The plea­s­ant­ly ter­se ruling of the ECJ in the Case. C‑621/22 of Octo­ber 4, 2024 con­cer­ned legi­ti­ma­te inte­rests, more spe­ci­fi­cal­ly the que­sti­on of whe­ther a legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest can justi­fy the dis­clo­sure of mem­ber data by a sports asso­cia­ti­on to spon­sors for adver­ti­sing pur­po­ses in return for payment.

The ECJ first recalls that the legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest applies if (i) the pro­ce­s­sing pur­sues a legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest of the per­son respon­si­ble or a third par­ty (ii) the pro­ce­s­sing for this pur­po­se requi­red (which requi­res appro­pria­te assess­ment and data mini­mizati­on) and (iii) does not adver­se­ly affect the inte­rests or fun­da­men­tal rights and free­doms of the data subject(s). pre­do­mi­na­te (which the sub­stan­ti­ve court must exami­ne). The­se inte­rests are also set out in the pri­va­cy poli­cy to dis­c­lo­se (accor­ding to the GDPR – in Switz­er­land the­re are con­tra­ry to the wis­hes of the FDPIC no obli­ga­ti­on to sta­te over­ri­ding interests).

Legi­ti­ma­te” inte­rests are not only tho­se that have found legal expres­si­on – any other inte­rest is suf­fi­ci­ent, pro­vi­ded that it lawful is. But also eco­no­mic inte­rests are fun­da­men­tal­ly justi­fi­ed and may pre­vail – this is not new and is actual­ly self-evi­dent, but was nevert­hel­ess not uncontroversial:

48 In that regard, the Court has It can­not be ruled out that an eco­no­mic inte­rest of the con­trol­ler, which con­sists in the adver­ti­sing and sale of adver­ti­sing space for mar­ke­ting pur­po­ses, can be regard­ed as a legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest within the mea­ning of Art. 6 para. 1 sub­pa­ra. 1 let­ter f GDPR […].

49 In the­se cir­cum­stances, an eco­no­mic inte­rest of the con­trol­ler such as that men­tio­ned in para. 47 abo­ve could con­sti­tu­te a legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest within the mea­ning of Art. 6(1)(1)(f) GDPR, unless it is unlawful is. Howe­ver, it is for the refer­ring court to assess the exi­stence of such an inte­rest on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the appli­ca­ble legal frame­work and all the cir­cum­stances of the case.

Howe­ver, under the hea­ding of more leni­ent mea­su­res, the ECJ not only takes data mini­mizati­on into account, but also the Pos­si­bi­li­ty of con­sent:

51 As regards, second­ly, the con­di­ti­on of the neces­si­ty of that pro­ce­s­sing for the pur­po­ses of the inte­rest in que­sti­on and, in par­ti­cu­lar, the exi­stence of means which are equal­ly sui­ta­ble and less intru­si­ve on the fun­da­men­tal rights and free­doms of the data sub­jects, it must be held that a sports asso­cia­ti­on such as the KNLTB, which wis­hes to dis­c­lo­se per­so­nal data of its mem­bers to third par­ties in return for payment, in par­ti­cu­lar would be pos­si­ble to inform its mem­bers in advan­ce and ask themwhe­ther they want their data to be pas­sed on to third par­ties for adver­ti­sing or mar­ke­ting purposes.

52 This solu­ti­on would allow the mem­bers con­cer­ned to retain con­trol over the dis­clo­sure of their per­so­nal data, in accordance with the prin­ci­ple of data mini­mizati­on refer­red to in reci­tal 43 abo­ve, thus limi­ting the dis­clo­sure of tho­se data to what is actual­ly neces­sa­ry and rele­vant for the pur­po­ses for which tho­se data are trans­mit­ted and processed […].

53 A pro­ce­du­re such as that descri­bed in the pre­ce­ding para­graph could have a less inter­ven­ti­on the right to pro­tec­tion of the con­fi­den­tia­li­ty of the data subject’s per­so­nal data and at the same time enable the con­trol­ler to justi­fy the legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest asser­ted by the data sub­ject. to per­cei­ve effec­tivelyHowe­ver, it is for the refer­ring court to exami­ne this […].

The pre­sent court must then exami­ne the Weig­hing of inte­rests car­ry out. The ECJ does not anti­ci­pa­te its out­co­me, but gives an indi­ca­ti­on. Two points are inte­re­st­ing here – the par­ti­cu­lar weight of the expec­ta­ti­ons of tho­se affec­ted (which some aut­ho­ri­ties under­stand as an objec­ti­ve que­sti­on that can­not sim­ply be influen­ced by a pri­va­cy poli­cy) and the fact that the ECJ also takes into account whe­ther a dan­ge­rous – albeit legal – pro­duct is to be advertised:

55 In car­ry­ing out that balan­cing exer­cise, the refer­ring court must deter­mi­ne whe­ther the right to pri­va­cy of mem­bers of ten­nis clubs, enshri­ned in Artic­le 8(1) of the Char­ter and Artic­le 16(1) TFEU, takes pre­ce­dence over the eco­no­mic inte­rest of a natio­nal ten­nis asso­cia­ti­on in the pro­ce­s­sing of their per­so­nal data. As sta­ted in reci­tal 47 of the GDPR, par­ti­cu­lar importance must be atta­ched to the que­sti­on of whe­ther, at the time their per­so­nal data is coll­ec­ted for the pur­po­se of joi­ning a ten­nis club could rea­son­ab­ly fore­seethat this data is dis­c­lo­sed to third par­ties, in this case spon­sors of the KNLTB, for adver­ti­sing and mar­ke­ting pur­po­ses in return for payment.

56 Fur­ther­mo­re, the refer­ring court will have to take into account the fact that the data in que­sti­on are trans­fer­red, inter alia, to a pro­vi­der of gambling and casi­no games, such as NLO, who­se adver­ti­sing and mar­ke­ting acti­vi­ties, even if lawful, take place in a con­text which, con­tra­ry to reci­tal 47 in the pre­am­ble to the GDPR not cha­rac­te­ri­zed by a rele­vant and appro­pria­te rela­ti­on­ship bet­ween the data sub­jects and the con­trol­ler appears to be unlawful. Fur­ther­mo­re, the pro­ce­s­sing of such data could, in cer­tain cir­cum­stances, adver­se­ly affect the mem­bers of the ten­nis clubs con­cer­ned, as it expo­ses them to the Risk of deve­lo­ping a gambling addic­tion could be exposed.

The sports asso­cia­ti­on should cer­tain­ly not have high hopes – after the­se indi­ca­ti­ons, it will hard­ly be gran­ted suf­fi­ci­ent legi­ti­ma­te interest.