Take-Aways (AI)
  • The FDPIC clas­si­fi­es dyna­mic IP addres­ses as per­so­nal data, as they can con­tri­bu­te to the crea­ti­on of per­so­na­li­ty pro­files and identification.
  • The Fede­ral Supre­me Court fol­lows a rela­ti­ve deter­mina­bi­li­ty approach: The iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on pos­si­bi­li­ties and inte­rests of the data owner or reci­pi­ent are decisive.
  • Legal effect also extends to data coll­ec­tors and dis­se­mi­na­tors; data pro­tec­tion law applies if reci­pi­ent can iden­ti­fy data sub­ject after data transfer.

Are dyna­mic IP addres­ses per­so­nal data? For the FDPIC (eva­lua­ti­on tools for web­sites) yes:

From a data pro­tec­tion per­spec­ti­ve, many of the known web track­ing ser­vices are pro­ble­ma­tic. By ana­ly­zing Inter­net usa­ge, per­so­na­li­ty pro­files within the mea­ning of the Data Pro­tec­tion Act are obtai­ned under cer­tain cir­cum­stances. Even if only the IP address of a user is pro­ce­s­sed, this is rele­vant in terms of data pro­tec­tion law, sin­ce the IP address is basi­cal­ly to be qua­li­fi­ed as per­so­nal data.

The Fede­ral Court (i.S. Logi­step) on the other hand, takes a rela­ti­ve approach: for deter­mina­bi­li­ty, the pos­si­bi­li­ties and inte­rests of the respec­ti­ve owner (or reci­pi­ent) of the data must be taken into account.

3.4 Whe­ther infor­ma­ti­on can be lin­ked to a per­son on the basis of addi­tio­nal data, i.e. whe­ther the infor­ma­ti­on rela­tes to an iden­ti­fia­ble per­son (Art. 3 lit. a FADP), is asses­sed from the per­spec­ti­ve of the respec­ti­ve hol­der of the infor­ma­ti­on (ROSENTHAL, loc. cit., n. 20 on Art. 3 FADP; WEBER/FERCSIK SCHNYDER, loc. cit., p. 583). In the case of the dis­clo­sure of infor­ma­ti­on, it is suf­fi­ci­ent if the reci­pi­ent is able to iden­ti­fy the data sub­ject. In this con­text, ROSENTHAL cites the exam­p­le of a news­pa­per report about the acci­dent of a local poli­ti­ci­an who has not been named. Accor­ding to the author’s con­vin­cing argu­men­ta­ti­on, if part of the rea­der­ship is able to dedu­ce the iden­ti­ty of the per­son con­cer­ned (if neces­sa­ry on the basis of fur­ther rese­arch), the publi­ca­ti­on con­sti­tu­tes a dis­clo­sure of per­so­nal data from their point of view (ROSENTHAL, loc. cit., n. 30 on Art. 3 DPA; cf. also Art. 3 lit. e DPA). This means for the pre­sent case that it is not a pre­re­qui­si­te that the copy­right inf­ring­ers are alre­a­dy iden­ti­fia­ble for the respon­dent. Rather, it is suf­fi­ci­ent if they beco­me so for the copy­right hol­ders after the rele­vant data has been han­ded over. If this is the case (see below), the Data Pro­tec­tion Act also applies to the respon­dent its­elf. To deci­de other­wi­se would mean to app­ly the Data Pro­tec­tion Act only to the indi­vi­du­al reci­pi­en­ts, but not to the per­son who obta­ins the data in que­sti­on and dis­se­mi­na­tes them. This would run coun­ter to the pur­po­se of the Act.

This approach is now also advo­ca­ted by the Ger­man fede­ral govern­ment in a state­ment on the Brey­er case pen­ding befo­re the ECJ: