Take-Aways (AI)
  • Cyber risks remain one of the big­gest ope­ra­tio­nal risks; insti­tu­ti­ons must con­ti­nuous­ly moni­tor thre­ats and test their infras­truc­tu­re for vulnerabilities.
  • Rise in out­sour­cing increa­ses sup­p­ly chain com­ple­xi­ty and con­cen­tra­ti­on risks, espe­ci­al­ly for cloud ser­vices, and increa­ses depen­den­ci­es and cyber­at­tack risks.
  • FINMA requi­res insti­tu­ti­ons to build up know­ledge and con­trol mecha­nisms for out­sour­ced func­tions; iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on and moni­to­ring of out­sour­cing risks are insufficient.

FINMA publishes an annu­al risk moni­tor as an over­view of the risks that FINMA curr­ent­ly clas­si­fi­es as par­ti­cu­lar­ly signi­fi­cant for super­vi­sed insti­tu­ti­ons and the focus of its super­vi­so­ry activities.

Cyber Risks

At Risk Moni­tor for the year 2023 FINMA first reports on cyber risks (see also the FINMA cyber risks dos­sier). It con­ti­nues to see cyber risks as one of the grea­test ope­ra­tio­nal risks. The num­ber of reports sub­mit­ted to FINMA (Art. 29 para. 2 FINMASA) remain­ed at the pre­vious level, but the pres­su­re on insti­tu­ti­ons to keep an eye on the cur­rent thre­at situa­ti­on, react quick­ly and con­ti­nuous­ly test their own infras­truc­tu­re for vul­nerabi­li­ties remains high, espe­ci­al­ly with regard to zero-day exploits or DDoS attacks. The type of attack is dis­tri­bu­ted as follows:

Within the super­vi­so­ry cate­go­ries, the reports in abso­lu­te figu­res come main­ly from the lar­ge insti­tu­ti­ons. Howe­ver, smal­ler insti­tu­ti­ons are attacked more fre­quent­ly, and insu­rance com­pa­nies (around 30%) and asset mana­gers (around 20%) are cat­ching up:

In terms of attack vec­tors, soft­ware vul­nerabi­li­ties and attacks via a web inter­face are in the fore­ground, but attacks via ser­vice pro­vi­ders are on the rise:

Against this back­ground, among others, FINMA has revi­sed RS Ope­ra­tio­nal Risks (in force as of Janu­ary 1, 2024) has adapt­ed its super­vi­so­ry prac­ti­ce for cyber risks. It has also con­duc­ted a sur­vey of small and medi­um-sized insu­rance com­pa­nies in order to assess the matu­ri­ty of cyber risk manage­ment and will “defi­ne fur­ther sel­ec­ti­ve super­vi­so­ry mea­su­res” on this basis. FINMA has also car­ri­ed out a cor­re­spon­ding deep dive at banks, which it is not (yet) report­ing on in the risk monitor.

New­ly reco­gnized out­sour­cing risk

FINMA now inclu­des out­sour­cing as a “key dri­ver of ope­ra­tio­nal risks” in the Risk Moni­tor. With an increa­se in signi­fi­cant out­sour­cing, the com­ple­xi­ty of the sup­p­ly chain is gro­wing. Finan­cial insti­tu­ti­ons main­ly out­sour­ce busi­ness pro­ce­s­ses such as payment tran­sac­tions (2÷3 of banks), secu­ri­ties sett­le­ment or IT infras­truc­tu­re (80% of banks, 60% of insu­r­ers) in who­le or in part. This results in depen­den­ci­es, espe­ci­al­ly for insti­tu­ti­ons with con­cen­tra­ti­on risks such as cloud ser­vices in par­ti­cu­lar, but also – as men­tio­ned – fur­ther risks of cyber attacks.

Insti­tu­ti­ons remain respon­si­ble for the pro­per con­duct of busi­ness. They must the­r­e­fo­re build up the know­ledge to be able to mana­ge and moni­tor out­sour­ced func­tions and take mea­su­res if neces­sa­ry. FINMA sees a par­ti­cu­lar need to catch up in terms of iden­ti­fy­ing the enti­re sup­p­ly chain and the asso­cia­ted risks, and risks in con­nec­tion with signi­fi­cant out­sour­cing are some­ti­mes not ade­qua­te­ly iden­ti­fi­ed, moni­to­red and managed.