Take-Aways (AI)
  • The LAG Ham­burg con­siders a three-month expiry clau­se for claims to be com­pa­ti­ble with the GDPR, pro­vi­ded that the effec­ti­ve­ness of the data subject’s rights is preserved.
  • Pre­re­qui­si­tes for vali­di­ty: time limits must not prac­ti­cal­ly pre­vent asser­ti­on, start of time limit after know­ledge of the facts giving rise to the cla­im, cla­im remains reco­gnizable and enforceable.
  • Swiss law only pro­hi­bits a pri­or wai­ver of the right to infor­ma­ti­on; a later wai­ver is per­mis­si­ble under cer­tain cir­cum­stances if suf­fi­ci­ent infor­ma­ti­on and spe­ci­fics are provided.

The Ham­burg Hig­her Labor Court (LAG) had to checkwhe­ther the fol­lo­wing clau­se is com­pa­ti­ble with the GDPR:

1) All mutu­al claims ari­sing from the employment rela­ti­on­ship and tho­se that are rela­ted to the employment rela­ti­on­ship shall lap­se if they are not asser­ted in wri­ting or in text form (§ 126 BGB) to the other par­ty to the con­tract within three months of the due date.

The LAG comes to the con­clu­si­on that the GDPR such a for­feit­u­re clau­se does not pre­clude. The GDPR does not regu­la­te the dis­posa­bi­li­ty of data sub­jects’ rights. Rather, in accordance with the prin­ci­ple of pro­ce­du­ral auto­no­my, it is the Mem­ber Sta­tes that design the pro­ce­du­ral moda­li­ties for enfor­cing data sub­jects’ rights, as long as the prin­ci­ple of effec­ti­ve­ness is also upheld. This applies if the fol­lo­wing con­di­ti­ons are met:

  • the time limits do not in fact make it impos­si­ble to assert claims;
  • the peri­od beg­ins after know­ledge of the facts giving rise to the cla­im, and
  • the cla­im remains reco­gnizable and enforceable for the creditor.

This ruling is per­haps less rele­vant for Switz­er­land becau­se com­pa­nies with employee data in Switz­er­land are often not sub­ject to the GDPR. Howe­ver, the FADP con­ta­ins a simi­lar pro­vi­si­on in Art. 25 para. 5 FADP:

No one can wai­ve the right to infor­ma­ti­on in advance.

Becau­se it is a rela­tively high­ly per­so­nal right, it is not waiva­ble – but only “in advan­ce”. This indi­ca­tes that it can be wai­ved at a later date under cer­tain con­di­ti­ons. Con­tra­ry to stric­ter opi­ni­ons (e.g. Schmid, FZR 1995 13, but also in the cur­rent BSK), this is also the view of the Fede­ral Supre­me Court. In BGE 141 III 119 has recor­ded it:

Une renon­cia­ti­on (non anti­ci­pée) ne peut être envi­sa­gée que si la per­son con­cer­née con­naît déjà l’e­s­sen­tiel de l’in­for­ma­ti­on à laquel­le elle pour­rait avoir accès […]

A wai­ver is the­r­e­fo­re per­mis­si­ble if the data sub­ject can essen­ti­al­ly assess the pro­ce­s­sing wit­hout the infor­ma­ti­on. This is cer­tain­ly cor­rect becau­se a wai­ver, like con­sent – which is also a wai­ver of the exer­cise of a rela­tively high­ly per­so­nal right – can only be con­side­red on the basis of suf­fi­ci­ent infor­ma­ti­on, and the sub­ject of the wai­ver must also be suf­fi­ci­ent­ly clear. A con­cre­tizati­on is the­r­e­fo­re a pre­re­qui­si­te for effec­ti­ve­ness. This means, for exam­p­le, that a Balan­ce clau­se It is conceiva­ble that an employee could wai­ve the right to infor­ma­ti­on from the employer to a cer­tain ext­ent. An agree­ment in which an employee con­firms that he or she is suf­fi­ci­ent­ly infor­med about cer­tain data pro­ce­s­sing would also be conceiva­ble – in this case, the right to infor­ma­ti­on would pro­ba­b­ly only exist to the ext­ent of other or fur­ther processing.