OGer ZH, 8.2.2016: A bank may not dis­c­lo­se per­so­nal data of an employee to the USA

The OGer ZH initi­al­ly ruled in LB150052 v. 8.2.2016 that both the district court and the labor court have juris­dic­tion in actions brought by bank employees against the deli­very of data to the DOJ:

In the pre­sent case, the plain­ti­ff reli­es pri­ma­ri­ly on Art. 15 DPA. Accor­ding to the wor­ding of the law, such actions aim to pro­tect the per­so­na­li­ty and are gover­ned by Artic­les 28, 28a and 28I of the Civil Code. It is thus clear that such an action extends far bey­ond the mere employment rela­ti­on­ship bet­ween the par­ties and con­cerns the enti­re per­so­na­li­ty of the plain­ti­ff, which is why the sub­ject-mat­ter juris­dic­tion of the district court is rea­di­ly given. The lower court, howe­ver, exami­ned the cla­im not only from the point of view of Art. 15 DPA, but also from the point of view of the employment con­tract, name­ly Art. 328 and Art. 328b CO (Urk. 38 pp. 23 – 25). This is cle­ar­ly admis­si­ble, becau­se the lower court had to exami­ne the cla­im under all rele­vant aspects within the mea­ning of Art. 57 ZPO. Con­ver­se­ly, it would also have been conceiva­ble to link the same action to the employment con­tract, which would have resul­ted in the labor court being respon­si­ble for the assess­ment of the action and would have had to be exami­ned by it in the same way from all points of view. As a result, both the District Court and the Labor Court are com­pe­tent for actions of the pre­sent type.

On the merits, the OGer ZH then sees no over­ri­ding public inte­rest within the mea­ning of DSG 6 II, as long as no syste­mical­ly important bank is affected:

que­sti­on of whe­ther the end­an­ger­ment of a bank in the sen­se of the abo­ve is con­tra­ry to the Swiss public inte­rest, it is justi­fi­ed to focus on whe­ther or not the insti­tu­ti­on in que­sti­on is to be con­side­red syste­mical­ly rele­vant. In its lea­ding decis­i­on BGE 137 II 431, issued on July 15, 2011, on the deli­very of bank cus­to­mer data to the U.S. aut­ho­ri­ties, the Fede­ral Supre­me Court also lin­ked the syste­mic rele­van­ce of the bank in que­sti­on (see BGE 137 II 431 E. 4.1, 4.2, 4.4). The fact that in the con­text of inte­rest, syste­mic rele­van­ce is the decisi­ve cri­ter­ion from the point of view of the public inte­rest also results not least from the BankA: As of March 1, 2012, artic­les 7 to 10a were added to the BankA as the “Fifth Sec­tion: Syste­mical­ly Rele­vant Banks”, whe­re the decisi­ve eva­lua­tions were made by the legis­la­tor. Accor­ding to Art. 7 para. 1 BankA, banks are con­side­red syste­mical­ly rele­vant if “their fail­ure would signi­fi­cant­ly dama­ge the Swiss eco­no­my and the Swiss finan­cial system”. Banks that do not meet the­se requi­re­ments are not con­side­red syste­mical­ly important; the­r­e­fo­re, it can­not be assu­med that their fail­ure would “signi­fi­cant­ly dama­ge the Swiss eco­no­my and the Swiss finan­cial system. In other words, if a non-syste­mical­ly important bank fails, the Swiss public inte­rest is not affected.

The OGer ZH also does not see any other justi­fi­ca­ti­on for the data sup­p­ly, name­ly not the enforce­ment of legal claims in court within the mea­ning of DSG 6 II lit. d:

The defen­dant is also able to name aut­hors who sup­port its the­sis. This is the case with Liv­s­chitz (in: Daten­schutz­recht, Basel 2015, Rz 18.79), who belie­ves that “what applies to the court pro­ce­e­dings must also app­ly to the upstream inve­sti­ga­ti­on pro­ce­du­re of the aut­ho­ri­ties”. This argu­men­ta­ti­on, which is not fur­ther sub­stan­tia­ted, howe­ver, aims past the wor­ding of the law, which men­ti­ons the “enforce­ment of legal claims in court”. Ano­ther aut­hor cited by the defen­dant (Wyss, in: Daten­schutz­recht, Basel 2015, Rz 11.92) empha­si­zes the dif­fe­ren­ces bet­ween the con­ti­nen­tal Euro­pean and the U.S. judi­cial systems, in that in the lat­ter the court is mere­ly assi­gned a “coor­di­na­ting over­all manage­ment func­tion” and the pro­ce­du­ral mate­ri­al is alre­a­dy coll­ec­ted befo­re the for­mal court pro­ce­e­dings in the form of pre-dis­co­very pro­ce­e­dings. That may well be so. Howe­ver, when the law refers to “court” in Art. 6(2)(d) DPA, it assu­mes a con­ti­nen­tal Euro­pean under­stan­ding of this term and not a pro­ce­du­re in which data is coll­ec­ted from indi­vi­du­als wort­hy of pro­tec­tion for any pur­po­se. No Euro­pean court will coll­ect data for pur­po­ses unre­la­ted to the pro­ce­e­dings, as the DoJ intends to do.

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