- The six-month retention of marginal data for Internet providers is unnecessary, as it is of no relevant benefit for billing and criminal prosecution.
- The regulation causes high costs for providers, is economically damaging and ineffective against crime, as it can be easily circumvented.
Frick parliamentary initiative (03.435): Elimination of superfluous monitoring measures in Internet traffic
26.04.2004: withdrawn.
Submitted text
Based on Article 160 paragraph 1 of the Federal Constitution and Article 21bis of the Business Transactions Act, I submit the following parliamentary initiative in the form of a general suggestion:
The Federal Act on the Interception of Postal and Telecommunications Traffic (Büpf, in particular Article 15) must be amended in such a way that the six-month obligation to retain so-called marginal data for providers (Internet service providers) is eliminated.
Justification
On the basis of Article 15 Büpf, the Federal Council has regulated two essential matters with the Ordinance (Vüpf; SR 780.11):
- If a crime is suspected, Internet traffic must be monitored within hours, and the transmitted data must be recorded in detail. This is necessary and can be done with reasonable effort. Anyone who has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity via the Internet should be thoroughly monitored without any quarter.
- The Federal Council also orders general retrospective monitoring of all traffic and billing data. Every provider must be able to indicate at any time, six months back, which Internet user sent a mail to which person or received a mail at which time.
Insofar as the Büpf creates the basis for retroactive monitoring in Article 15, it overshoots the mark:
According to the Federal Council’s answer to my interpellation (02.3739), the retention for billing is necessary so that the billing of the providers can be checked. However, the reality is that no provider invoices according to the number of messages sent or received. Therefore, the provision is not necessary – unlike in the case of telephone traffic.
2. for the fight against crime, the provision does nothing for three reasons (obviously, the legislator started from ideas a few years ago that have been completely overtaken by reality):
- Anyone can switch to a foreign provider anywhere in the world in whose state no analog monitoring takes place. Incidentally, the EU does not have any such regulations either.
- Anyone can bypass the provider and be “his own provider”. All that is needed is an investment of a few hundred francs and a few hours of work.
- For the fight against crime, the provision is unproductive because only the marginal data (essentially: sender, recipient and time) are kept, which say nothing about the content.
3. the provision requires a cost input that is disproportionate to the revenue. Small providers have to make initial investments of between 50,000 and 100,000 francs, which amounts to up to 10 percent of sales. For large ones, it’s well over a million francs. For operation – maintenance, updates, software and labor services – the same costs are incurred annually. Imposing such costs on companies in order to force unproductive detailed monitoring of all Internet users is pointless and economically damaging.
Article 15(3) Büpf and, if necessary, other provisions must be amended so that this superfluous, cost-driving and useless surveillance – “Orwell made in Switzerland 2003” – is reversed.