Take-Aways (AI)
  • No cri­mi­nal offen­se: The public prosecutor’s office did not accept the pro­ce­e­dings for alle­ged vio­la­ti­on of the right to infor­ma­ti­on, as the­re was no cri­mi­nal offense.
  • Only fal­se or decep­tively incom­ple­te infor­ma­ti­on is punis­ha­ble; mere delay or com­ple­te refu­sal does not fall under Art. 60 para. 1 lit. a FADP.
  • In this spe­ci­fic case, alt­hough infor­ma­ti­on was not pro­vi­ded within 30 days, this did not con­sti­tu­te a cri­mi­nal offen­se and the char­ges were dis­missed in accordance with Art. 310 para. 1 lit. a of the Code of Cri­mi­nal Procedure.

In April 2025, the public prosecutor’s office of the Can­ton of Solo­thurn did not take up cri­mi­nal pro­ce­e­dings due to an alle­ged vio­la­ti­on of the right to infor­ma­ti­on with a legal­ly bin­ding ruling. The back­ground to this was a Request for infor­ma­ti­on that was not ans­we­red within the stan­dard peri­od of 30 days.

Accor­ding to the StA cle­ar­ly not a cri­mi­nal offen­se ful­fil­led. The rea­so­ning cor­re­sponds to the clear doc­tri­ne and the mate­ri­als (see also here):

The first offen­se is the pro­vi­si­on of fal­se infor­ma­ti­on, i.e. the Com­mu­ni­ca­ti­on of incor­rect infor­ma­ti­on that does not cor­re­spond to rea­li­ty. Incom­ple­te infor­ma­ti­on that does not con­tain all the requi­red infor­ma­ti­on is then punis­ha­ble. To put this into per­spec­ti­ve, it should be noted that a Incom­ple­te infor­ma­ti­on is only punis­ha­ble under the con­di­ti­on that at the same time the fal­se impres­si­on is crea­ted that the infor­ma­ti­on is com­ple­te. Incom­ple­te (or limi­t­ed or par­ti­al­ly refu­sed) infor­ma­ti­on is the­r­e­fo­re not objec­tionable under cri­mi­nal law, pro­vi­ded this is dis­c­lo­sed accor­din­gly. The com­ple­te refu­sal to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on also does not fall under Art. 60 para. 1 lit. a FADP (Dis­patch on the revi­si­on of the FADP 2017, 7101) and is the­r­e­fo­re not punis­ha­ble, espe­ci­al­ly as the offen­se of omis­si­on under Art. 60 para. 1 lit. b FADP does not app­ly to the duty to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on (but only to the duty to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on under Art. 19 para. 1 and para. 1 as well as Art. 21 para. 1 FADP). The­re is the­r­e­fo­re no rele­van­ce under cri­mi­nal law, for exam­p­le, if the request for infor­ma­ti­on from a data sub­ject com­ple­te­ly igno­red or dis­pen­sed with the pro­vi­si­on of infor­ma­ti­on altog­e­ther even if infor­ma­ti­on pur­su­ant to Art. 25 FADP would actual­ly be requi­red from a purely data pro­tec­tion per­spec­ti­ve. The fact that total non-dis­clo­sure as the grossest form of refu­sal is not cover­ed by Art. 60 para. 1 lit. a FADP can be justi­fi­ed by the fact that in such cases it is most rea­sonable for the data sub­ject to assert their rights in civil pro­ce­e­dings (see BSK DSG-Mathy­s/­Tho­mann, Art. 60 N 20, 22, 25 and 27 f.).

In the pre­sent case, neither fal­se infor­ma­ti­on was pro­vi­ded nor incom­ple­te infor­ma­ti­on, which at the same time gives the fal­se impres­si­on that the infor­ma­ti­on is com­ple­te. The reque­sted infor­ma­ti­on was sim­ply not deli­ver­ed within 30 dayswhich con­sti­tu­tes at most a refu­sal to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on (wher­eby it should be noted that the infor­ma­ti­on is gene­ral­ly pro­vi­ded within 30 days in accordance with Art. 25 para. 7 FADP and that the pro­vi­si­on of infor­ma­ti­on was pro­mi­sed by […] in the e‑mail dated […] by […]). This means that cle­ar­ly no cri­mi­nal offen­se has been com­mit­ted in the pre­sent case and the cor­re­spon­ding cri­mi­nal char­ges for vio­la­ti­on of the duty to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on within the mea­ning of the Data Pro­tec­tion Act in appli­ca­ti­on of Art. 310 para. 1 lit. a StPO.