Take-Aways (AI)
  • The Advo­ca­te Gene­ral con­siders the EU stan­dard con­trac­tu­al clau­ses to be effec­ti­ve for the trans­fer of per­so­nal data to third countries.
  • Laws of the reci­pi­ent coun­try can under­mi­ne clau­ses, but do not auto­ma­ti­cal­ly ren­der them ineffective.
  • The export­er must stop the trans­fer if the importer can­not com­ply with the clauses.
  • Super­vi­so­ry aut­ho­ri­ties are obli­ged to inve­sti­ga­te vio­la­ti­ons and, if neces­sa­ry, sus­pend the trans­fer of data.

The Advo­ca­te Gene­ral of the ECJ (Att­or­ney Gene­ral, AG; Hen­rik Saug­mands­gaard Øe) con­siders the data trans­fer rules adopted by the EU Com­mis­si­on for data trans­fer to third count­ries to be Stan­dard Con­trac­tu­al Clau­ses for effec­ti­ve. His recom­men­da­ti­on is here in eng­lish retrievable.

Schrems had argued befo­re the refer­ring court, the Irish High Court, as follows:

In his refor­mu­la­ted com­plaint, Mr. Schrems claims, first, that the clau­ses in that agree­ment [basis of data trans­fer within the Face­book group to the U.S.] are not con­si­stent with the stan­dard con­trac­tu­al clau­ses set out in Decis­i­on 2010/87 and, second­ly, that tho­se stan­dard con­trac­tu­al clau­ses could not in any event justi­fy the trans­fer of the per­so­nal data rela­ting to him to the United Sta­tes. Mr. Schrems claims that the­re is no reme­dy that would allow the per­sons con­cer­ned to invo­ke, in the United Sta­tes, their rights to respect for pri­va­te life and to pro­tec­tion of per­so­nal data.

With regard to the effec­ti­ve­ness or vali­di­ty of the stan­dard con­trac­tu­al clau­ses, the AG initi­al­ly sta­tes that the stan­dard con­trac­tu­al clau­ses are an agree­ment bet­ween the par­ties. inter par­tes the Do not bind aut­ho­ri­ties of the reci­pi­ent sta­te and who­se law may pro­vi­de for obli­ga­ti­ons that con­flict with the requi­re­ments of the stan­dard con­trac­tu­al clauses:

125 In that regard, as, in essence, the DPC, Mr Schrems, the BSA, Ire­land, the Austri­an, French, Polish and Por­tu­guese Govern­ments and the Com­mis­si­on have sub­mit­ted, the safe­guards in the stan­dard con­trac­tu­al clau­ses may be redu­ced, or inde­ed eli­mi­na­ted, when the law of the third coun­try of desti­na­ti­on impo­ses obli­ga­ti­ons that are con­tra­ry to the requi­re­ments of tho­se clau­ses on the importer. Thus, the pre­vai­ling legal con­text in the third coun­try of desti­na­ti­on may, depen­ding on the actu­al cir­cum­stances of the trans­fer, (48) make the obli­ga­ti­ons set out in tho­se clau­ses impos­si­ble to implement.

Howe­ver, this does not lead to the inva­li­di­ty of the stan­dard con­trac­tu­al clau­ses. This is becau­se the­se requi­re the data export­er to Stop trans­mis­si­onif the reci­pi­ent vio­la­tes or fails to com­ply with its obligations:

132 To my mind, and as Mr Schrems and the Com­mis­si­on have main­tai­ned, Clau­se 5(a) can­not be inter­pre­ted as mea­ning that sus­pen­si­on of the trans­fer or ter­mi­na­ti­on of the con­tract is mere­ly optio­nal whe­re the importer can­not com­ply with the stan­dard clau­ses. Alt­hough that clau­se refers only to a right in that sen­se for the bene­fit of the export­er, that wor­ding must be under­s­tood by refe­rence to the con­trac­tu­al frame­work of which it forms part.. The fact that the export­er is given a right, in its bila­te­ral rela­ti­ons with the importer, to sus­pend the trans­fer or ter­mi­na­te the con­tract whe­re the importer is unable to honor the stan­dard clau­ses is wit­hout pre­ju­di­ce to the obli­ga­ti­on pla­ced on the export­er to do so in the light of the requi­re­ments to pro­tect the rights of the per­sons con­cer­ned ari­sing under the GDPR. Any other inter­pre­ta­ti­on would ren­der Decis­i­on 2010/87 inva­lid in that the stan­dard con­trac­tu­al clau­ses which it sets out would not per­mit the trans­fer to be accom­pa­nied by ‘appro­pria­te safe­guards’ as requi­red by Artic­le 46(1) of the GDPR, read in the light of the pro­vi­si­ons of the Char­ter. (50)

133. in addi­ti­on, accor­ding to clau­se 5(b) the importer is to cer­ti­fy that it has no rea­son to belie­ve that the legis­la­ti­on appli­ca­ble to it pre­vents it from ful­fil­ling the ins­truc­tions recei­ved from the export­er and its obli­ga­ti­ons under the con­tract. In the event of a chan­ge in that legis­la­ti­on that is likely to have a sub­stan­ti­al adver­se effect on the war­ran­ties and obli­ga­ti­ons pro­vi­ded by the stan­dard clau­ses, the importer will prompt­ly noti­fy that chan­ge to the export­erin which case the export­er is entit­led to sus­pend the trans­fer of data and/or ter­mi­na­te the con­tract. In accordance with Clau­se 4(g), the export­er must for­ward the noti­fi­ca­ti­on recei­ved from the importer to the com­pe­tent super­vi­so­ry aut­ho­ri­ty if it deci­des to con­ti­n­ue the transfer.

Moreo­ver, the Super­vi­so­ry aut­ho­ri­ties obli­ga­ted – and not only entit­led – to order the omis­si­on or ces­sa­ti­on of the trans­ferif the export­er does not ful­fill his obli­ga­ti­on in this respect:

146. thus, a super­vi­so­ry aut­ho­ri­ty must exami­ne with all due dili­gence the com­plaint lodged by a per­son who­se data are alle­ged to be trans­fer­red to a third coun­try in breach of the stan­dard con­trac­tu­al clau­ses appli­ca­ble to the trans­fer. (56) Artic­le 58(1) of the GDPR con­fers on the super­vi­so­ry aut­ho­ri­ties, for that pur­po­se, signi­fi­cant inve­sti­ga­ti­ve powers.
147. the com­pe­tent super­vi­so­ry aut­ho­ri­ty is also requi­red to react appro­pria­te­ly to any inf­rin­ge­ments of the rights of the data sub­ject which it has estab­lished fol­lo­wing its inve­sti­ga­ti­on. In that regard, each super­vi­so­ry aut­ho­ri­ty has, under Artic­le 58(2) of the GDPR, a wide ran­ge of means – the various powers to adopt cor­rec­ti­ve mea­su­res listed in that pro­vi­si­on – of car­ry­ing out the task ent­ru­sted to it. […] Alt­hough the choice of the most effec­ti­ve means is a mat­ter for the dis­creti­on of the com­pe­tent super­vi­so­ry aut­ho­ri­ty having regard to all the cir­cum­stances of the trans­fer at issue, that aut­ho­ri­ty is requi­red to car­ry out in full the super­vi­so­ry task ent­ru­sted to it. Whe­re appro­pria­te, it must sus­pend the trans­fer if it con­clu­des that the stan­dard con­trac­tu­al clau­ses are not being com­plied with and that appro­pria­te pro­tec­tion of the data trans­fer­red can­not be ensu­red by other means, whe­re the export­er has not its­elf put an end to the transfer.

Howe­ver, the ECJ is not bound by the opi­ni­on of the AG.