Postu­la­te Mül­ler-Alter­matt (13.3482): Legal basis for the “tax pillory
Writ­ten off 19.06.2015

Sub­mit­ted text

The Fede­ral Coun­cil is ins­truc­ted to draw up a report on the legal situa­ti­on and cur­rent prac­ti­ce regar­ding the coll­ec­tion of tax debts from muni­ci­pa­li­ties and can­tons. In par­ti­cu­lar, the fol­lo­wing should be presented,

1. what data pro­tec­tion law foun­da­ti­ons exist at the fede­ral and can­to­nal level that regu­la­te the publi­ca­ti­on of tax liabilities;

2. what dif­fe­ren­ces exist bet­ween the can­tons with regard to the publi­ca­ti­on of tax liabilities;

3. what fede­ral law adjust­ment would be neces­sa­ry to lega­li­ze a “tax pillory.”

4. how a “tax pil­lo­ry” could be desi­gned so that the per­so­nal rights of tho­se denoun­ced are not vio­la­ted (e.g. by defi­ning the cri­te­ria for publi­ca­ti­on, man­da­to­ry pro­ce­du­re, etc.).

Justi­fi­ca­ti­on

For can­tons and muni­ci­pa­li­ties, the coll­ec­tion of taxes is an ever grea­ter chall­enge. The decre­a­sing payment mora­le and the stron­gly deve­lo­ped data pro­tec­tion lead to ever lar­ger arre­ars of taxes and fees. In respon­se to this unsa­tis­fac­to­ry situa­ti­on, some muni­ci­pa­li­ties have taken mea­su­res that go bey­ond the limits of what is legal. With a “tax pil­lo­ry”, for exam­p­le, the muni­ci­pal aut­ho­ri­ties of Eger­kin­gen have made them­sel­ves lia­ble to pro­se­cu­ti­on. In fact, the den­un­cia­ti­on of citi­zens who are unwil­ling to pay is que­stionable in terms of the pro­tec­tion of their per­so­nal rights. Equal­ly que­stionable, howe­ver, is the fact that peo­p­le can hide behind this pro­tec­tion of per­so­na­li­ty and cheat the gene­ral public out of its payment.

It is the­r­e­fo­re advi­sa­ble to find ways of resol­ving the con­flict of objec­ti­ves bet­ween per­so­nal pro­tec­tion and tax eva­si­on. An ana­ly­sis of the legal bases and pos­si­bi­li­ties as well as the applied prac­ti­ce should open up the­se paths.

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h1>Statement of the Fede­ral Council

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The postu­lant asks the Fede­ral Coun­cil for a report on the publi­ca­ti­on of tax debts owed by can­tons and muni­ci­pa­li­ties, with a par­ti­cu­lar focus on explo­ring the pos­si­bi­li­ty of intro­du­cing a “tax pran­ger” for defaul­ting tax debtors.

Accor­ding to the appli­ca­ble fede­ral and can­to­nal tax legis­la­ti­on, all per­sons ent­ru­sted with the enforce­ment of tax laws are obli­ged to main­tain sec­re­cy about the fin­dings made in the pro­cess and about the cir­cum­stances of the tax­payers (cf. Art. 110 of the Fede­ral Law of 14 Decem­ber 1990 on Direct Fede­ral Tax, DBG; SR 642.11). This is refer­red to as the pre­ser­va­ti­on of tax sec­re­cy. The intro­duc­tion of the reque­sted “tax pran­ger” would con­tra­dict this principle.

The Con­fe­de­ra­ti­on, the can­tons and the com­mu­nes must com­ply with the pro­vi­si­ons of the Fede­ral Act of 11 April 1889 on Debt Coll­ec­tion and Bank­rupt­cy (SchKG; SR 281.1) for the coll­ec­tion of taxes due to them. The legis­la­tor has always refrai­ned from pro­vi­ding the Tre­a­su­ry with spe­cial means for the coll­ec­tion of its public-law claims that are not available to cre­di­tors of pri­va­te-law claims. It is true that the can­tons and muni­ci­pa­li­ties encoun­ter gre­at dif­fi­cul­ties with a num­ber of tax debtors when they want to coll­ect out­stan­ding tax debts. Pri­va­te cre­di­tors, howe­ver, may encoun­ter simi­lar dif­fi­cul­ties in coll­ec­ting their claims. For rea­sons of equal tre­at­ment of all cre­di­tors, it would the­r­e­fo­re be pro­ble­ma­tic to intro­du­ce a “tax pil­lo­ry” for the bene­fit of the tre­a­su­ry as envi­sa­ged by the postulant.

The postu­lant hims­elf points out that the intro­duc­tion of the “tax pran­ger” would result in pro­blems with per­so­nal pri­va­cy and data pro­tec­tion. It would hard­ly be pos­si­ble to pro­tect the per­so­nal rights of tho­se affec­ted by the intro­duc­tion of the “tax pran­ger”. After all, the “tax pran­ger” is inten­ded to encou­ra­ge debtors to pay their tax arre­ars by publicly naming them. The vio­la­ti­on of their per­so­nal rights would thus be inten­tio­nal or at least accepted.

In sum­ma­ry, the intro­duc­tion of the “tax pran­ger” pro­ves to be incom­pa­ti­ble with the appli­ca­ble legal order, which is why the pre­pa­ra­ti­on of the report reque­sted by the postu­lant should be dis­pen­sed with.