Take-Aways (AI)
  • The FDPIC con­siders trans­fers to the SEC to be pos­si­ble in prin­ci­ple, pro­vi­ded that FINMASA Art. 42c and FINMA Cir­culars meet the requirements.
  • Legal basis for trans­fers: Con­sent pur­su­ant to Art. 6 para. 2 lit. b FADP, con­tract pro­ce­s­sing pur­su­ant to Art. 6 para. 2 lit. c or over­ri­ding public inte­rest pur­su­ant to lit. d.
  • Com­pa­nies must weigh up indi­vi­du­al inte­rests; trans­pa­ren­cy obli­ga­ti­on applies to pro­cu­re­ment, in prin­ci­ple no gene­ral obli­ga­ti­on to pro­vi­de sub­se­quent information.

In a let­ter dated August 4, 2021, the FDPIC sub­mit­ted to the U.S. Secu­ri­ties and Exch­an­ge Com­mis­si­on (SEC) on the issue of the Admis­si­bi­li­ty of data trans­fers by cer­tain Swiss finan­cial firms to the SECOpi­ni­on issued and published.

The back­ground to the opi­ni­on is a requi­re­ment under U.S. law: Swiss finan­cial firms must also pro­vi­de cer­tain docu­ments to the SEC upon request if they are regi­stered or requi­red to regi­ster with the SEC in a cer­tain capa­ci­ty (e.g., as asset managers/investment advi­sors, as bro­ker-dea­lers or as SBS­Ds, secu­ri­ty-based swap dea­lers) or if they are regu­la­ted by the SEC. This curr­ent­ly appears to affect appro­xi­m­ate­ly 75 firms or bran­ches estab­lished in Switz­er­land. In the cour­se of an exami­na­ti­on, the SEC can demand cer­tain infor­ma­ti­on direct­ly from the com­pa­ny con­cer­ned, depen­ding on the spe­ci­fic sub­ject of the exami­na­ti­on, e.g. inter­nal pro­cess docu­men­ta­ti­on, employee lists, VR pro­to­cols, cus­to­mer con­tracts, tran­sac­tion docu­men­ta­ti­on, etc. The SEC tre­ats this infor­ma­ti­on con­fi­den­ti­al­ly. The SEC tre­ats this infor­ma­ti­on con­fi­den­ti­al­ly, as it informs the FDPIC (repro­du­ced in the opi­ni­on of the FDPIC), but infor­ma­ti­on can be pas­sed on to other aut­ho­ri­ties and is appar­ent­ly sub­ject to the US right of public access (free­dom of information).

The FDPIC asses­ses the rele­vant Swiss law in this con­text as follows:

Appli­ca­ble provisions

The FDPIC’s opi­ni­on does not address the legal situa­ti­on accor­ding to the GDPRalt­hough this may app­ly to the rele­vant Swiss com­pa­nies. Howe­ver, the FADP is appli­ca­ble. The appli­ca­ti­on exclu­si­ons of Art. 2 of the cur­rent FADP do not app­ly, in par­ti­cu­lar the exclu­si­on of pen­ding pro­ce­e­dings accor­ding to Art. 2 (2) lit. c FADP.

Art. 42c FINMASA

The FDPIC first expres­ses its opi­ni­on on Art. 42c para. 1 FINMASA. This pro­vi­si­on allo­ws the direct trans­mis­si­on of non-public infor­ma­ti­on by super­vi­sed enti­ties to the com­pe­tent for­eign finan­cial mar­ket super­vi­so­ry aut­ho­ri­ties and other for­eign enti­ties ent­ru­sted with super­vi­si­on. As a result, Art. 271 SCC is not vio­la­ted in this case eit­her (on the basis of Art. 14 SCC). This direct trans­mis­si­on – unli­ke that under Art. 42c para. 2 FINMASA – is only per­mis­si­ble to aut­ho­ri­ties that use this infor­ma­ti­on exclu­si­ve­ly for the enforce­ment of finan­cial mar­ket law or for­ward it to other aut­ho­ri­ties, courts or bodies only for this pur­po­se and that are bound by offi­ci­al or pro­fes­sio­nal sec­re­cy (Art. 42c para. 1 in con­junc­tion with Art. 42 para. 2 FINMASA). In addi­ti­on, the rights of the per­sons con­cer­ned must always be safe­guard­ed. – To this end, FINMA has published the recent­ly par­ti­al­ly revi­sed Cir­cular direct trans­mis­si­on published. It also publishes a List of aut­ho­ri­ties, which are expec­ted to meet the requi­re­ments, inclu­ding the SEC.

The FDPIC is con­tent here with a refe­rence to the list of aut­ho­ri­ties and adds that FINMA recent­ly con­firm­ed (to whom and when remains open) that the­re is no rea­son to belie­ve that a direct trans­fer to the SEC would not meet the requi­re­ments of Art. 42c para. 1. FINMA appar­ent­ly also con­siders the prin­ci­ple of spe­cia­li­ty (Art. 42c para. 1 in con­junc­tion with Art. 42 para. 2 FINMASA) to be respec­ted, alt­hough the SEC has con­firm­ed to the FDPIC that it may pass on infor­ma­ti­on to other authorities.

Admis­si­bi­li­ty of dis­clo­sure accor­ding to Art. 6 DSG

With refe­rence to Art. 6 DPA, the FDPIC sta­tes that Art. 42c FINMAG is No basis for the trans­mis­si­on to an inse­cu­re third coun­try such as the U.S., espe­ci­al­ly sin­ce Art. 42c para. 1 FINMASA sta­tes that the rights of cli­ents and third par­ties must be pro­tec­ted, and the afo­re­men­tio­ned FINMA Cir­cular sta­tes that bank-cli­ent con­fi­den­tia­li­ty, the pro­vi­si­ons on data pro­tec­tion and the rights ari­sing from the employment rela­ti­on­ship must be pro­tec­ted under this heading.

At least, howe­ver, Art. 6 (2) DPA could help:

The­re could pos­si­bly be a Con­sent into the trans­fer must be obtai­ned from the data sub­jects (Art. 6 para. 2 lit. b FADP):

  • Such con­sent is vol­un­t­a­ryeven if the com­pa­ny con­cer­ned would not enter into a con­tract with the data sub­ject wit­hout such con­sent. The FDPIC justi­fi­es this with the fac­tu­al neces­si­ty of the trans­fer to the USA, i.e. argu­ab­ly with the fact that it is not abu­si­ve to requi­re con­sent here. The con­sent could also in GTC be obtained.
  • If a cus­to­mer revo­kes con­sent, the cus­to­mer rela­ti­on­ship would have to be ter­mi­na­ted so that the com­pa­ny does not vio­la­te U.S. law.
  • In the event of a Ter­mi­na­ti­on of the con­tract could the Con­sent no lon­ger a basis for the trans­mis­si­on. This is likely to be incor­rect; the­re is not­hing to pre­vent the GTCs from obtai­ning con­sent that out­lasts the con­tract. Howe­ver, the GTC should expli­ci­t­ly sta­te that the con­sent sur­vi­ves the contract.
  • A Employee can in no way vol­un­t­a­ri­ly con­sent to dis­clo­sure of his or her infor­ma­ti­on to the SEC becau­se he or she may not vol­un­t­a­ri­ly work for an appro­pria­te com­pa­ny and the loss of employment would be unacceptable.

Like­wi­se, the excep­ti­on of the Con­tract pro­ce­s­sing (Art. 6 para. 2 lit. c DSG), becau­se the dis­clo­sure is neces­sa­ry for the per­for­mance of the con­tract of the com­pa­ny sub­ject to the infor­ma­ti­on obli­ga­ti­on with the customer:

  • This would app­ly even if the con­tract in que­sti­on no lon­ger exi­sted, i.e. after a con­tract ter­mi­na­ti­on. Howe­ver, a balan­cing of inte­rests must also be car­ri­ed out: The con­text of the con­tract does not per­mit dis­clo­sure to arbi­tra­ry aut­ho­ri­ties; it must be exami­ned, for exam­p­le, whe­ther the rele­vant for­eign law is com­pa­ra­ble to Swiss law and whe­ther the for­eign aut­ho­ri­ty is sub­ject to appro­pria­te con­fi­den­tia­li­ty pro­vi­si­ons. Both are the case here.
  • Art. 6 para. 2 lit. c DSG applies. also for employee dataThe SEC shall be entit­led to demand the dis­clo­sure of such infor­ma­ti­on to the ext­ent that the dis­clo­sure to the SEC is direct­ly rela­ted to the employment rela­ti­on­ship; Artic­le 328b of the Swiss Code of Obli­ga­ti­ons shall also not pre­clude such dis­clo­sure. Here, howe­ver, it must again be exami­ned whe­ther the­re is real­ly an over­ri­ding inte­rest in the disclosure.

In addi­ti­on, the­re is also a Over­ri­ding public inte­rest in the dis­clo­sure to the SEC. It is true that a public inte­rest pur­su­ant to Art. 6 para. 2 lit. d DPA must be exami­ned with refe­rence to the indi­vi­du­al case, not with refe­rence to a gene­ral prac­ti­ce. Howe­ver, the legis­la­tor had alre­a­dy made an assess­ment in Art. 42c FINMASA that direct trans­mis­si­on should be possible.

Addi­tio­nal weig­hing of inte­rests in case of justi­fi­ca­ti­on by con­trac­tu­al connection?

The FDPIC sta­tes that even if the dis­clo­sure its­elf is justi­fi­ed by the con­trac­tu­al con­text, an addi­tio­nal balan­cing of inte­rests must be car­ri­ed out:

The FDPIC […] is […] of the opi­ni­on that – from the per­spec­ti­ve of data pro­tec­tion – a cross-bor­der trans­fer of data to the SEC can be justi­fi­ed eit­her by con­tract (Art. 6 para. 2 let. c FADP; see abo­ve 2.4.3 and 2.4.4) or by an over­ri­ding public inte­rest (Art. 6 para. 2 let. d FADP; see abo­ve 2.4.5), pro­vi­ded that, in the indi­vi­du­al case, the­re are not any over­weig­hing inte­rests of the data sub­ject that do not allow for the dis­clo­sure. It is the duty and respon­si­bi­li­ty of the rele­vant Swiss firm to ana­ly­ze whe­ther the­re could be such over­weig­hing inte­rests of the data sub­ject.

What the FDPIC bases this requi­re­ment on remains unclear, howe­ver, and is also not justi­fi­ed (except with a refe­rence to Art. 13 DPA, which is not actual­ly rele­vant). Art. 6(2)(c) FADP (con­trac­tu­al con­nec­tion) is alre­a­dy an expres­si­on of a legal balan­cing of inte­rests; the­re is no room for a fur­ther balan­cing of inte­rests (unli­ke in the case of over­ri­ding public inte­rest). The requi­re­ment to take the inte­rests of the data sub­jects into account can also be justi­fi­ed by the fair­ness requi­re­ment and, in the employment rela­ti­on­ship, by the duty of care, but even then the expli­cit legis­la­ti­ve values should not dis­sol­ve in a cloud of gene­ral weig­hing of inte­rests. As a result, it would be more appro­pria­te to allow the appli­ca­ti­on of Art. 6(2)(c) DPA (con­trac­tu­al con­nec­tion) to suf­fice and to exami­ne spe­cial con­flic­ting inte­rests only if they have been actively rai­sed and justi­fi­ed by the data sub­ject and if they car­ry par­ti­cu­lar weight.

Trans­pa­ren­cy

The FDPIC notes that both the prin­ci­ple of trans­pa­ren­cy and the duty to inform under the revDSG app­ly to the Stage of pro­cu­re­ment and not any other pro­ce­s­sing refers. The com­pa­ny sub­ject to the report­ing obli­ga­ti­on usual­ly pro­vi­des infor­ma­ti­on about the con­trac­tu­al rela­ti­on­ship when the con­trac­tu­al rela­ti­on­ship is estab­lished. This is suf­fi­ci­ent; in this case, the com­pa­ny does not have to pro­vi­de fur­ther infor­ma­ti­on about the actu­al dis­clo­sure or the asso­cia­ted processing.

In this way, the FDPIC also sta­tes that, in prin­ci­ple, the­re are No obli­ga­ti­on to pro­vi­de fol­low-up infor­ma­ti­on if the pro­cu­re­ment chan­ges at a later date (sub­ject to a chan­ge of pur­po­se, if this is regard­ed as a new pro­cu­re­ment, and sub­ject to con­sent in the indi­vi­du­al case).

Big and small pro­fes­sio­nal secrets

The FDPIC express­ly lea­ves open whe­ther a dis­clo­sure can also be made under the tit­le of a spe­cial pro­fes­sio­nal sec­re­cy (bank cli­ent sec­re­cy, FINIG sec­re­cy, etc.) is per­mis­si­ble or whe­ther a wai­ver must be obtai­ned. In any case, it would be conceiva­ble to obtain a wai­ver in the gene­ral terms and con­di­ti­ons. It would also be conceiva­ble, but pro­ba­b­ly more tricky, to sim­ply make a clear refe­rence to trans­fers to the SEC. A cus­to­mer who nevert­hel­ess con­clu­des a con­tract with the com­pa­ny sub­ject to the infor­ma­ti­on obli­ga­ti­on has implied­ly con­sen­ted and can­not have any dis­cer­ni­ble secret intent in the facts of the case that such a trans­mis­si­on should not take place.

The FDPIC then also addres­ses Art. 35 FADP and Art. 62 revDSG, i.e.. the “minor pro­fes­sio­nal sec­re­cy” or “data sec­re­cy”, i.e. the pro­hi­bi­ti­on of the dis­clo­sure of secret, job-rela­ted data (accor­ding to Art. 62 revDSG; only of per­so­na­li­ty pro­files or data requi­ring spe­cial pro­tec­tion accor­ding to the DSG). It does not go into details here, but holds that in his opi­ni­on, dis­clo­sure in con­for­mi­ty with data pro­tec­tion does not vio­la­te Art. 35 FADP or Art. 62 revDSG. In our view, this is cor­rect. The legal natu­re of Art. 62 revDSG is not clear and alre­a­dy dis­pu­ted, but accor­ding to our inter­pre­ta­ti­on, dis­clo­sure of secret per­so­nal data can­not be a crime if it meets the requi­re­ments of data pro­tec­tion law. In this sen­se, Art. 62 revDSG is a norm under data pro­tec­tion law.