Take-Aways (AI)
  • The Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court sta­tes that a spe­ci­fi­cal­ly named, attri­bu­ta­ble natu­ral per­son (de fac­to offen­der) is requi­red to punish a legal entity.
  • The direct appli­ca­bi­li­ty of ECJ com­pe­ti­ti­on law prin­ci­ples to Art. 83 GDPR is rejec­ted; offi­ci­al pro­ce­du­res must ensu­re suf­fi­ci­ent con­cre­tizati­on and rights of defense.

The Austri­an data pro­tec­tion aut­ho­ri­ty had impo­sed a fine of EUR 4 800 for fail­ure to dele­te video recor­dings. The fined respon­si­ble par­ty had chal­len­ged the fine decis­i­on befo­re the Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court (FAC).

The BVG held in its Decis­i­on from August 19, 2019 first notes the fol­lo­wing in this regard:

The Punish­ment of the legal per­son under the pro­vi­si­on in que­sti­on pre­sup­po­ses that a per­son who has given it attri­bu­ta­ble natu­ral per­son (lea­der) com­mit­ted a cri­mi­nal offen­se has. […]

The main que­sti­on was whe­ther the data pro­tec­tion super­vi­so­ry aut­ho­ri­ty (DPA) had a was allo­wed to impo­se a fine wit­hout spe­ci­fi­cal­ly naming the employee who was respon­si­ble for the initia­ting act. The DSB wan­ted to dis­pen­se with this, part­ly on the basis of prin­ci­ples of com­pe­ti­ti­on law:

The DPA dealt with this issue in an opi­ni­on […], in which she first refer­red to a brief […] in ano­ther pro­ce­e­ding […]. It sum­ma­ri­zes that, on the basis of the GDPR, any act of per­sons acting within the frame­work of a legal per­son is impu­ta­ble to the legal per­son. It is irrele­vant which employee was invol­ved in this case.. […] In its opi­ni­on […], the DPA fur­ther sta­tes that Art. 83 GDPR sub­stan­tively com­pe­ti­ti­on law regu­la­ti­ons mode­led on which is why the rele­vant case law of the ECJ on Artic­le 15 of Regu­la­ti­on No. 17/1962 and Artic­le 23 of Regu­la­ti­on No. 1/2003 must be applied. It fol­lows from this – in sum­ma­ry in this case – that a Con­cre­te naming of a natu­ral per­son who is alle­ged to have acted cul­pa­b­ly within the com­pa­ny or is to be held respon­si­ble for a pos­si­bly faul­ty orga­nizati­on not neces­sa­ry (cf. ECJ, judgment of 18.09.2003, C‑338/00 P, and fur­ther ECJ, judgment of 23.01.2014, T‑391/09, as well as the Opi­ni­ons on Cases C‑204/00 P and C‑280/06).

The BVG rejects this view – rather, the con­cre­te desi­gna­ti­on of the de fac­to respon­si­ble offen­der is required:

The pro­ce­e­dings cited in the Opi­ni­on refer to com­pe­ti­ti­on law pro­ce­e­dings con­duc­ted by the Com­mis­si­on, i.e. at the level of Euro­pean law using its own – also pro­ce­du­ral – Spe­ci­fi­ca­ti­ons of the regu­la­ti­ons cited abo­ve. In con­trast, Art. 83(8) GDPR sta­tes that the exer­cise of the super­vi­so­ry authority’s powers shall be sub­ject to appro­pria­te pro­ce­du­ral safe­guards in accordance with the Uni­on law and the Mem­ber Sta­te law inclu­ding effec­ti­ve judi­cial reme­dies and due pro­cess must be sub­ject to. In the opi­ni­on of the Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court, this pre­clu­des the direct appli­ca­bi­li­ty of the prin­ci­ples of juris­dic­tion of the Euro­pean courts with regard to com­pe­ti­ti­on law. […] from. […] The­r­e­fo­re, it must be sta­ted in the result that not a suf­fi­ci­ent­ly con­cre­te accu­sa­ti­on of an offen­se in the offi­ci­al pro­ce­e­dings. can be assumed.

Rather, it would be neces­sa­ry to spe­ci­fi­cal­ly name the de fac­to respon­si­ble person(s):

In addi­ti­on, it should not be over­loo­ked in this con­text that the com­plaint of the LPD of XXXX 2018 alre­a­dy sta­tes that the wai­tress working the­re at that time had sta­ted to the poli­ce offi­cers that the boss of the com­pa­ny was Mr. XXXX [and thus the share­hol­der or the mana­ging direc­tor under com­mer­cial law]. In the admi­ni­stra­ti­ve court pro­ce­e­dings con­duc­ted so far, it final­ly also tur­ned out that the Actu­al influence and con­trol of the per­sons invol­ved with regard to the com­plainant with the infor­ma­ti­on from the com­pa­ny regi­ster not suf­fi­ci­ent­ly con­cre­te and not pre­sen­ted accor­ding to rea­li­ty has been made. As a result, it must be assu­med that the fol­lo­wing no suf­fi­ci­ent con­cre­tizati­on of the accu­sa­ti­on of the crime in the offi­ci­al pro­ce­e­dings, sin­ce it is not clear from the lat­ter which person’s con­duct should have been attri­bu­ted to the com­plainant. Thus, howe­ver, the exer­cise of essen­ti­al rights of defen­se of the accu­sed in the pro­ce­e­dings no lon­ger seems to be suf­fi­ci­ent­ly guaranteed.

For this pur­po­se you will find here a con­tri­bu­ti­on by Micha­el Suda, who works at the DSB.