Take-Aways (AI)
  • The ECJ rules that the name, signa­tu­re and cont­act details of repre­sen­ta­ti­ves of legal enti­ties are per­so­nal data and their dis­clo­sure con­sti­tu­tes pro­ce­s­sing under the GDPR.
  • The GDPR (Art. 6 para. 1 lit. c and e) per­mits offi­ci­al acts of dis­clo­sure, Art. 86 GDPR per­mits natio­nal rules on the coor­di­na­ti­on of the right of publi­ci­ty and data protection.
  • Mem­ber Sta­tes may inform and con­sult inte­re­sted par­ties befo­re dis­clo­sure, pro­vi­ded that this is prac­ti­ca­ble and does not cau­se dis­pro­por­tio­na­te effort or rest­ric­tion of access.

In Case C‑710/23 the ECJ had to rule on the que­sti­on of whe­ther infor­ma­ti­on on the repre­sen­ta­ti­ves of legal per­sons in the dis­clo­sure of offi­ci­al docu­ments is sub­ject to the pro­tec­tion of the GDPR under natio­nal free­dom of infor­ma­ti­on law (right of public access). Spe­ci­fi­cal­ly, the case con­cer­ned a Access request to the Mini­stry of Health for infor­ma­ti­on on per­sons who had signed con­tracts con­clu­ded by the Mini­stry for the purcha­se of Covid-19 tests and cer­ti­fi­ca­tes for the­se tests. The Mini­stry had redac­ted the details of the­se signa­to­ries befo­re dis­clo­sing the contracts.

Defi­ni­ti­on of the pro­ce­s­sing of per­so­nal data

Unsur­pri­sin­gly, the ECJ initi­al­ly cla­ri­fi­es that Name, signa­tu­re or cont­act details of a natu­ral per­son are “per­so­nal data” even if they are only dis­c­lo­sed to docu­ment the power of repre­sen­ta­ti­on, and the dis­clo­sure of the­se data as part of an infor­ma­ti­on access pro­ce­du­re is a “pro­ce­s­sing”. The GDPR the­r­e­fo­re applies to this disclosure:

31 In the light of the fore­go­ing, the ans­wer to the first que­sti­on is that Artic­le 4(1) and (2) GDPR must be inter­pre­ted as mea­ning that the dis­clo­sure of the first name, sur­na­me, signa­tu­re and cont­act details of a natu­ral per­son repre­sen­ting a legal per­son con­sti­tu­tes pro­ce­s­sing of per­so­nal data. The fact that the dis­clo­sure is made for the sole pur­po­se of enab­ling the iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on of the natu­ral per­son aut­ho­ri­zed to act on behalf of the legal per­son is irrele­vant in this respect.

Rela­ti­on­ship to the right of publicity

In addi­ti­on, Mem­ber Sta­tes may pro­vi­de that data sub­jects must be infor­med and, if neces­sa­ry, con­sul­ted befo­re their data is dis­c­lo­sed in offi­ci­al docu­mentseven bey­ond the GDPR (the GDPR its­elf would pro­ba­b­ly per­mit this dis­clo­sure here, on the basis of Art. 6 (1) (c) and (e)). This aut­ho­rizati­on is based on Art. 86 GDPR:

Per­so­nal data con­tai­ned in offi­ci­al docu­ments held by a public aut­ho­ri­ty or body or by a pri­va­te body for the per­for­mance of a task car­ri­ed out in the public inte­rest may be dis­c­lo­sed by the public aut­ho­ri­ty or body in accordance with Uni­on law or the law of the Mem­ber Sta­te to which the public aut­ho­ri­ty or body is sub­ject in order to recon­ci­le public access to offi­ci­al docu­ments with the right to the pro­tec­tion of per­so­nal data under this Regulation.

This con­cer­ned the case law of the Czech Supre­me Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court, accor­ding to which aut­ho­ri­ties must noti­fy the per­sons con­cer­ned and obtain their opi­ni­on befo­re dis­clo­sing per­so­nal data as part of an infor­ma­ti­on access pro­ce­du­re. Such regu­la­ti­ons must not, howe­ver, make dis­clo­sure impos­si­ble.whe­re the GDPR per­mits it, e.g. if con­sul­ta­ti­on would not be fea­si­ble by rea­sonable means:

48 In the light of the fore­go­ing, the ans­wer to the second que­sti­on is that Artic­le 6(1)(c) and (e) of the GDPR, read in con­junc­tion with Artic­le 86 the­reof, must be inter­pre­ted as not pre­clu­ding natio­nal legis­la­ti­on which pro­hi­bits a con­trol­ler which is a public aut­ho­ri­ty from exer­cis­ing the right of public access to data. c and e GDPR, read in con­junc­tion with Artic­le 86 the­reof, must be inter­pre­ted as not pre­clu­ding natio­nal case-law which requi­res a con­trol­ler, which is a public aut­ho­ri­ty requi­red to recon­ci­le the public’s right of access to offi­ci­al docu­ments and the right to the pro­tec­tion of per­so­nal data, to inform and con­sult the natu­ral per­son con­cer­ned befo­re dis­clo­sing offi­ci­al docu­ments con­tai­ning such data, inso­far as such an obli­ga­ti­on is not impos­si­ble to ful­fill is or a dis­pro­por­tio­na­te effort and the­r­e­fo­re does not lead to a dis­pro­por­tio­na­te rest­ric­tion of the public’s right of access leads to the­se documents.

This second part of the ruling is sur­pri­sing inso­far as the GDPR does not regu­la­te the prin­ci­ple of public access and does not pro­vi­de a right of access to offi­ci­al docu­ments, but at most rest­ricts this access to a grea­ter or les­ser ext­ent. In this respect, natio­nal regu­la­ti­ons that rest­rict or even exclude access to a grea­ter ext­ent for data pro­tec­tion rea­sons can­not actual­ly vio­la­te the GDPR.