Data pro­ce­s­sing that falls under the GDPR are inad­mis­si­ble, inso­far as they are not based on a Legal basis based (Art. 5(1)(a) GDPR). The legal basis may be

  • for tri­vi­al data from Art. 6,
  • for per­so­nal data requi­ring spe­cial pro­tec­tion from Art. 9 GDPR (and if neces­sa­ry addi­tio­nal­ly from Art. 6 GDPR, inso­far as Art. 9(2)(…) does not con­sti­tu­te a basis for pro­ce­s­sing, but only lifts the pro­hi­bi­ti­on of Art. 9(1), e.g. in the case of Art. 9(2)(e) GDPR) and
  • for trans­fers to third count­ries from Art. 46 et seq. GDPR result.

In the field of mar­ke­ting, the main focus is on the legal bases of the Con­sent (Art. 6(1)(a)) and of the legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest (Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR) come into con­side­ra­ti­on. The que­sti­on the­r­e­fo­re ari­ses for which acti­vi­ties in the mar­ke­ting area a com­pa­ny (or a group of com­pa­nies) can invo­ke a legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest and from when or for what con­sent must be obtai­ned (with the cor­re­spon­ding con­se­quen­ces for the pos­si­bly also tech­ni­cal imple­men­ta­ti­on and the requi­re­ments for vol­un­t­a­ri­ness, among other things).

The­re are good argu­ments for using the Scope of legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest in the area of direct mar­ke­ting not to be drawn too nar­row­ly. It can also cover pro­fil­ing mea­su­res, for exam­p­le, i.e. data pro­ce­s­sing for the per­so­na­lizati­on of adver­ti­sing mea­su­res, in my view also when per­so­nal data coll­ec­ted off­line and online are com­bi­ned for pro­fil­ing. The pre­re­qui­si­te in each case is that

  • the data pro­ce­s­sing is limi­t­ed to the ext­ent appro­pria­te to the purpose;
  • the respon­si­ble per­son car­ri­es out a suf­fi­ci­ent­ly con­cre­te balan­cing of inte­rests that addres­ses the cir­cum­stances of the pro­ject wit­hout the balan­cing get­ting out of hand,
  • the weig­hing of inte­rests is docu­men­ted and
  • that it explains the data pro­ce­s­sing in suf­fi­ci­ent detail and cle­ar­ly in a pri­va­cy statement.

Respon­si­ble have quite the right to exhaust the legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest. Thus, in April 2014, the (then) Artic­le 29 Working Par­ty (now the Euro­pean Data Pro­tec­tion Board) on legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest (Opi­ni­on 06/2014, WP217) recor­ded,

  • 7 lit. f be not just a “last resort for spe­cial cases in which the other legal bases do not app­ly; and
  • the weig­hing of inte­rests not the func­tion to save the per­son con­cer­ned from any nega­ti­ve impactbut only from dis­pro­por­tio­na­te bur­dens. In other words, not every nega­ti­ve impact makes the pen­dulum swing in favor of tho­se affec­ted.

Legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest within the mea­ning of Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR

In deter­mi­ning the legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest, the fol­lo­wing fac­tors must be taken into account on the one hand all legal­ly not pro­scri­bed inte­rests also com­mer­cial inte­rests that speak in favor of the pro­ce­s­sing in que­sti­on, which may be inte­rests of the controller(s) and third par­ties, but also of the data sub­jects them­sel­ves. This must be set against any con­flic­ting inte­rests of the data subjects.

Sub­se­quent­ly, the­se inte­rests are and weigh them up against each other. Ther­eby, accor­ding to the men­tio­ned WP217 con­sider not only the inten­si­ty of inter­ven­ti­on and the likeli­hood that nega­ti­ve impacts will occur, but a num­ber of other fac­tors, such as the following:

Incre­a­sing the weight on the part of the per­son responsible

  • The per­sons con­cer­ned have agreed to the pro­ce­s­sing rea­sonable to expecte.g. exi­sting cus­to­mers within the scope of a cor­re­spon­ding busi­ness rela­ti­on­ship, but also, for exam­p­le, on the basis of a data pro­tec­tion declaration;
  • the inte­rests that speak for the pro­ce­s­sing have a Fun­da­men­tal rights refe­rence;
  • the machi­ning also lies in a public inte­rest;
  • the inte­rests move in the envi­ron­ment of other pro­ce­s­sing bases; for exam­p­le, pro­ce­s­sing is not neces­sa­ry for a con­tract, but it is rele­vant (cf. below on pur­po­se com­pa­ti­bi­li­ty, which takes up this idea);
  • the inte­rests are soci­al­ly reco­gnized;
  • the inte­rests beco­me through the GDPR par­ti­cu­lar­ly reco­gnized, accor­ding to the interests 
    • in direct adver­ti­sing (see below);
    • in the trans­fer of data for inter­nal Group admi­ni­stra­ti­ve purposes;
    • in ensu­ring net­work and infor­ma­ti­on security.

Accor­ding to reci­tal 47, the fol­lo­wing are par­ti­cu­lar­ly important legi­ti­ma­te expec­ta­ti­ons of the data sub­jects. The Ger­man Con­fe­rence of Inde­pen­dent Fede­ral and Sta­te Data Pro­tec­tion Aut­ho­ri­ties (DSK) has been in the Brief Paper No. 3 (“Pro­ce­s­sing of per­so­nal data for adver­ti­sing”) has empha­si­zed this and at the same time made it clear that the con­trol­ler must deter­mi­ne the out­co­me of the balan­cing of inte­rests Influence through appro­pria­te data pro­tec­tion noti­ces can:

If the data con­trol­ler pro­vi­des trans­pa­rent and com­pre­hen­si­ve infor­ma­ti­on about the inten­ded use of the data for adver­ti­sing pur­po­ses, the expec­ta­ti­on of the data sub­ject is gene­ral­ly that his or her cus­to­mer data will be used accordingly.

Increa­se of the weight on the part of the per­sons concerned

  • The per­sons con­cer­ned are child­ren or other­wi­se vul­nerable as, for exam­p­le, in the case of elder­ly or sick people;
  • a Fun­da­men­tal rights refe­rence of interests;
  • Editing Per­so­nal data requi­ring spe­cial pro­tec­tion (howe­ver, the invo­ca­ti­on of a legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest is sever­ely limi­t­ed here anyway);
  • the pro­ce­s­sed data are Sen­si­ti­ve or sus­cep­ti­ble to misu­se, e.g. account data, com­mu­ni­ca­ti­on con­tent data, loca­ti­on data, high­ly per­so­nal data such as life log­ging data;
  • a par­ti­cu­lar­ly strong mar­ket posi­ti­on, from the point of view of the Artic­le 29 Working Par­ty, which is, howe­ver, que­stionable in my opinion.

Cer­tain pro­ce­s­sing ope­ra­ti­ons are gover­ned by the GDPR The use of the­se tech­no­lo­gies is then more rest­ric­ted than others or is con­side­red par­ti­cu­lar­ly ris­ky, e.g. machining,

  • whe­re the per­son con­cer­ned Degra­ded to object respec­tively dis­cri­mi­na­tes would;
  • whe­re the per­son con­cer­ned spied out would;
  • the Par­ti­cu­lar­ly exten­si­ve are;
  • Very exten­si­ve pro­fil­ing;
  • the Com­bi­na­ti­on of per­so­nal data from dif­fe­rent sources with dif­fe­rent pur­po­ses, pro­vi­ded that this goes bey­ond the rea­sonable expec­ta­ti­ons of the data subjects;
  • Data pro­ce­s­sing ope­ra­ti­ons in which the data sub­ject par­ti­ci­pa­tes in the Pre­ven­ted from exer­cis­ing a right or using a ser­vice will.

Sui­ta­ble guarantees

It must also be taken into account whe­ther or which “appro­pria­te safe­guards” are in place (Art. 6(4)(d). GDPR). By “gua­ran­tees”, the GDPR gene­ral­ly tech­ni­cal and orga­nizatio­nal mea­su­res for the pro­tec­tion of the data sub­jects, e.g.

  • Encryp­ti­on or pseudonymization;
  • Rest­ric­tions on access to pro­ce­s­sed data;
  • Pri­va­cy-by-design and pri­va­cy-by-default measures;
  • con­trac­tu­al safeguards
  • Ensu­ring the rights of data subjects;
  • Ensu­re a right to object and a simp­le opt-out solution;
  • Con­duc­ting a data pro­tec­tion impact assessment;
  • Trans­pa­ren­cy mea­su­res (see abo­ve on the legi­ti­ma­te expec­ta­ti­ons of data subjects);
  • Docu­men­ta­ti­on of pro­ce­s­sing and balan­cing of interests.

The­se con­side­ra­ti­ons play an essen­ti­al role in the balan­cing of inte­rests, which gives the respon­si­ble par­ty a cer­tain Room for maneu­ver gives.

On the legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest in direct marketing

The GDPR reco­gnizes in reci­tal 47 that the inte­rest in direct mar­ke­ting is legitimate:

The pro­ce­s­sing of per­so­nal data for the pur­po­ses of direct mar­ke­ting may be con­side­red as pro­ce­s­sing ser­ving a legi­ti­ma­te interest.

Howe­ver, this does not ans­wer the que­sti­on of how far this inte­rest extends or to what ext­ent data pro­ce­s­sing for the pur­po­se of direct mar­ke­ting can be based on a legi­ti­ma­te interest.

First of all, it must be assu­med that the legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest not only the trans­mis­si­on of adver­ti­sing (e.g., the sen­ding of an e‑mail, which, howe­ver, accor­ding to Art. 3 (1) lit. o UWG or the appli­ca­ble local mar­ket con­duct law, as a rule, requi­res con­sent), but also pre­vious data pro­ce­s­sing can cap­tu­re, name­ly in par­ti­cu­lar also a pro­fil­ing. This results from the spe­cial right of objec­tion pur­su­ant to Art. 21 Para. 2 GDPR:

If per­so­nal data are pro­ce­s­sed for the pur­po­ses of direct mar­ke­ting, the data sub­ject shall have the right to object at any time to pro­ce­s­sing of per­so­nal data con­cer­ning him or her for such mar­ke­ting; this shall also app­ly to pro­fil­ing inso­far as it is rela­ted to such direct marketing.

Such a right of objec­tion only makes sen­se if the pro­ce­s­sing in que­sti­on is not based on con­sent; in that case, the right of revo­ca­ti­on pur­su­ant to Art. 7 (3) GDPR.

Also infor­ma­ti­ve is the afo­re­men­tio­ned WP217. The Art. 29 Group holds in it for the time being,

[…] con­trol­lers may have a legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest in get­ting to know their cus­to­mers’ pre­fe­ren­ces so as to enable them to bet­ter per­so­na­li­se their offersand ulti­m­ate­ly, offer pro­ducts and ser­vices that bet­ter meet the needs and desi­res of the cus­to­mers. In light of this, Artic­le 7(f) may be an appro­pria­te legal ground to be used for some types of mar­ke­ting acti­vi­ties, on-line and off-line, pro­vi­ded that appro­pria­te safe­guards are in place […]. 

It is also clear from this that legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest may include pro­fil­ing for adver­ti­sing purposes.

As Inte­rim result it fol­lows that the legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest within the mea­ning of Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR

  • in direct mar­ke­ting is con­sidera­ble on the whole,
  • also covers pro­fil­ing, e.g. pro­fil­ing of cus­to­mers for the pur­po­se of per­so­na­li­zed mar­ke­ting measures,
  • under the reser­va­ti­on that the respon­si­ble per­son takes appro­pria­te guarantees.

This also makes sen­se in terms of the result: it is dif­fi­cult to see which inte­rests of the cus­to­mer are undu­ly inter­fe­red with if mar­ke­ting mea­su­res are tail­o­red to his (pre­su­med) inte­rests, espe­ci­al­ly sin­ce the cus­to­mer can at any time exer­cise the uncon­di­tio­nal right of objec­tion under Art. 21 para. 2 GDPR can make use of. The limit would pro­ba­b­ly be rea­ched whe­re the customer’s self-deter­mi­na­ti­on is under­mi­ned. In this case, howe­ver, the rele­vant mar­ket con­duct law inter­ven­es, e.g. the law on fair tra­ding (in Switz­er­land Art. 3 Para. 1 lit. h UWGwhich pro­hi­bits aggres­si­ve adver­ti­sing; simi­lar­ly, § 4a of the Ger­man UWG). It is obvious to use this limit as a gui­de­line in data pro­tec­tion law as well. This lea­ves the gene­ral risks when exten­si­ve data­ba­ses are crea­ted (e.g., the increa­sed poten­ti­al for dama­ge in the event of unaut­ho­ri­zed access). Howe­ver, this is not a rea­son for pro­hi­bi­ti­on, but increa­ses the requi­re­ments for sui­ta­ble safe­guards whe­re necessary.

Online track­ing

In the area of online track­ing, the scope of legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest is curr­ent­ly under dis­cus­sion in Ger­ma­ny. The afo­re­men­tio­ned con­fe­rence of the inde­pen­dent fede­ral and sta­te data pro­tec­tion aut­ho­ri­ties (DSK) repres­ents the posi­ti­onThe use of track­ing mecha­nisms, e.g. coo­kies that are not tech­ni­cal­ly neces­sa­ry, should be sub­ject to a Con­sent requi­red:

In any case, pri­or con­sent is requi­red for the use of track­ing mecha­nisms that make the beha­vi­or of data sub­jects on the Inter­net traceable and for the crea­ti­on of user pro­files. This means that infor­med con­sent within the mea­ning of the Ger­man Data Pro­tec­tion Act is requi­red. GDPRThis means, for exam­p­le, befo­re coo­kies are pla­ced or infor­ma­ti­on stored on the user’s ter­mi­nal device is collected.

This posi­ti­on has met with justi­fi­ed cri­ti­cism (e.g. the GDD). The (Ger­man) lite­ra­tu­re (e.g. here) is also more libe­ral; in ten­den­cy, online track­ing and the for­ma­ti­on of cor­re­spon­ding Pro­files based on a legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest to the ext­ent that the data coll­ec­ted in the pro­cess are Pro­ce­s­sed only in pseud­ony­mous form be amen­ded. As a result, the pro­vi­si­ons of sec­tions 13 and 15 of the Ger­man Tele­me­dia Act will be continued.

This stric­ter stance affects the area of online track­ingbut, in my opi­ni­on, should be limi­t­ed to per­sons who are not exi­sting cus­to­mers are. For exi­sting cus­to­mers, the gene­ral balan­cing of inte­rests must app­ly, which is why data coll­ec­ted online can also be coll­ec­ted in per­so­nal form and, if neces­sa­ry, mer­ged with other per­so­nal data. Howe­ver, it is also true for the area of online track­ing of non-cus­to­mers that the balan­cing of inte­rests can­not be done so sche­ma­ti­cal­ly and must also take into account sui­ta­ble safe­guards, among other things. The fol­lo­wing should be noted:

  • The inte­rest in adver­ti­sing mea­su­res is basi­cal­ly justi­fi­ed. Art. 6 para. 1 lit. f GDPR the­r­e­fo­re comes into que­sti­on as a legal basis.
  • When app­ly­ing this pro­vi­si­on, all inte­rests must be weig­hed and balan­ced against each other. The weig­hing of inte­rests must not dis­re­gard gua­ran­tees in the spe­ci­fic case (such as trans­pa­ren­cy mea­su­res or the per­for­mance of a data pro­tec­tion impact assessment).
  • The GDPR gives increa­sed weight to the inte­rest in direct adver­ti­sing mea­su­res in Reci­tal 47.
  • In the absence of an ope­ning clau­se, the­se requi­re­ments lea­ve no room for stric­ter requi­re­ments by the mem­ber states.
  • A refe­rence to Ger­man law may not affect the rights con­fer­red by the GDPR The aim is not to under­mi­ne the uni­for­mi­ty of the law throug­hout the Union.

As a result, in my opi­ni­on, data con­trol­lers are not exclu­ded in prin­ci­ple from invo­king a legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest in the area of online adver­ti­sing even if they do not pro­cess the cor­re­spon­ding data in pseud­ony­mous form; alt­hough gre­at legal uncer­tain­ty remains.

Excur­sus: Pur­po­se compatibility

Ano­ther legal basis can be found in Art. 5(1)(b) and Art. 6(4) GDPR lie: The (Fur­ther) pro­ce­s­sing for com­pa­ti­ble pur­po­ses Is cover­ed by the lega­li­ty of the ori­gi­nal pur­po­se; “in this case. keine andere gesonderte Rechtsgrundlage erforderlich” (Reci­tal 50; howe­ver, this is dis­pu­ted; cf. esp. Herbst in Kühling/Buchner).

Ther­eby a Weig­hing accor­ding to Art. 6(4) GDPR which takes into account, among other things, the fac­tors men­tio­ned in Art. 6(4) lit. a‑d. As a result, the con­side­ra­ti­ons in deter­mi­ning legi­ti­ma­te inte­rest and tho­se in the com­pa­ti­bi­li­ty test are the­r­e­fo­re simi­lar. The dif­fe­rence is that pur­po­se com­pa­ti­bi­li­ty may also legi­ti­mi­ze the pro­ce­s­sing of spe­cial cate­go­ries of per­so­nal data (as Art. 6(4)(lit. c) GDPR makes clear). Howe­ver, this pre­sup­po­ses that the pro­ce­s­sing of such per­so­nal data was lawful for the ori­gi­nal pur­po­se, which – at least for com­pa­nies in Switz­er­land – often requi­res con­sent. The que­sti­on here is the­r­e­fo­re not so much whe­ther pro­ce­s­sing is “com­pa­ti­ble” with the ori­gi­nal pur­po­se, but whe­ther the con­sent was for­mu­la­ted in a suf­fi­ci­ent­ly broad manner.

As a result, pur­po­se com­pa­ti­bi­li­ty the­r­e­fo­re hard­ly leads to legi­ti­mi­zing pro­ce­s­sing that is not alre­a­dy legi­ti­mi­zed by a legi­ti­ma­te interest.