Take-Aways (AI)
  • In the Net­her­lands, the cla­im for dama­ges under Art. 82 GDPR can be asser­ted eit­her tog­e­ther with an admi­ni­stra­ti­ve com­plaint or inde­pendent­ly befo­re a civil court.
  • The GDPR does not deter­mi­ne the deter­mi­na­ti­on and cal­cu­la­ti­on of the dama­ge; natio­nal law regu­la­tes the bur­den of pro­of and scope, wher­eby actu­al and cer­tain dama­ge is required.

The Dutch Coun­cil of Sta­te has issued a Decis­i­on from April 1, 2020 (thanks to Chri­sti­an Drechs­ler for the refe­rence!) sta­ted that

  • the cla­im for dama­ges within the mea­ning of Art. 82 GDPR can, at the choice of the aggrie­ved par­ty, be asser­ted tog­e­ther with a com­plaint befo­re the admi­ni­stra­ti­ve aut­ho­ri­ties or inde­pendent­ly befo­re a civil court (in any case in the Net­her­lands, whe­re­o­beio abo­ve EUR 25,000 only the civil courts have jurisdiction);
  • the Deter­mi­na­ti­on and cal­cu­la­ti­on of the cla­im for dama­ges as a result of a data pro­tec­tion breach (here: delay­ed infor­ma­ti­on) is not spe­ci­fi­ed by the GDPR and is the­r­e­fo­re a mat­ter for the natio­nal law (wher­eby “effet uti­le” is to be obser­ved in particular);
  • accor­ding to reci­tal 146[mfn][…] The con­cept of dama­ge should be inter­pre­ted broad­ly in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justi­ce in a way that is ful­ly con­si­stent with the objec­ti­ves of this Regu­la­ti­on. This is wit­hout pre­ju­di­ce to claims for dama­ges based on inf­rin­ge­ments of other pro­vi­si­ons of Uni­on law or the law of the Mem­ber Sta­tes. […][/mfn], the con­cept of dama­ge must be inter­pre­ted broad­ly. Accor­ding to the case law of the ECJ (e.g. Rs. C‑337/15 P para. 91), howe­ver, the dama­ge to be com­pen­sa­ted must be “actu­al and certain”;
  • a Vio­la­ti­on of the GDPR as such does not pro­ve any dama­ge yet:

    The­re is no rea­son to assu­me that a breach of the GDPR alre­a­dy implies an attack on the inte­gri­ty of a per­son and the­r­e­fo­re leads to com­pensable dama­ge. Con­tra­ry to [the appellant’s] sub­mis­si­on, this can­not be dedu­ced from reci­tals 85 and 146 of the reci­tals to the GDPR. The fact that a per­so­nal data breach may lead to (im)material dama­ge and that a data sub­ject must recei­ve full and actu­al com­pen­sa­ti­on for the dama­ge suf­fe­r­ed, does not mean that a vio­la­ti­on of the stan­dards by defi­ni­ti­on leads to damage.

  • an initi­al­ly incom­ple­te infor­ma­ti­on does not then con­sti­tu­te a serious cul­pa­ble con­duct so serious as to con­sti­tu­te a vio­la­ti­on of a fun­da­men­tal right;
  • the com­pen­sa­ti­on for dama­ges under the GDPR has not puni­ti­ve in natu­re. Rather, the pur­po­se is to reme­dy an unlawful inter­fe­rence with pri­va­cy or to pro­vi­de com­pen­sa­ti­on. Reci­tal 146 also does not say that the com­pen­sa­ti­on must be effec­ti­ve and “dissua­si­ve”;
  • the inju­red par­ty should the­r­e­fo­re have pro­vi­ded con­cre­te evi­dence of the dama­ge incur­red, which he fai­led to do.

In a par­al­lel case, the Coun­cil of Sta­te award­ed com­pen­sa­ti­on of EUR 500. Here, medi­cal data had been erro­n­eous­ly for­ward­ed to a disci­pli­na­ry com­mit­tee of the health care system, which had appar­ent­ly cau­sed imma­te­ri­al damage.

The situa­ti­on is dif­fe­rent under Art. 82 GDPR from that under the Cali­for­nia CCPAwhich pro­vi­des for a cla­im for “dama­ges” even in cases whe­re no dama­ge has occur­red (e.g., a lump sum of USD 100 – 750 per data breach, unless the real dama­ge is higher).