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ECJ i.S. Pankki S (Case C‑579/21): Infor­ma­ti­on about employees acce­s­sing data

The ECJ has ruled in the Judgment of June 22, 2023 in Rs. C‑579/21 The Admi­ni­stra­ti­ve Court of Eastern Fin­land dealt with the scope of the right to infor­ma­ti­on. A for­mer bank employee, who was also a cus­to­mer of the bank, had reque­sted infor­ma­ti­on about which employees of the bank had acce­s­sed his data after the end of the employment relationship.

Que­stionable at first was the Tem­po­ral appli­ca­bi­li­ty of the right to infor­ma­ti­onbecau­se it con­cer­ned data access in a peri­od befo­re the ent­ry into force of the GDPR. Accor­ding to the ECJ, howe­ver, it is decisi­ve that the request for infor­ma­ti­on was made after the ent­ry into force:

32 […] in the case of pro­ce­du­ral pro­vi­si­ons, it must gene­ral­ly be assu­med that they app­ly from the time of their ent­ry into force, whe­re­as sub­stan­ti­ve pro­vi­si­ons are gene­ral­ly inter­pre­ted in such a way that they only app­ly to legal posi­ti­ons that aro­se and were defi­ni­tively acqui­red befo­re their ent­ry into force if it is clear from their wor­ding, pur­po­se or struc­tu­re that such an effect is to be attri­bu­ted to them […].

35 It fol­lows […] that Art. 15(1) GDPR con­fers a pro­ce­du­ral right on data sub­jects to request infor­ma­ti­on about the pro­ce­s­sing of their per­so­nal data. As a pro­ce­du­ral pro­vi­si­on, this pro­vi­si­on shall app­ly to requests for infor­ma­ti­on made […] as of the date of appli­ca­ti­on of this Regu­la­ti­on..

In prin­ci­ple, infor­ma­ti­on about access to per­so­nal data is also personal:

45 The­r­e­fo­re, the broad defi­ni­ti­on of per­so­nal data covers not only the data coll­ec­ted and stored by the con­trol­ler, but also any infor­ma­ti­on rela­ting to an iden­ti­fi­ed or iden­ti­fia­ble indi­vi­du­al resul­ting from the pro­ce­s­sing of per­so­nal data (see in this sen­se judgment of 4 May 2023, Austri­an Data Pro­tec­tion Aut­ho­ri­ty and CRIF, C‑487/21, EU:C:2023:369, para. 26).

Fur­ther­mo­re, the­re is in prin­ci­ple a right to infor­ma­ti­on about the spe­ci­fic, indi­vi­du­al reci­pi­en­ts of per­so­nal data, as the ECJ sta­ted in the Judgment in the case of Öster­rei­chi­sche Post AG had deter­mi­ned. Sin­ce indi­vi­du­al Employees of the respon­si­ble par­ty but are not reci­pi­en­tsThis does not imply any entit­le­ment to be named.

Nevert­hel­ess Log data (logs) may con­sti­tu­te per­so­nal data. The ECJ refers to the fact that the­se data in the pre­sent case are lists of pro­ce­s­sing acti­vi­ties. This is dif­fi­cult to under­stand; the ECJ refers to state­ments made by the Advo­ca­te Gene­ral in his Opi­ni­on, but he did not say so. Howe­ver, the fol­lo­wing state­ment of the ECJ is correct:

Inso­far as the­se direc­to­ries of pro­ce­s­sing acti­vi­ties No infor­ma­ti­on about an iden­ti­fi­ed or iden­ti­fia­ble natu­ral per­son […], they only enable the con­trol­ler to ful­fill its obli­ga­ti­ons towards the super­vi­so­ry aut­ho­ri­ty reque­st­ing their provision.

This does not mean, howe­ver, that a cla­im to men­ti­on infor­ma­ti­on from pro­ce­s­sing lists is exclu­ded. It depends on two points:

  • First, a cla­im may be Docu­ment dis­clo­sure and not only of per­so­nal data, as far as the­se docu­ments are neces­sa­ry as con­text infor­ma­ti­on for the under­stan­ding of the per­so­nal data (ECJ i.S. CRIF (C‑487/21)).
  • Second­ly, the right to infor­ma­ti­on ser­ves to pro­vi­de the data sub­ject with the Veri­fi­ca­ti­on of lega­li­ty of the pro­ce­s­sing. This may include, as in the pre­sent case, veri­fy­ing that access by other employees was “actual­ly car­ri­ed out under the super­vi­si­on of the con­trol­ler and in accordance with his ins­truc­tions” (Art. 29 GDPR).

Howe­ver, this would result in the dis­clo­sure of per­so­nal data of the­se acce­s­sing employees. This does not exclude the right of access, but it is a Weig­hing of inte­rests and the infor­ma­ti­on is to be pro­vi­ded as gent­ly as possible.

The ECJ the­r­e­fo­re arri­ves at the fol­lo­wing answer:

[…] Infor­ma­ti­on, which con­cern queries of per­so­nal data of a per­son and which rela­te to the time and the pur­po­ses of the­se ope­ra­ti­ons, con­sti­tu­te infor­ma­ti­on that the said per­son is entit­led to request from the con­trol­ler under this pro­vi­si­on. In con­trast, this pro­vi­si­on does not pro­vi­de such right in rela­ti­on to infor­ma­ti­on about the iden­ti­ty of the employees of this con­trol­ler who have car­ri­ed out the­se ope­ra­ti­ons under his super­vi­si­on and in accordance with his ins­truc­tions, except when such infor­ma­ti­on is indis­pensable to enable the data sub­ject toto exer­cise effec­tively the rights con­fer­red upon it by this Regu­la­ti­on, and pro­vi­ded that the rights and free­doms of such employees are taken into account.

The ECJ fur­ther sta­tes – based on a cor­re­spon­ding que­sti­on for refe­rence – that the­se con­side­ra­ti­ons also app­ly to banks, at least as long as the natio­nal legis­la­tor has not pro­vi­ded for a rest­ric­tion of the right of access (accor­ding to Art. 23 GDPR).

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