Take-Aways (AI)
  • In prin­ci­ple, the GDPR does not app­ly to a Swiss con­trol­ler sole­ly becau­se of an EU processor.
  • Art. 3 GDPR fol­lows the prin­ci­ple of estab­lish­ment; excep­ti­ons are mar­ket ori­en­ta­ti­on and beha­vi­oral moni­to­ring in the EU.
  • An EU branch of the pro­ces­sor does not auto­ma­ti­cal­ly con­sti­tu­te a branch of the exter­nal controller.
  • Spe­cial cases: Offer to EU mar­ket or beha­vi­oral obser­va­ti­on trig­ger GDPR appli­ca­ti­on; Switz­er­land may have dif­fe­rent views.
[Updates on Octo­ber 5, 2017]

One of the many que­sti­ons that Swiss com­pa­nies are curr­ent­ly facing or have alre­a­dy faced in con­nec­tion with the GDPR is the fol­lo­wing: Does the GDPR app­ly to the data pro­ce­s­sing of a Swiss con­trol­ler who employs a data pro­ces­sor in the EU?

In my opi­ni­on, the ans­wer to this is No:

  • The system and pur­po­se of Art. 3 GDPR speak against this. In prin­ci­ple, the prin­ci­ple of estab­lish­ment or coun­try of domic­i­le applies (para. 1). Accor­din­gly, a Swiss con­trol­ler is not sub­ject to the GDPR as long as it does not have an estab­lish­ment in the EU. As Excep­ti­on Para­graph 2 regu­la­tes two cases in which a for­eign com­pa­ny is nevert­hel­ess sub­ject to the GDPR by way of excep­ti­on, name­ly mar­ket ori­en­ta­ti­on (lit. a) and beha­vi­oral moni­to­ring (lit. b). Out­side of the­se excep­ti­ons, howe­ver, the GDPR does not app­ly to com­pa­nies in Switzerland.
  • This is also reflec­ted in the fact that Art. 27(1) GDPR only men­ti­ons the­se two excep­ti­ons when it comes to the obli­ga­ti­on of non-Euro­pean pro­ces­sors to appoint an EU repre­sen­ta­ti­ve, and that Art. 40(3) GDPR men­ti­ons com­pli­ance with codes of con­duct by for­eign con­trol­lers and prin­ci­pals, which are not cover­ed by the GDPR accor­ding to Art. 3 (and the same applies to Art. 42(3)).
  • It should also be clear that the estab­lish­ment of the order pro­ces­sor No branch of the respon­si­ble is. An estab­lish­ment in the EU is only an estab­lish­ment of a non-Euro­pean con­trol­ler if it is con­nec­ted to it in a qua­li­fi­ed man­ner. This is cle­ar­ly reflec­ted in reci­tal 22: “The legal form of such an enti­ty, whe­ther it is a branch or a sub­si­dia­ry with its own legal per­so­na­li­ty, shall not be decisi­ve”. In prin­ci­ple, the­r­e­fo­re, a con­nec­tion under com­pa­ny law is requi­red, but accor­ding to the ruling of the ECJ i.S. Goog­le Spain an agen­cy, for exam­p­le, would also suf­fice. Howe­ver, mere com­mis­sio­ned pro­ce­s­sing is not suf­fi­ci­ent (cf. Artic­le 29 Working Par­ty, Update of Opi­ni­on 8/2010 on appli­ca­ble law in light of the CJEU jud­ge­ment in Goog­le Spain, S. 5; at chan­ges Goog­le Spain not­hing: Goog­le Spain was a sub­si­dia­ry and thus a branch of Goog­le, Inc. [para. 49]; the only dis­pu­te was whe­ther the ope­ra­ti­on of the search engi­ne by Goog­le, Inc. was attri­bu­ta­ble to the Spa­nish branch, i.e. whe­ther it took place “within the scope of this branch”; para. 52 et seq.). As a result, the estab­lish­ment prin­ci­ple can­not lead to sub­jec­ting the non-Euro­pean con­trol­ler to the GDPR.
  • It should also be taken into account that the GDPR also applies to the EU-based Pro­ces­sor sub­ject to the GDPR. The pre­sent gui­de­line does not do this; in prin­ci­ple, it pre­sup­po­ses an estab­lish­ment of the respon­si­ble (Art. 4(1)(a)). With the sub­or­di­na­ti­on of the pro­ces­sor, the­re is no lon­ger any rea­son to sub­ject a CH con­trol­ler to the GDPR in order to avo­id a pro­tec­tion gap (becau­se the pro­tec­tion is alre­a­dy ensu­red by the appli­ca­ti­on to the local pro­ces­sor, the GDPR can also dis­pen­se with the cri­ter­ion of the use of local “means” under Art. 4(1)(c) of the RiLi). Thus, with the goal of not depri­ving per­sons in the EU of the pro­tec­tion of Euro­pean law, one can no lon­ger justi­fy the appli­ca­ti­on of the GDPR to the non-Euro­pean con­trol­ler. If one nevert­hel­ess wan­ted to sub­ject the for­eign con­trol­ler with an EU pro­ces­sor to the GDPR, one would have to con­se­quent­ly any pro­ce­s­sing of data of per­sons in the EU to be sub­ject to the GDPR. Howe­ver, this is pre­cis­e­ly what the legis­la­tor deli­bera­te­ly refrai­ned from doing.

As a result, a Swiss con­trol­ler does not have to com­ply with the GDPR for a par­ti­cu­lar pro­ce­s­sing acti­vi­ty sim­ply becau­se it employs a pro­ces­sor in the EU; or for­mu­la­ted dif­fer­ent­ly: The trans­fer of per­so­nal data to the EU pro­ces­sor no lon­ger “infects” the pro­ce­s­sing of such per­so­nal data. This is also the view of, for exam­p­le Karg (in the Cooling/Buchner, curr­ent­ly the most com­pre­hen­si­ve com­men­ta­ry on the GDPR, Art. 3 N 38). In Switz­er­land, howe­ver, other views are also held (e.g. here, here, here and here).

The­re are two caveats to keep in mind:

  • If the data con­trol­ler simul­ta­neous­ly directs its offer to the EU mar­ket (as defi­ned in Art. 3(2)(a)) or moni­tors the beha­vi­or of per­sons in the EU (as defi­ned in Art. 3(2)(b)), the fol­lo­wing applies this The facts of the case pre­clude the appli­ca­ti­on of the GDPR.
  • Accor­ding to Art. 139 IPRG, per­sons in the EU can gene­ral­ly invo­ke their home coun­try law befo­re Swiss courts.

Admit­ted­ly, not being sub­ject to the GDPR does not chan­ge the fact that the EU pro­ces­sor must at least de fac­to will insist on rea­ching an agree­ment with the per­son in char­ge Con­tract accor­ding to Art. 28 para. 3 DSGVO to clo­se. Howe­ver, the requi­re­ments of this pro­vi­si­on pri­ma­ri­ly affect the pro­ces­sor. Art. 28 GDPR is the­r­e­fo­re pri­ma­ri­ly rele­vant in the rever­se case, as an EU con­trol­ler uses a pro­ces­sor in Switz­er­land. Howe­ver, the con­clu­si­on of an agree­ment pur­su­ant to Art. 28(3) only leads to the con­trac­tu­al Bin­ding to cer­tain obli­ga­ti­ons of the GDPR, not to the appli­ca­ti­on of the GDPR its­elf, which is of cour­se rele­vant in case of a breach (con­trac­tu­al con­se­quen­ces vs. risk of fines), but also with regard to fur­ther obli­ga­ti­ons such as tho­se to appoint an EU repre­sen­ta­ti­ve or data pro­tec­tion officer.

An open que­sti­on is whe­ther the EU con­trol­ler, when trans­fer­ring data (back) to the non-Euro­pean con­trol­ler in such a con­stel­la­ti­on, can Art. 44 ff. GDPR regar­ding trans­fers to third count­ries (or vice ver­sa the EU con­trol­ler to the Swiss pro­ces­sor). The wor­ding of Art. 44 GDPR sug­gests this. Howe­ver, it would con­tra­dict the legis­la­ti­ve decis­i­on to sub­ject the con­trol­ler in such con­stel­la­ti­ons to the GDPR. The que­sti­on is open, but hard­ly plays a role in the rela­ti­on­ship with Switz­er­land, as the EU Com­mis­si­on con­siders Switz­er­land to have ade­qua­te data protection.