Take-Aways (AI)
  • The Advo­ca­te Gene­ral explains that dyna­mic IP addres­ses can be per­so­nal data if the tele­me­dia pro­vi­der has access to addi­tio­nal iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on data.
  • Ensu­ring the func­tion­a­li­ty of a tele­me­di­um may con­sti­tu­te a legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest pur­su­ant to Art. 7f Direc­ti­ve 95/46 and justi­fy processing.
  • Natio­nal regu­la­ti­ons that exclude the legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest in pro­ce­s­sing such data con­tra­dict the Directive.
  • A gene­ral inter­pre­ta­ti­on, accor­ding to which any infor­ma­ti­on would poten­ti­al­ly be per­so­nal, is rejec­ted as it would have imprac­ti­ca­ble consequences.

The Advo­ca­te Gene­ral of the ECJ, Cam­pos Sán­chez-Bor­do­na, in Case C‑582/14. its Opi­ni­on on the reten­ti­on of dyna­mic IP addres­ses when visi­ting Inter­net por­tals of public insti­tu­ti­ons. It pro­po­ses to ans­wer the que­sti­ons sub­mit­ted by the BGH to the ECJ in this con­text as follows:

1. pur­su­ant to Artic­le 2(a) of Direc­ti­ve 95/46/EC of the Euro­pean Par­lia­ment and of the Coun­cil of 24 Octo­ber 1995 on the pro­tec­tion of indi­vi­du­als with regard to the pro­ce­s­sing of per­so­nal data and on the free move­ment of such data, a dyna­mic IP address used by a user to access the web­site of a Tele­me­dia pro­vi­der has cal­led, for the lat­ter, a “per­so­nal data”, inso­far as an Inter­net access pro­vi­der has other addi­tio­nal data at its dis­po­sal, which in con­junc­tion with the dyna­mic IP address allow the iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on of the user.

2) Artic­le 7(f) of Direc­ti­ve 95/46 must be inter­pre­ted as mea­ning that the pur­po­se of ensu­ring the func­tio­ning of the tele­me­di­um must, in prin­ci­ple, be regard­ed as a legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest the achie­ve­ment of which justi­fi­es the pro­ce­s­sing of that per­so­nal data, pro­vi­ded that it has been accor­ded prio­ri­ty over the inte­rest or fun­da­men­tal rights of the data sub­ject. A natio­nal legal pro­vi­si­on that does not allow this legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest to be taken into account is not com­pa­ti­ble with the afo­re­men­tio­ned article.

In con­trast, it is not suf­fi­ci­ent for the qua­li­fi­ca­ti­on as per­so­nal data that any third par­ty could pos­si­bly have addi­tio­nal infor­ma­ti­on that enables identification:

(64) Again, refe­rence should be made to the 26th reci­tal of Direc­ti­ve 95/46. The wor­ding “means … which could rea­son­ab­ly be used … by a third party”(17) could be inter­pre­ted as mea­ning that it is suf­fi­ci­ent for any third par­ty to be able to obtain addi­tio­nal data (which can be lin­ked to a dyna­mic IP address in order to iden­ti­fy a per­son) for such an address to be con­side­red eo ipso as per­so­nal data.

65. this broa­dest pos­si­ble inter­pre­ta­ti­on would in prac­ti­ce lead to any kind of infor­ma­ti­on being clas­si­fi­ed as per­so­nal datahowe­ver insuf­fi­ci­ent it would be in its­elf to be able to deter­mi­ne a user. It will never be pos­si­ble to rule out with abso­lu­te cer­tain­ty that the­re is not a third par­ty in pos­ses­si­on of addi­tio­nal know­ledge that can be lin­ked to the infor­ma­ti­on in que­sti­on and thus make it pos­si­ble to deter­mi­ne the iden­ti­ty of a person.