Takea­ways (AI):
  • The SNB wies die Beschwer­de der Pro­vi­der gegen den Zugang zu Betriebs­da­ten eines Jour­na­li­sten ab.
  • Der Zugang wur­de im Inter­es­se der Trans­pa­ren­cy und auf­grund des Prin­ci­ple of publi­ci­ty gewährt, trotz der Berück­sich­ti­gung von Trade secrets.
  • The öffent­li­che Sicher­heit sei durch den Daten­zu­gang nicht gefähr­det, da 5G-Anten­nen­stand­or­te bereits öffent­lich are.
  • The Pri­va­cy wur­de berück­sich­tigt; das Infor­ma­ti­ons­be­dürf­nis bezüg­lich 5G-Tech­no­lo­gie über­wiegt die Pri­vat­in­ter­es­sen.

The FAC had to rule on the access of a jour­na­list to ope­ra­tio­nal data of anten­na data from 5G anten­nas of Sun­ri­se, Salt and Swis­s­com at OFCOM. The FDPIC had recom­men­ded gran­ting access in the stra­ti­fi­ca­ti­on pro­ce­du­re under the FCO, and OFCOM had issued a cor­re­spon­ding order. The pro­vi­ders appea­led against this to the FAC. The FAC rejects the appeal (Judgment A‑516/2022 of 12 Sep­tem­ber 2023). The judgment is not final.

The Pro­vi­ders first argued in gene­ral terms that the BGÖ ser­ves to con­trol the sta­te, not to inve­sti­ga­te com­pa­nies as mar­ket play­ers. This objec­tion is unque­stionab­ly justi­fi­ed in the mat­ter. In fact, the FCO – espe­ci­al­ly in the broad inter­pre­ta­ti­on of the FDPIC and the FAC – leads to the fact that com­pa­nies that inter­act with the sta­te are them­sel­ves sub­ject to the prin­ci­ple of publi­ci­ty. To a cer­tain ext­ent, this is in the natu­re of things, but the que­sti­on ari­ses whe­ther the FCO should not be inter­pre­ted more rest­ric­tively. In fact, the pro­tec­tion of pri­va­te par­ties lies almost exclu­si­ve­ly in the pro­tec­tion of trade secrets, and here the FAC applies a very strict stan­dard. In the pre­sent case, the FAC is con­tent with the gene­ral refe­rence to the pro­tec­tion of Trade secretswhich “safe­guards the legi­ti­ma­te pro­tec­tion inte­rests of pri­va­te-sec­tor actors.”

Que­stionable was then the Rela­ti­on­ship of Art. 24f TCA to the FCO. Accor­ding to Art. 24f TCA, OFCOM shall pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on on, among other things, trans­mit­ter sites, pro­vi­ded that the­re are no over­ri­ding public or pri­va­te inte­rests to the con­tra­ry. In con­trast, the FAC does not regard Art. 24f TCA as a spe­cial pro­vi­si­on reser­ved for the FCO (Art. 4 FCO), becau­se the pur­po­se of this pro­vi­si­on is to pro­mo­te trans­pa­ren­cy. It would be con­tra­ry to this pur­po­se to use this pro­vi­si­on to rest­rict access. Howe­ver, as far as can be seen, the FAC has only dealt with the pur­po­se of of the con­tent of Art. 24f TCA and does not also deal with the pur­po­se of its boun­da­ries. – Art. 22 GeoIV is also not such a spe­cial stan­dard, if only becau­se it is a pro­vi­si­on of an ordinance.

Nor would access lead to a serious Thre­at to public safe­ty (Artic­le 7(1)(c) of the Code of Civil Pro­ce­du­re). In con­trast to the judgment A‑407/2019 (mea­su­ring sta­ti­ons of OFCOM’s radio moni­to­ring net­work), the net­work in que­sti­on does not direct­ly and imme­dia­te­ly ser­ve to pro­tect public order, and the loca­ti­ons of the 5G anten­nas are alre­a­dy public in any case.

Also be no trade secrets con­cer­ned. The data affec­ted by the access request is not secret, but public. Coor­di­na­tes and tech­no­lo­gy of mobi­le pho­ne anten­nas can be found on the fede­ral government’s geo­por­tal, as can trans­mis­si­on fre­quen­ci­es, and fur­ther data is public at least from time to time in the con­text of the buil­ding per­mit pro­ce­du­re. In any case, it is not evi­dent that the publi­ca­ti­on “could serious­ly impair the busi­ness suc­cess” of the pro­vi­ders – here, the Fede­ral Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court fol­lows the well-known case law that access requi­res a con­cre­te­ly asser­ted dis­ad­van­ta­ge, which is usual­ly difficult.

Final­ly, the rele­vant infor­ma­ti­on was not within the mea­ning of Art. 7 para. 1 lit. h of the Fede­ral Law on Civil Pro­ce­du­re. vol­un­t­a­ri­ly com­mu­ni­ca­ted becau­se they have to be regu­lar­ly com­mu­ni­ca­ted to OFCOM on the basis of the licenses.

This is fol­lo­wed by expl­ana­ti­ons on the Data pro­tec­tion law. Until the end of August 2023, the aDSG was appli­ca­ble to data of legal enti­ties. The FCO had the­r­e­fo­re refer­red to the FADP in Art. 9(2). In the cur­rent ver­si­on, Art. 9 FCO now refers to Art. 36 FADP for per­so­nal data and to Art. 57s RVOG in the like­wi­se amen­ded ver­si­on for data of legal per­sons. The FAC first had to cla­ri­fy whe­ther old or new law is applied.

The for­mer was the case:

  • In appeal pro­ce­e­dings, the lawful­ness of an admi­ni­stra­ti­ve act shall in prin­ci­ple be asses­sed in accordance with the law when it was issued, unless new law is more favorable to the appel­lant or the­re are com­pel­ling rea­sons for its imme­dia­te application.
  • Pur­su­ant to Art. 70 FADP, the new FADP does not app­ly to pen­ding appeals against first-instance decis­i­ons pri­or to its ent­ry into force.
  • Accor­ding to Art. 71 FADP, pro­vi­si­ons in other fede­ral decrees that rela­te to per­so­nal data con­ti­n­ue to app­ly to fede­ral bodies for five years after the new FADP comes into force, for data of legal per­sons. Howe­ver, this is not rele­vant in the case of the FADP becau­se it has alre­a­dy been adapt­ed with regard to data of legal persons.

The refe­rence norm of aArt. 9 para. 2 FCO was the­r­e­fo­re also appli­ca­ble. Accor­ding to this, offi­ci­al docu­ments con­tai­ning per­so­nal data must be anony­mi­zed if pos­si­ble, and if this is not pos­si­ble, the dis­clo­sure must be asses­sed in accordance with Art. 19 aDSG. Accor­ding to this “a com­pre­hen­si­ve balan­cing of inte­rests to strike a balan­ce bet­ween the public inte­rest in the dis­clo­sure of the infor­ma­ti­on sought and the con­flic­ting inte­rests, in par­ti­cu­lar that of pro­tec­ting the pri­va­cy or the data of the per­sons con­cer­ned.” (BGE 144 II 77). Artic­le 7 para. 2 of the Fede­ral Con­sti­tu­tio­nal Court regu­la­tes a simi­lar situa­ti­on. The FAC again lea­ves the rela­ti­on­ship bet­ween the two pro­vi­si­ons open:

Sin­ce both Art. 7 (2) FCO and Art. 19 (1bis) FADP pro­vi­de for a balan­cing of inte­rests, it is justi­fi­ed to weigh the oppo­sing public and pri­va­te inte­rests against each other wit­hout strict­ly deli­mi­ting the two provisions.

In the pre­sent case, the public inte­rest in access was to be given grea­ter weight, which is why the FAC dis­missed the appeal:

  • The right to data pro­tec­tion as well as eco­no­mic free­dom are ancho­red in the con­sti­tu­ti­on, unli­ke the prin­ci­ple of publi­ci­ty. Howe­ver, this is “not of decisi­ve importance”, and the prin­ci­ple of publi­ci­ty also con­tri­bu­tes to the rea­lizati­on of free­dom of information.
  • In the case of legal enti­ties, the need for pro­tec­tion of per­so­nal data is natu­ral­ly lower than in the case of natu­ral per­sons. Here, the inte­rest in pro­tec­tion is pri­ma­ri­ly safe­guard­ed by the pro­tec­tion of busi­ness secrets.
  • On the other hand, the need for infor­ma­ti­on regar­ding 5G tech­no­lo­gy is gre­at, becau­se sin­ce its intro­duc­tion it has rai­sed “que­sti­ons and fears among many peo­p­le”. With a “trans­pa­rent infor­ma­ti­on poli­cy”, the fears of the popu­la­ti­on could be coun­te­red and accep­tance pro­mo­ted, “which, inci­den­tal­ly, is also in the inte­rest of the complainants”.
  • As hol­ders of licen­ses, the pro­vi­ders have a legal rela­ti­on­ship with an aut­ho­ri­ty sub­ject to the Public Access Act, from which they deri­ve signi­fi­cant bene­fits, which also speaks in favor of access.

Howe­ver, the­se con­side­ra­ti­ons boil down to the fact that the media can gene­ra­te a public inte­rest them­sel­ves through their reporting.

AI-gene­ra­ted takea­ways can be wrong.