- Data are not tangible objects and do not give rise to property rights; they are protected by various areas of specialized law (contract law, data protection law, copyright law, and criminal law).
- Gaps in protection should be closed by establishing a new exclusive right; property law rules are unsuitable for data.
As reported earlier, Martin Eckert has expressed the view in the SJZ,
The functionality of the material concept advocated by Wiegand and the realities and needs of the digital economy allow for a Extension of the conventional notion of subject matter to digital data. These fulfill the requirements of controllability and – insofar as required at all under Swiss law – physicality. Digital data can be subsumed under a slightly expanded concept of tangibles and can thus be the subject of driving property and possession.
Gianni Fröhlich-Bleuler now contradicts this in today’s Jusletter (Gianni Fröhlich-Bleuler, Eigentum an Daten?, in: Jusletter March 6, 2017.). He comes to the following conclusion:
[para 31] Data are not things; there is no property right in them. They are protected in many ways by the legal system. This ranges from protection under contract law, criminal law, data protection law and copyright law to protection under unfair competition law. It remains to be clarified whether this protection meets the requirements of the digital society.
[If there were indeed gaps in the protection of data, these would have to be filled within the framework of a new exclusive right to be created. The legislator would have to take into account the character of the data as a public good (with regard to the duration of the protection right, limitation provisions, etc.). However, the provisions of the substantive law are not suitable for the protection of data.
With the kind permission of the author, you will find the complete essay below (PDF):