users (e.g. cor­rec­tions and ratings) can be saved and pro­ce­s­sed again, inclu­ding wit­hout consent/inadmissibly.
  • Pro­fi­le deve­lo­p­ment: Con­ti­nuous inter­ac­tions with a system can store user-rela­ted beha­vi­or patterns.
  • Lack of ear­mar­king: Con­fir­ma­ti­on data is often not pro­ce­s­sed sepa­ra­te­ly and is mixed with other data records.

4. syste­mic risks in agent architectures:

  • Auto­no­my: LLMs in agent-based systems may be able to make inde­pen­dent decis­i­ons with poten­ti­al effects on tho­se affected.
  • Lack of trans­pa­ren­cy: The decis­i­on-making pro­cess is tech­ni­cal­ly com­plex and may not be com­pre­hen­si­ble to outsiders.
  • Risk poten­tia­ti­on: The more exter­nal tools and data sources are inte­gra­ted, the more dif­fi­cult it is to con­trol data flows.

Mea­su­res

The docu­ment men­ti­ons risk miti­ga­ti­on mea­su­res such as

1. design and conception:

  • Data mini­mizati­on: Avo­id­ance of unneces­sa­ry per­so­nal data sources in trai­ning, in par­ti­cu­lar no use of raw data from non-vali­da­ted open sources.
  • Pri­va­cy by Design: Inte­gra­ti­on of data pro­tec­tion prin­ci­ples in archi­tec­tu­re and system plan­ning, e.g. through modu­lar data sepa­ra­ti­on or rest­ric­ted con­text windows.
  • Tech­ni­cal pro­tec­ti­ve mea­su­res: Instal­la­ti­on of dif­fe­ren­ti­al pri­va­cy or similar.

2. trai­ning and data preparation:

  • Data sel­ec­tion: Use of veri­fi­ed, pre­fer­a­b­ly anony­mi­zed or pseud­ony­mi­zed trai­ning data; pre­fer­a­b­ly syn­the­tic or aggre­ga­ted sources.
  • Fil­ter: Use of auto­ma­ted detec­tion and exclu­si­on mecha­nisms for sen­si­ti­ve con­tent (e.g. per­so­nal iden­ti­fiers, health data, finan­cial information).
  • Anony­mi­ty: Vali­da­ti­on of whe­ther trai­ning data meets the cri­te­ria of irrever­si­bi­li­ty in the sen­se of the Opi­ni­on 28/2024 correspond.

3. ope­ra­ti­on and application:

  • Access and role con­cepts: Imple­men­ta­ti­on of dif­fe­ren­tia­ted access rest­ric­tions for admins, deve­lo­pers and end users.
  • Out­put con­trol: Use of out­put fil­ters, prompt fire­walls and toxi­ci­ty-based black­lists to pre­vent the out­put of harmful or iden­ti­fy­ing content.
  • Token level pro­tec­tion: Use of seman­tic token fil­te­ring to detect and mask sen­si­ti­ve con­tent befo­re deli­very to the user.
  • RAG pro­tec­tion: For Retrie­val Aug­men­ted Gene­ra­ti­on (RAG): Access rest­ric­tions, log­ging of queries, vali­da­ti­on of the data used.

4. feed­back and improvement:

  • Sepa­ra­ti­on: Tech­ni­cal sepa­ra­ti­on bet­ween ope­ra­tio­nal use and trai­ning data.
  • Con­sent Manage­ment: Trans­pa­rent design of feed­back, labe­l­ing of vol­un­t­a­ry feed­back, docu­men­ted consent.
  • Dele­ti­on pro­ce­s­ses: Imple­men­ta­ti­on of rever­si­ble feed­back sto­rage with the opti­on of revo­ca­ti­on and deletion.

5. moni­to­ring, resi­du­al risk ana­ly­sis and governance:

  • Risk review: Regu­lar tech­ni­cal and orga­nizatio­nal reviews, espe­ci­al­ly in the event of system updates, archi­tec­tu­re chan­ges or model replacements.
  • Resi­du­al risk clas­si­fi­ca­ti­on: Syste­ma­tic assess­ment of accept­ed resi­du­al risks, based on com­pre­hen­si­ble seve­ri­ty and pro­ba­bi­li­ty of occurrence.
  • Docu­men­ta­ti­on and trans­pa­ren­cy: Main­ten­an­ce of a risk regi­ster, log­ging of data pro­tec­tion-rele­vant decis­i­ons, dis­clo­sure to super­vi­so­ry authorities.