Take-Aways (AI)
  • Data con­trol­lers must proac­tively docu­ment the gran­ting and elec­tro­nic con­sent; the mere design of the web­site is not suf­fi­ci­ent proof.
  • Lega­cy cons­ents remain valid only if they com­ply with the GDPR con­di­ti­ons, inclu­ding indi­vi­du­al docu­men­ta­ti­on and infor­ma­ti­on obligations.
  • Lack of refe­rence to right of revo­ca­ti­on can ren­der old legal cons­ents inef­fec­ti­ve; repa­pe­ring would be cost­ly and controversial.
  • Arbi­tra­ry swit­ching bet­ween con­sent and other legal bases is not per­mit­ted; swit­ching remains pos­si­ble in prin­ci­ple, but must be justi­fi­ed fair­ly and transparently.

The DSK (Data Pro­tec­tion Con­fe­rence, the body of the Ger­man data pro­tec­tion super­vi­so­ry aut­ho­ri­ties) has Brief Paper No. 20 on Con­sent under the GDPR published. It con­ta­ins litt­le new per se, but some refe­ren­ces are noteworthy:

  • Pro­of of con­sent: The respon­si­ble per­son must be able to pro­ve that it has been issued. This obli­ga­ti­on is not only to be under­s­tood as a bur­den of pro­of rule, but also as a docu­men­ta­ti­on obli­ga­ti­on. Elec­tro­nic cons­ents must be log­ged. It would not be suf­fi­ci­ent mere­ly to pro­ve the pro­per design of the rele­vant web­site if con­sent can­not be pro­ven in the indi­vi­du­al case.
  • Con­tin­ued vali­di­ty of old-law cons­entsAccor­ding to Reci­tal 171, cons­ents given pri­or to the ent­ry into force of the GDPR shall con­ti­n­ue to be valid, pro­vi­ded that the natu­re of such cons­ents “com­plies with the con­di­ti­ons of this Regu­la­ti­on” (the GDPR). This requi­res, among other things, that the con­sent is docu­men­ted in the indi­vi­du­al case, that it was given vol­un­t­a­ri­ly, that it was given for the spe­ci­fic case, infor­med and unam­bi­guous, and that the con­trol­ler enables revo­ca­ti­on and informs how it can be revoked.

The second point is pro­ble­ma­tic in that it ren­ders old-law con­sent inva­lid if, among other things, the right of revo­ca­ti­on was not poin­ted out when it was gran­ted. This point is dis­pu­ted in the lite­ra­tu­re. In my opi­ni­on, this goes too far. If the DSK’s view is fol­lo­wed, such con­sent would have to be obtai­ned again (“repa­pe­ring”), which can be enorm­ously time-consuming.

Regar­ding the chan­ge to an alter­na­ti­ve legal basis, the FSC comm­ents as follows:

Basing the data pro­ce­s­sing in this case on ano­ther legal basis, for exam­p­le the pro­tec­tion of legi­ti­ma­te inte­rests of the con­trol­ler or a third par­ty (Art. 6(1)(f) DS-GVO), is in prin­ci­ple inad­mis­si­ble, becau­se the con­trol­ler must obser­ve the prin­ci­ples of fair­ness and trans­pa­ren­cy (Art. 5(1)(a) DS-GVO). In any case, arbi­tra­ry swit­ching bet­ween con­sent and other legal bases is not pos­si­ble.

The FADP thus lea­ves open the pos­si­bi­li­ty of chan­ging to an alter­na­ti­ve legal basis. This could be con­side­red, for exam­p­le, if a pre­vious legal con­sent is no lon­ger effective.