Take-Aways (AI)
  • ECJ exami­nes whe­ther natio­nal data reten­ti­on is com­pa­ti­ble with the ePri­va­cy Direc­ti­ve and Char­ter, taking into account the Digi­tal Rights Ire­land ruling.
  • Advo­ca­te Gene­ral sup­ports pos­si­ble sto­rage, but demands strict legal basis, access pro­tec­tion, reten­ti­on peri­od and secu­ri­ty guarantees.
  • Six pro­por­tio­na­li­ty requi­re­ments: Legal basis, pre­ser­va­ti­on of essence, legi­ti­ma­te aim, sui­ta­bi­li­ty, neces­si­ty and proportionality.

The ECJ will rule on refer­rals from Swe­den and the United King­dom (united Rs. C‑203/15 and C‑698/15) to deci­de whe­ther natio­nal data reten­ti­on rights are com­pa­ti­ble with Euro­pean law, in par­ti­cu­lar with the ePri­va­cy Direc­ti­ve and the Char­ter. The Advo­ca­te Gene­ral has today pre­sen­ted his sub­mis­si­ons on this (Media release and Appli­ca­ti­ons).

Back­ground: “Digi­tal Rights Ireland

The ECJ had alre­a­dy on April 8, 2014 in the Digi­tal Rights Ire­land judgment (Joi­n­ed Cases C‑293/12 and C‑594/12). to deci­de on data reten­ti­on issues (for this pur­po­se, the Artic­le 29 Working Par­ty has Opi­ni­on authored).

At that time, it declared Direc­ti­ve 2006/24/EC (reten­ti­on of data gene­ra­ted or pro­ce­s­sed in con­nec­tion with the pro­vi­si­on of publicly available elec­tro­nic com­mu­ni­ca­ti­ons ser­vices or of public com­mu­ni­ca­ti­ons net­works) inva­lid. The reten­ti­on of traf­fic data pro­vi­ded for in the Direc­ti­ve serious­ly inter­fe­res with the fun­da­men­tal right to respect for pri­va­te life and the other rights under Artic­le 7 of the Char­ter, and is dis­pro­por­tio­na­te: It is true that data reten­ti­on is sui­ta­ble for achie­ving the goal of sol­ving serious cri­mes. Howe­ver, it is not suf­fi­ci­ent­ly limi­t­ed in the Direc­ti­ve becau­se it neither requi­res a con­cre­te sus­pi­ci­on nor is it limi­t­ed to data of a cer­tain peri­od of time or a cer­tain area or group of per­sons (i.e. it can be car­ri­ed out “wit­hout cause”).

The “Digi­tal Rights Ire­land” judgment con­cer­ned the Data Reten­ti­on Direc­ti­ve. Sub­se­quent­ly, the Swe­dish and Eng­lish laws on data reten­ti­on were sub­mit­ted to the ECJ as a preli­mi­na­ry que­sti­on (for more infor­ma­ti­on, see e‑comm). The ECJ must the­r­e­fo­re assess data reten­ti­on in the natio­nal con­text against the back­ground of the ePri­va­cy Direc­ti­ve, wher­eby the frame­work deter­mi­ned in Digi­tal Rights Ire­land will be decisive.

Requests of the Advo­ca­te General

The Advo­ca­te Gene­ral pro­po­ses the fol­lo­wing ans­wer to the que­sti­ons referred:

Artic­le 15(1) of Direc­ti­ve 2002/58/EC […], and Artic­les 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Char­ter […] are to be inter­pre­ted as not pre­clu­ding Mem­ber Sta­tes from impo­sing on pro­vi­ders of elec­tro­nic com­mu­ni­ca­ti­ons ser­vices an obli­ga­ti­on to retain all data rela­ting to com­mu­ni­ca­ti­ons effec­ted by the users of their ser­vices whe­re all of the fol­lo­wing con­di­ti­ons are satis­fiedwhich it is for the refer­ring courts to deter­mi­ne in the light of all the rele­vant cha­rac­te­ri­stics of the natio­nal regimes at issue in the main proceedings:

  • the obli­ga­ti­on and the safe­guards which accom­pa­ny it must be pro­vi­ded for in legis­la­ti­ve or regu­la­to­ry mea­su­res pos­ses­sing the cha­rac­te­ri­stics of acce­s­si­bi­li­ty, fore­seea­bi­li­ty and ade­qua­te pro­tec­tion against arbi­tra­ry interference;
  • the obli­ga­ti­on and the safe­guards which accom­pa­ny it must obser­ve the essence of the rights reco­g­nis­ed by Artic­les 7 and 8 of the Char­ter of Fun­da­men­tal Rights;
  • the obli­ga­ti­on must be strict­ly neces­sa­ry in the fight against serious crime, which means that no other mea­su­re or com­bi­na­ti­on of mea­su­res could be as effec­ti­ve in the fight against serious crime while at the same time inter­fe­ring to a les­ser ext­ent with the rights enshri­ned in Direc­ti­ve 2002/58 and Artic­les 7 and 8 of the Char­ter of Fun­da­men­tal Rights;
  • the obli­ga­ti­on must be accom­pa­nied by all the safe­guards descri­bed by the Court in para­graphs 60 to 68 of its judgment of 8 April 2014 in Digi­tal Rights Ire­land and Others (C‑293/12 and C‑594/12, EU:C:2014:238) con­cer­ning access to the data, the peri­od of reten­ti­on and the pro­tec­tion and secu­ri­ty of the data, in order to limit the inter­fe­rence with the rights enshri­ned in Direc­ti­ve 2002/58 and Artic­les 7 and 8 of the Char­ter of Fun­da­men­tal Rights to what is strict­ly neces­sa­ry; and
  • the obli­ga­ti­on must be pro­por­tio­na­te, within a demo­cra­tic socie­ty, to the objec­ti­ve of fight­ing serious crime, which means that the serious risks engen­de­red by the obli­ga­ti­on, in a demo­cra­tic socie­ty, must not be dis­pro­por­tio­na­te to the advan­ta­ges which it offers in the fight against serious crime.

The fol­lo­wing con­side­ra­ti­ons were decisive:

  • The ePri­va­cy Poli­cy is appli­ca­ble to data retention.
  • Data reten­ti­on does not fun­da­men­tal­ly vio­la­te the ePri­va­cy Directive:

    In light of the fore­go­ing, I con­sider that gene­ral data reten­ti­on obli­ga­ti­ons are con­si­stent with the regime estab­lished by Direc­ti­ve 2002/58 and that Mem­ber Sta­tes are the­r­e­fo­re entit­led to avail them­sel­ves of the pos­si­bi­li­ty offe­red by Artic­le 15(1) of that direc­ti­ve in order to impo­se a gene­ral data reten­ti­on obli­ga­ti­on. (20) Recour­se to that opti­on is, howe­ver, sub­ject to com­pli­ance with strict requi­re­ments which flow not only from Artic­le 15(1) but also from the rele­vant pro­vi­si­ons of the Char­ter, read in the light of Digi­tal Rights Ire­land, which I shall exami­ne later on. (21)

  • The Char­ter is appli­ca­ble to data retention.
  • This results in gene­ral requi­re­ments for data retention:
    • 132. Tog­e­ther, tho­se two pro­vi­si­ons estab­lish six requi­re­ments that must be satis­fied in order for the inter­fe­rence cau­sed by a gene­ral data reten­ti­on obli­ga­ti­on to be justified:
    • the reten­ti­on obli­ga­ti­on must have a legal basis;
    • it must obser­ve the essence of the rights enshri­ned in the Charter;
    • it must pur­sue an objec­ti­ve of gene­ral interest;
    • it must be appro­pria­te for achie­ving that objective;
    • it must be neces­sa­ry in order to achie­ve that objective;
    • it must be pro­por­tio­na­te, within a demo­cra­tic socie­ty, to the pur­su­it of that same objective.