Take-Aways (AI)
  • FDPIC cri­ti­ci­zes Digi­tec Gala­xus’ old pri­va­cy poli­cy and recom­mends grea­ter trans­pa­ren­cy on ana­ly­sis tools used, pur­po­ses, pro­fil­ing and legal remedies.
  • FDPIC recom­mends the offer of a guest purcha­se as a pro­por­tio­na­te mea­su­re; legal­ly con­tro­ver­si­al due to tran­si­tio­nal law, pur­po­se and lack of FADP basis.

Today (April 17, 2024), the FDPIC published the final report in a fact-fin­ding inve­sti­ga­ti­on into the Digi­tec Gala­xus AG online store that has been ongo­ing sin­ce 2021 (Media release and Final report).

The sub­ject of the cla­ri­fi­ca­ti­on of the facts was que­sti­ons rela­ting to Digi­tec Gala­xus’ (“Digi­tec”) pri­va­cy poli­cy at the time – which has long been out­da­ted – and the lin­king of cus­to­mer orders with a cus­to­mer account (key­word: guest purcha­se). Over­all, the FDPIC is (very) strict – a cer­tain trend that can also be obser­ved elsewhere.

Dis­clai­merDigi­tec Gala­xus was repre­sen­ted in the inve­sti­ga­ti­on by Wal­der Wyss (inclu­ding the aut­hor of this article).

Digitec’s recom­men­da­ti­ons and position

The final report con­ta­ins six recom­men­da­ti­ons. The first five main­ly con­cern Digitec’s pri­va­cy poli­cy at the time. The FDPIC recom­mends that:

  1. it is cle­ar­ly reco­gnizable for the data sub­jects which web ana­ly­sis tools are used and which data pro­ce­s­sing results from this.
  2. it is cle­ar­ly reco­gnizable to the data sub­jects for which pur­po­ses which per­so­nal data is pro­ce­s­sed and that data pro­ce­s­sing takes place that leads to per­so­na­li­ty profiles.
  3. the decla­ra­ti­on does not con­tain any data pro­ce­s­sing “on reser­ve” and only tho­se data pro­ce­s­sing ope­ra­ti­ons are listed that actual­ly take place.
  4. the decla­ra­ti­on pro­vi­des dif­fe­ren­tia­ted and unam­bi­guous infor­ma­ti­on about which pro­ce­s­sing ope­ra­ti­ons lead to vio­la­ti­ons of per­so­na­li­ty rights and the rea­sons Digi­tec Gala­xus AG reli­es on to justi­fy them.
  5. the decla­ra­ti­on descri­bes the cor­rect dele­ti­on or objec­tion opti­on depen­ding on the justi­fi­ca­ti­on for the data pro­ce­s­sing and its prac­ti­ce with regard to dele­ti­on or objec­tion requests is imple­men­ted cor­rect­ly in this respect.

On the sub­ject of guest purcha­ses, the final report con­ta­ins the fol­lo­wing some­what cryp­tic, but cer­tain­ly deli­bera­te­ly ambi­guous recom­men­da­ti­on (empha­sis added):

  • 6. As far as the data pro­ce­s­sing ope­ra­ti­ons exami­ned as a result of lin­king with the man­da­to­ry requi­re­ment of a cus­to­mer account vio­la­te the prin­ci­ple of pro­por­tio­na­li­tythey pro­ve to be inad­mis­si­ble. Digi­tec Gala­xus AG is the­r­e­fo­re adap­ting the pro­ce­s­sing in such a way that it will no lon­ger inter­fe­re with users’ infor­ma­tio­nal self-deter­mi­na­ti­on in future, than neces­sa­ry for the pro­per exe­cu­ti­on of the pro­ce­s­sing and can be justi­fi­ed under data pro­tec­tion law with the pri­va­te inte­rests of tho­se respon­si­ble. An obvious opti­on The alter­na­ti­ve offer of a data pro­ce­s­sing ser­vice for the pro­por­tio­na­te orga­nizati­on of data pro­ce­s­sing is the Guest purcha­se represent.

Digi­tec has taken the fol­lo­wing posi­ti­on on the­se recom­men­da­ti­ons (see final report):

  • Recom­men­da­ti­on 1: Point­less becau­se your request has alre­a­dy been anti­ci­pa­ted by the pri­va­cy poli­cy updated in 2023.
  • Recom­men­da­ti­on 2Dit­to; and the new law no lon­ger reco­gnizes per­so­na­li­ty pro­files, so this point has been settled.
  • Recom­men­da­ti­on 3: Rejec­ted.
  • Recom­men­da­ti­on 4: Rejec­ted.
  • Recom­men­da­ti­on 5: Point­less becau­se your request has alre­a­dy been anti­ci­pa­ted by the pri­va­cy poli­cy updated in 2023.
  • Recom­men­da­ti­on 6Accept­ed (as formulated).

Legal notes

Gene­ral

The cla­ri­fi­ca­ti­on of the facts was Tran­si­tio­nal law under the old law (Art. 70 FADP). This is pro­vi­ded for in the FADP, but it is wrong. It means that all recom­men­da­ti­ons are based on the old law – it was still rele­vant for the FDPIC, but it is lar­ge­ly no lon­ger appli­ca­ble to Digi­tec. In other words, the­re is a dis­crepan­cy under tran­si­tio­nal law bet­ween the law that is or was rele­vant in the cla­ri­fi­ca­ti­on of the facts and the law to which the con­trol­ler is sub­ject. This tran­si­tio­nal pro­vi­si­on forces the FDPIC to con­sider the legal histo­ry, and the FDPIC must not assu­me that the legal situa­ti­on is the same under the cur­rent law. Whe­ther recom­men­da­ti­ons may be made at all in this situa­ti­on is at least que­stionable, and the FDPIC can no lon­ger enforce them befo­re the FAC. It is also que­stionable whe­ther the FDPIC’s recom­men­da­ti­ons are in line with the actu­al Sub­ject of the cla­ri­fi­ca­ti­on of the facts The FDPIC inter­prets the scope of the fac­tu­al cla­ri­fi­ca­ti­on very freely.

Recom­men­da­ti­on 1: Web ana­ly­sis tools

The FDPIC has recom­men­ded here that Digi­tec should make it clear which web ana­ly­sis tools are used and what pro­ce­s­sing results from this.

The final report over­looks the fact that Art. 45c TCA a spe­cial regu­la­ti­on on the refe­ren­ces to coo­kies and other tech­no­lo­gies exists, which requi­res no more than that users are infor­med about the pro­ce­s­sing and its pur­po­se and are infor­med of the pos­si­bi­li­ty to object. It is not neces­sa­ry to spe­ci­fy which tools are used. This pro­vi­si­on is a lex spe­cia­lis that has not been touch­ed by the new DPA. The DPA can the­r­e­fo­re no lon­ger requi­re this.

In any case, the que­sti­on ari­ses as to whe­ther data pro­tec­tion law applies at all. The FDPIC assu­med here that per­so­nal data is pro­ce­s­sed in con­nec­tion with coo­kies. If the­re is a clear link bet­ween the data and a per­son, it “does not mat­ter very much” how much effort is requi­red for iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on; the­re is always iden­ti­fia­bi­li­ty here. A clear refe­rence will also be sup­port­ed by a Non-spea­king ID created.

Howe­ver, the legal basis for this view remains unclear. The final report takes an abso­lu­te approach, sta­ting that (only) pseud­ony­mizati­on exists if “the­re is still the pos­si­bi­li­ty of re-iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on of the data through extra­c­tion, lin­king and infe­rence” (wha­te­ver that means).

In doing so, the FDPIC is pro­ba­b­ly tal­king to the Sin­gu­la­rizati­on the word. If this were to be fol­lo­wed, the con­se­quen­ces would be incal­culable – data pro­tec­tion law would be far too broad­ly appli­ca­ble (“law of ever­ything”). Howe­ver, it remains unclear whe­ther the FDPIC real­ly wants to go that far. Else­whe­re, the FDPIC still requi­res – in line with the pre­vai­ling view and the (inter alia) Logi­step case law – that a re-iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on “wit­hout exce­s­si­ve effort” must be pos­si­ble, and thus right­ly con­tra­dicts the sin­gu­la­rizati­on thesis.

Ulti­m­ate­ly, the legal con­side­ra­ti­ons remain elu­si­ve, and the FDPIC is likely to have pro­ce­e­ded in a result-ori­en­ted man­ner here – he appar­ent­ly does not want to release the area of ID-based online mar­ke­ting from his com­pe­tence. Howe­ver, he would have been cor­rect to must exami­ne the spe­ci­fic effort requi­red for iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on and the inte­rest in iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on. Becau­se the cla­ri­fi­ca­ti­on of the facts fai­led to do so, the con­clu­si­on that per­so­nal data was being pro­ce­s­sed was unfoun­ded in both legal and fac­tu­al terms.

Recom­men­da­ti­on 2: Data and purposes

Recom­men­da­ti­on 2 recom­mends that it should be made clear for which pur­po­ses which per­so­nal data is pro­ce­s­sed and that data pro­ce­s­sing is car­ri­ed out that leads to per­so­na­li­ty pro­files. Digi­tec (vol­un­t­a­ri­ly) anti­ci­pa­ted this point more than a year ago with a new DSE.

Howe­ver neither the trans­pa­ren­cy nor the duty to inform requi­re an allo­ca­ti­on of data and pur­po­ses. The­re is no suf­fi­ci­ent basis for this in the mate­ri­als, the case law or the rele­vant lite­ra­tu­re. The FDPIC argues here with gene­ral con­side­ra­ti­ons on trans­pa­ren­cy – which can always justi­fy anything – and with the view that the right to object can only be exer­cis­ed effec­tively with suf­fi­ci­ent transparency.

Howe­ver, it remains unclear why the right to object should requi­re the assign­ment of per­so­nal data to pur­po­ses and dis­clo­sures. For exam­p­le, if a data sub­ject wis­hes to object to pro­ce­s­sing for mar­ke­ting pur­po­ses, they will not refrain from objec­ting becau­se they are not awa­re of the exact scope of the pro­ce­s­sed data – if they do, an objec­tion is more likely, not less likely, wit­hout an allocation.

Con­cep­tual­ly, the FDPIC’s con­side­ra­ti­on also dis­re­gards the fact that the FADP not only reco­gnizes a right to object, but also a right to infor­ma­ti­on. The duty to inform informs the data sub­ject gene­ricthe right to infor­ma­ti­on more spe­ci­fic. This also speaks against such far-rea­ching trans­pa­ren­cy requirements.

Nevert­hel­ess, it has beco­me com­mon prac­ti­ce to crea­te a cer­tain link bet­ween data and pur­po­ses in data pro­tec­tion decla­ra­ti­ons (see also the Sam­ple data pro­tec­tion decla­ra­ti­on from DSAT). Howe­ver, the Effort for the per­son respon­si­ble must be taken into account. The link the­r­e­fo­re does not have to be so gra­nu­lar that the main­ten­an­ce of the pri­va­cy poli­cy beco­mes too com­plex, and in fact the FDPIC assu­mes in the final report that the lin­king of data and pur­po­ses in accordance with Digitec’s cur­rent pri­va­cy poli­cy is legal­ly com­pli­ant, i.e. meets the requi­re­ments of the FDPIC.

The FDPIC fur­ther assu­mes that the pro­ce­s­sing of Digi­tec Per­so­na­li­ty pro­files ari­se. Howe­ver, the FDPIC remains far too gene­ral here. It is reco­gnized that the qua­li­fi­ca­ti­on of data as a per­so­na­li­ty pro­fi­le also depends on whe­ther its spe­ci­fic pro­ce­s­sing effec­tively leads to the par­ti­cu­lar risks that the per­so­na­li­ty pro­fi­le addres­ses. Anyo­ne who accu­mu­la­tes data but ulti­m­ate­ly only iden­ti­fi­es affi­ni­ties or cor­re­la­ti­ons is hard­ly pro­ce­s­sing a per­so­na­li­ty pro­fi­le – the state­ment that buy­er X has bought snea­k­ers and the­r­e­fo­re has a grea­ter inte­rest in T‑shirts is so banal that it is by no means a per­so­na­li­ty pro­fi­le. Whe­ther a lot or a litt­le data is pro­ce­s­sed for this state­ment can­not be decisi­ve, becau­se it is a que­sti­on of the spe­ci­fic use. The final report does not con­tain any cla­ri­fi­ca­ti­ons or expl­ana­ti­ons in this regard.

Recom­men­da­ti­on 3: Pro­ce­s­sing “in stock”

This recom­men­da­ti­on recom­mends that no data pro­ce­s­sing “on reser­ve” should be men­tio­ned in the pri­va­cy policy.

The final report assu­mes that data sub­jects trust that all the infor­ma­ti­on in a pri­va­cy poli­cy is cor­rect and the­r­e­fo­re gene­ral­ly expect that all the pro­ce­s­sing men­tio­ned will actual­ly take place. This is an assump­ti­on that is hard­ly accu­ra­te. At the very least, the expec­ta­ti­ons of the data sub­jects would have been Spe­ci­fic wor­ding of the pri­va­cy poli­cy depen­dent (the­re is a dif­fe­rence whe­ther a pri­va­cy poli­cy says “we pro­cess” or “we can process”).

Pur­po­se of the duty to inform is ulti­m­ate­ly to cali­bra­te the expec­ta­ti­ons of the data sub­jects. Infor­ma­ti­on about pos­si­ble pro­ce­s­sing is not harmful, but rather hel­pful – the data sub­ject then knows what to expect at the time they enter into a rela­ti­on­ship with the con­trol­ler and read the pri­va­cy poli­cy – if at all – for the first and pro­ba­b­ly last time. This is always more data pro­tec­tion-fri­end­ly than a pri­va­cy poli­cy that chan­ges every two months.

Also the Lite­ra­tu­re is unani­mously of the opi­ni­on that future or pos­si­ble pro­ce­s­sing may be men­tio­ned; pro­vi­ding infor­ma­ti­on about pos­si­ble future pro­ce­s­sing is even express­ly recom­men­ded. Even the dis­patch on the intro­duc­tion of Art. 4 para. 4 aDSG assu­med that infor­ma­ti­on about pos­si­ble pro­ce­s­sing may be pro­vi­ded. If data sub­jects then want more detail­ed infor­ma­ti­on about pos­si­ble pro­ce­s­sing, they have the right to object and the right to information.

Recom­men­da­ti­on 4: Spe­ci­fi­ca­ti­on of justi­fi­ca­ti­on reasons

The FDPIC recom­mends pro­vi­ding infor­ma­ti­on here, which pro­ce­s­sing leads to vio­la­ti­ons of per­so­na­li­ty rights lead and which justi­fi­ca­ti­ons be made use of. What the FDPIC bases this recom­men­da­ti­on on remains com­ple­te­ly unclear, and the­re is no appa­rent basis for this requi­re­ment. In any case, the lite­ra­tu­re does not requi­re such information.

Inte­re­st­ingly, the old FADP requi­red infor­ma­ti­on on “the legal basis of the pro­ce­s­sing” as part of the right to infor­ma­ti­on, and the­re was a view that this also meant an indi­ca­ti­on of the grounds for justi­fi­ca­ti­on. Howe­ver, the cur­rent regu­la­ti­on of the right to infor­ma­ti­on no lon­ger requi­res this. Even at the down­stream level of the right to infor­ma­ti­on, such an obli­ga­ti­on was the­r­e­fo­re deli­bera­te­ly not adopted, and it can cer­tain­ly not exist in the con­text of the obli­ga­ti­on to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on or the prin­ci­ple of trans­pa­ren­cy, as both go less far than the obli­ga­ti­on to pro­vi­de information.

Also inte­re­st­ing: As part of the revi­si­on of the FADP, the FDPIC had sug­ge­sted that infor­ma­ti­on about the legal basis should be inclu­ded in the duty to inform. This was not imple­men­ted. If the FDPIC now rein­tro­du­ces this requi­re­ment via the prin­ci­ple of trans­pa­ren­cy, this sim­ply con­tra­dicts the will of the legislator.

Recom­men­da­ti­on 5: Spe­ci­fi­ca­ti­on of dele­ti­on and objec­tion options

Accor­ding to this recom­men­da­ti­on, the pri­va­cy poli­cy should descri­be the cor­rect dele­ti­on or objec­tion opti­on depen­ding on the justi­fi­ca­ti­on. Howe­ver, a data con­trol­ler is not obli­ged to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on about era­su­re or objec­tion opti­ons, even if many data con­trol­lers do so. The­se rights – inso­far as they exist – ari­se from the law, and this is gene­ral­ly assu­med to be known. Fur­ther­mo­re, the FADP does not con­tain a sim­pli­fi­ca­ti­on requi­re­ment for data sub­ject rights such as the GDPR. Digi­tec has nevert­hel­ess inclu­ded state­ments on the rights to era­su­re and objec­tion in its cur­rent pri­va­cy policy.

Recom­men­da­ti­on 6: Guest purchasing

This recom­men­da­ti­on is rather vague and cer­tain­ly unsui­ta­ble for a legal request or a ruling. Alt­hough the FDPIC speaks of a guest purcha­se, he does not requi­re it, but mere­ly men­ti­ons it as an alter­na­ti­ve. He thus allo­ws a con­nec­tion bet­ween the order and the account. The account requi­re­ment is thus reco­gnized as fun­da­men­tal­ly per­mis­si­ble in Switzerland.

Even if the lat­ter is wel­co­me: this recom­men­da­ti­on suf­fers from a con­cep­tu­al defi­ci­en­cy. The Pro­ce­s­sing pur­po­se deter­mi­ned by the con­trol­ler and not data pro­tec­tion law.

In con­trast, the final report assu­mes that DG is pri­ma­ri­ly a pro­vi­der of goods for sale, which makes the cus­to­mer account appear to be a for­eign body. Thus the FDPIC assu­mes a pro­ce­s­sing pur­po­seand data pro­tec­tion law never spe­ci­fi­es this. This was con­firm­ed by the Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court in its Judgment in favor of Hels­a­na express­ly stated:

Moreo­ver, from a syste­ma­tic point of view, the Data Pro­tec­tion Act does not in prin­ci­ple spe­ci­fy the pur­po­ses for which per­so­nal data may or may not be processed.

Data pro­tec­tion law only requi­res the con­trol­ler to adhe­re to its (self-impo­sed) pro­ce­s­sing pur­po­ses. Digi­tec is still allo­wed to design its own offe­ringand if it does not see this as a one-off purcha­se, but – for good rea­sons – as a plat­form offe­ring with a com­mu­ni­ty cha­rac­ter, it is of cour­se free to do so. The FDPIC is inter­fe­ring with this pur­po­se. In doing so, howe­ver, it is arro­ga­ting to its­elf powers of eco­no­mic poli­cing that are not pro­vi­ded for in data pro­tec­tion law and to which it is not entitled.

Howe­ver, even if the pur­po­se of pro­ce­s­sing were to be sub­ject to an assess­ment under data pro­tec­tion law, the FDPIC’s posi­ti­on would be unfoun­ded. In the pri­va­te sec­tor, at least all tho­se pur­po­ses are pro­por­tio­na­te that also requi­re a rea­sonable data pro­ces­sor would pur­sue. In any case, it would also have to be taken into account that a pro­vi­der is in inter­na­tio­nal com­pe­ti­ti­on and that a lar­ge num­ber of online pro­vi­ders ope­ra­ting in Switz­er­land also requi­re a cus­to­mer account – the FDPIC can­not assu­me that they are all acting unre­a­son­ab­ly. It is also not clear to what ext­ent the inte­rests of cus­to­mers requi­re a guest purcha­se, espe­ci­al­ly as the account faci­li­ta­tes the asser­ti­on of war­ran­ty claims and the track­ing and allo­ca­ti­on of purcha­ses and cus­to­mers can dele­te their account at any time.

Espe­ci­al­ly the Opt-out opti­oni.e. the pos­si­bi­li­ty of objec­tion or dele­ti­on, is rele­vant here. This is also important when it comes to the vol­un­t­a­ry natu­re of con­sent, as the FDPIC poin­ted out in the for­mer Final report on Post­Fi­nan­ce (2015) its­elf has sta­ted: If con­sent beco­mes vol­un­t­a­ry ex post, so to speak, through an opt-out opti­on, pro­ce­s­sing must be pro­por­tio­na­te a for­tio­ri if data sub­jects can sub­se­quent­ly free them­sel­ves from it. This is pro­ba­b­ly also the rea­son why the FDPIC gene­ral­ly per­mits the account requirement.

Moreo­ver, the­re is no other basis in the DPA for requi­ring a guest purcha­se. The prin­ci­ple of Pri­va­cy by Default does not pro­vi­de this, despi­te indi­ca­ti­ons to the con­tra­ry in the mes­sa­ge. The prin­ci­ple of pri­va­cy by default is in the con­text of free pur­po­se set­ting. It does not rest­rict this and the­r­e­fo­re does not requi­re the user to be offe­red set­ting opti­ons; the lite­ra­tu­re is unani­mous on this.

If the appli­ca­ti­on area of the GDPR a guest purcha­se is requi­red in some places, this can­not mean anything for the DPA. The dis­cus­sion the­re is pri­ma­ri­ly about con­sent and the pro­hi­bi­ti­on of tying. This can­not be adopted con­cep­tual­ly. The GDPR requi­res a legal basis for all pro­ce­s­sing, and often con­sent. A cer­tain pro­hi­bi­ti­on of tying applies. The EDPB the­r­e­fo­re inter­prets the legal basis of the con­tract nar­row­ly so that con­sent requi­re­ments are not under­mi­ned by con­tract design. In con­trast, the FADP does not requi­re a legal basis or con­sent to be secu­red accor­din­gly and has not adopted the GDPR’s pro­hi­bi­ti­on of tying.