Moti­on Jani­ak (16.3186): Offi­ci­al sec­re­cy and coope­ra­ti­on bet­ween aut­ho­ri­ties. Sup­ple­ment to Artic­le 320, Para­graph 2, StGB

Moti­on Jani­ak (16.3186): Offi­ci­al sec­re­cy and coope­ra­ti­on bet­ween aut­ho­ri­ties. Sup­ple­ment to Artic­le 320, Para­graph 2, StGB
The Fede­ral Coun­cil pro­po­ses that the moti­on be rejected.

Sub­mit­ted text

The Fede­ral Coun­cil is ins­truc­ted to sub­mit a bill to Par­lia­ment that expands the grounds for justi­fi­ca­ti­on for the offen­se of vio­la­ti­on of offi­ci­al sec­re­cy (Art. 320 SCC) in cases whe­re secrets have been dis­c­lo­sed or had to be dis­c­lo­sed due to an over­ri­ding public interest.

Justi­fi­ca­ti­on

The­re is a ten­si­on bet­ween the duty to coope­ra­te with aut­ho­ri­ties and the obli­ga­ti­on to main­tain offi­ci­al sec­re­cy. For many employees in the public sec­tor, it is often not clear which data dis­clo­sure to other aut­ho­ri­ty mem­bers or offi­ci­als is per­mit­ted and when they may be com­mit­ting an offen­se. The cur­rent legal situa­ti­on is con­fu­sing. Artic­le 320 StGB has exi­sted in unch­an­ged form for more than half a cen­tu­ry. In the mean­ti­me, a lot has chan­ged with regard to the pro­tec­tion of secrets as well as with regard to the under­stan­ding of admi­ni­stra­ti­ve acti­vi­ty and public inte­rest. In her bache­lor the­sis “Amts­ge­heim­nis und Behör­den­ko­ope­ra­ti­on” (Offi­ci­al Sec­re­cy and Coope­ra­ti­on with Aut­ho­ri­ties), Karin Blöch­lin­ger has taken up the issue and pro­po­ses a cla­ri­fy­ing sup­ple­ment to the regu­la­ti­on of offi­ci­al sec­re­cy in Artic­le 320 num­ber 2 SCC by adding a second ground of justi­fi­ca­ti­on (cf. Wirt­schafts­ju­ri­sti­sche Arbei­ten 6, Schul­t­hess, Zurich 2015). The offen­der shall also not be lia­ble to pro­se­cu­ti­on “if he has dis­c­lo­sed the secret on the basis of a pre­do­mi­nant­ly public inte­rest within the same or to ano­ther aut­ho­ri­ty and the dis­clo­sure ser­ved the lat­ter to ful­fill its sta­tu­to­ry task.” The fede­ral law on data pro­tec­tion is to be reser­ved. The moti­on takes up this pro­po­sal, but of cour­se also lea­ves room for a dif­fe­rent formulation.

State­ment of the Fede­ral Council

Artic­le 320 of the Cri­mi­nal Code (StGB; SR 311.0) makes the dis­clo­sure of offi­ci­al secrets by public offi­ci­als a cri­mi­nal offen­se. Whe­ther the secret is dis­c­lo­sed within or out­side the admi­ni­stra­ti­on is irrele­vant. Howe­ver, the peti­tio­ner focu­ses on the coope­ra­ti­on bet­ween aut­ho­ri­ties and the pro­tec­tion of over­ri­ding public interests.

In various are­as of admi­ni­stra­ti­ve acti­vi­ty of the Con­fe­de­ra­ti­on and the can­tons, spe­ci­fic and pre­cise rules on admi­ni­stra­ti­ve and judi­cial assi­stance have been issued in recent years. In its opi­ni­on on 13.3277 Ip. Regaz­zi explains the dif­fe­ren­ces bet­ween report­ing rights and obli­ga­ti­ons on the one hand and report­ing rights and obli­ga­ti­ons on the other. Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve assi­stance rules are also stan­dar­di­zed in cer­tain are­as of admi­ni­stra­ti­ve law, e.g. in Artic­le 39 of the Finan­cial Mar­ket Super­vi­si­on Act (FINMASA; SR 956.1). The Fede­ral Coun­cil pre­fers such rules becau­se they exclude cri­mi­nal lia­bi­li­ty for a breach of offi­ci­al sec­re­cy under clear gui­de­lines pur­su­ant to Artic­le 14 SCC.

It may seem useful, for exam­p­le, to inform the aut­ho­ri­ty deci­ding on a pro­fes­sio­nal licen­se or a school aut­ho­ri­ty which per­sons are being inve­sti­ga­ted in spe­ci­fic cri­mi­nal pro­ce­e­dings. Howe­ver, both the pro­se­cu­ting aut­ho­ri­ty and the per­sons con­cer­ned have an inte­rest in ensu­ring that this infor­ma­ti­on is only dis­c­lo­sed under pre­cis­e­ly defi­ned con­di­ti­ons, as set out in Artic­le 364 SCC and Artic­le 75 of the Code of Cri­mi­nal Pro­ce­du­re (CCP; SR 312.0). The justi­fi­ca­ti­on pro­po­sed in the moti­on would lead to incon­si­stent infor­ma­ti­on dis­clo­sure, and the supe­ri­or aut­ho­ri­ties would no lon­ger be able to ensu­re con­si­stent prac­ti­ce. In the inte­rests of the rule of law and legal cer­tain­ty, admi­ni­stra­ti­ve assi­stance must be based on a pre­cise legal foun­da­ti­on. Last but not least, the requi­red justi­fi­ca­ti­on could also cau­se col­li­si­ons with such admi­ni­stra­ti­ve assi­stance rules of the Con­fe­de­ra­ti­on and the cantons.

In addi­ti­on, when gran­ting con­sent pur­su­ant to Artic­le 320 no. 2 SCC, the supe­ri­or aut­ho­ri­ty must alre­a­dy car­ry out the balan­cing of inte­rests pro­po­sed by the motio­ner (cf. for exam­p­le Art. 170 para. 3 Cri­mi­nal Pro­ce­du­re Code). The fact that this con­sent must be given not by the offi­ci­al con­cer­ned but by the supe­ri­or aut­ho­ri­ty and, moreo­ver, in wri­ting is ulti­m­ate­ly inten­ded to gua­ran­tee that the weig­hing of inte­rests – also in the inte­rests of any citi­zens affec­ted – is car­ri­ed out carefully.

The inclu­si­on of the justi­fi­ca­ti­on ground in Artic­le 320 SCC, as cal­led for in the moti­on, is the­r­e­fo­re super­fluous and could lead to num­e­rous ten­si­ons and con­sidera­ble legal uncer­tain­ty. Ulti­m­ate­ly, the­re would be a risk that this would even impair coope­ra­ti­on bet­ween aut­ho­ri­ties. The Fede­ral Coun­cil is the­r­e­fo­re of the opi­ni­on that coope­ra­ti­on bet­ween aut­ho­ri­ties is regu­la­ted appro­pria­te­ly in the cur­rent law and in terms of the rule of law and legal certainty.

Final­ly, it should be noted that doc­tri­ne and case law also reco­gnize the extra-legal justi­fi­ca­ti­on of the pro­tec­tion of legi­ti­ma­te inte­rests for the offen­se of vio­la­ti­on of offi­ci­al sec­re­cy (Art. 320 StGB) (e.g. judgment of the Fede­ral Supre­me Court 6B_305/2011 of Decem­ber 12, 2011, E. 3.). This also inclu­des the over­ri­ding public inte­rests cited by the petitioner.

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